



DISASTERS  
EMERGENCY  
COMMITTEE

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## TEARFUND EAST AFRICA CRISIS HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

### FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

November 2018

Report by Gigliola Pantera

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## Acronyms

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
CBI	Cash-Based Intervention
CC	Community Committees
CFW	Cash For Work
CTP	Cash Transfer Programming
CWG	Cash Working Group
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
EAC	East Africa Crisis
EGCDWO	Ethiopian Guenet Church Development and Welfare Organisation
EKHC-DC	Ethiopian Kale Heywet Church Development Commission
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HH	House Hold
HQ	Headquarter
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGA	Income Generating Activity
IPC	Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification
IR	Inception Report
LF	Logical Framework
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basket
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
PM	Project Manager
PNSP	Productive Safety Net Programme
SP	Service Provider
SSD	South Sudan
SSP	South Sudanese Pound
TF	Tearfund
TOR	Terms Of Reference
UN-OCHA	United Nations - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WCDO	World Concern Development Organization
WFP	World Food Programme

## List of Annexes

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Annex 2 – EAC Evaluation Matrix

Annex 3 – EAC Evaluation Plan Implemented

Annex 4 – Interview Guide Beneficiaries

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In the picture above, Focus Group Discussion with the Community Committee in Waridaad (Somaliland). In the front page, a beneficiary of the agricultural inputs in Manyel (South Sudan) explaining the farming practices just learned.

## Acknowledgments

I wish to thank ACROSS, CEDS, EGCDWO, EKHC-DC and WCDO teams for the efforts done in managing the field work and for their patient and valuable participation to the exercise. Many thanks to Local Authorities, Community Representatives and Community Members consulted for having promptly dedicated their time to the exercise. Thanks to Tearfund in-country teams and East and Central Africa Team for their counselling and support, as well as to Lauren Kejeh and Marina Kobzeva for joining the evaluation and making the field work smooth and pleasant. Many thanks to Beth Mather and to the Project Managers for their precious contribution to the discussion of the findings and to the accomplishment of this report.

## Section 1 - Executive Summary

The evaluation assessed Tearfund's Phase 2 DEC response in East Africa, and was aimed at: "*Assessing the relevance, efficiency and impact of Tearfund Phase 2 response to providing lifesaving support to drought affected communities in East Africa*". The assessment concerned 6 projects implemented by 5 partners, for a total allocated amount of £2,852,013. The evaluation methodology applies OECD-DAC and ALNAP guidelines and standards for the evaluation of humanitarian action, while also assessing compliance with Tearfund Quality Standards (QS). Limitations were mostly due to challenges in the organization of the field work, especially faced in Ethiopia.

The Cash-Based Intervention (CBI) was found to be **relevant** to address immediate basic needs, such as food and water, and flexible to address other unpredicted needs, as largely confirmed by the people consulted in the three countries (South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somaliland) covered by the evaluation. Participation of local authorities and communities was high during the project's implementation and monitoring, while the design of the response was developed by the project staff based on the need assessment results. Community-managed targeting, an approach that involves the local leaders in the selection of the beneficiaries, was found to be relevant to ensure understanding of the vulnerabilities perceived by community members and, most importantly, acceptance of the selection results. On the other hand, community-managed targeting cannot fully prevent from bias, unless projects perform a consistent vulnerability scoring of potential beneficiaries while strengthening community understanding and application of targeting criteria, to reduce the likelihood of the exclusion/inclusion errors found during the evaluation. In some cases, the identification of the beneficiaries is further challenged by the lack of ID cards, as observed among IDPs and pastoralists in South Sudan and Somaliland; the partners addressed the registration challenges working with local Service Providers to issue cards or perform biometric registration. Partners developed accurate strategies to ensure information about the beneficiaries and access to feedback communication, in compliance with Tearfund QSs. However, direct communication from the most marginalized people and project management need to be strengthened by coping with illiteracy and social patterns of exclusion. Projects mainstream gender equality, and women are largely represented among beneficiaries (about 50%) and community-based committees, which is likely to have a positive impact on their empowerment. However, women awareness of the project process was lower compared to men, and inadequate for some of the groups consulted (e.g. in Dillo and Koran Mula). Relevance to address women protection and deeper causes of vulnerability was limited, and projects missed an opportunity to reinforce existing resilience strategies developed by women groups. Gender equality among partners' staff was overall challenged by local social patterns of marginalization hampering women recruitment and long-term availability of female staff.

The consultation with the beneficiaries and the HH visits overall confirmed the achievements reported by the partners, accounting for projects' **effectiveness**. The cash transfer amount was consistently set according to the Cash Working Group recommendations, based on the local assessment of MEB (Minimum Expenditure Basket). The amount was tailored either to the individuals or the HH, the latter strategy resulting less effective due to challenges in the definition of the HH size. On the other hand, the cash distribution duration mostly depended on the availability of funds rather than on an accurate context analysis. Cash distributions were performed in collaboration with local SPs following alternative modalities, however the mobile cash transfer was found to be the most effective to limit delays and ensure security. Delays in the implementation affected the delivery of the assistance during the lean season and jeopardized the consistency of cash monthly distributions, generating uncertainty and hindering the possibility for beneficiaries to plan how to use the funds and any related investment. Nonetheless, cash distribution was found to be effective in meeting and exceeding basic needs during the projects' duration, although access to dietary diversity was challenged by the poor availability of livestock products. Livelihood support was effective in scaling up

technical skills and resources; the implementation of logistic procedures, which caused delays while not preventing from inadequate quality of items distributed, suggest that a cash for livelihood approach would be more effective. Conditional cash could also be adopted for WASH items to better fit with people needs. Practice of hygiene messages needs to be improved by promoting the inclusion of non-beneficiaries. Project monitoring is overall consistent, nonetheless tools could be further developed to ensure that evidence-based information is reported.

Partners were overall **efficient** in the implementation and reporting of the projects. The consistent use of a Gantt chart was nevertheless deemed necessary for planning and reporting. The limited familiarity of some of the partners with CTP implementation resulted in significant delays, also due to TF's late management of grants and procurements. The cash response VFM is confirmed by high rates directly transferred to the beneficiaries compared to other approaches. Beneficiaries also took advantage of the favourable exchange rates. The collaboration with the SPs was crucial to the implementation of cash distributions, and costs are fully justified by security and logistic advantages.

The intervention had an overall positive **impact** on the objective of saving lives as confirmed with the improvement of indicators such as the Food Consumption Score and Livelihood Coping Strategy Index. Consistency of impact assessment is nevertheless limited by the lack of adequate monitoring based on the impact indicators, which have been developed and accurately measured only by one partner (WCDO). Positive impact on child nutrition and health was confirmed during the FGDs, though not supported by evidence-based data, which partners need to collect from health and nutrition governmental and humanitarian actors. CTP was not affecting local market prices according to the beneficiary feedback, while market price monitoring data are missing. The intervention had limited expectations of a significant positive impact on community resilience given its design of being an emergency response, while the likelihood of dependency on cash assistance was found to be high. Women's participation to the projects had a positive impact on their empowerment, though limited by the context features and lacking strategies to strength self-help mechanisms. Impact on partners' knowledge was found to be positive, due to QS trainings and the use of Kobo for screenings, while improved practices need to be further strengthened.

Partners largely **coordinated** their intervention with local authorities and humanitarian actors to design the response and target beneficiaries, though discrepancy of CTP and overlapping were not fully addressed. Bilateral field coordination and data sharing can be further strengthened.

In **conclusion**, the evaluated EAC response was found to be thematically relevant, as well as relevant to the context and effective in addressing the urgent food security need and other basic needs that emerged after the recurrent droughts and escalation occurred in 2016. Nonetheless, the emergency response had a limited impact on strengthening people resilience and reducing risks of future similar disasters.

## Section 2 - Background information

While East African countries still struggle to recover from the 2015/2016 El Niño-induced drought, below-average 2016 autumn rains have led to a new drought in lowland pastoralist areas, resulting in large-scale loss of livelihood assets and displacement and increasing food insecurity. Limited water source replenishment and poor pasture for livestock strongly reduce access to milk and meat, increasing dependency from imported food because of crop losses at harvesting. The volatile political situation in South Sudan and Somalia also results in a protracted negative impact on the whole region, exposing people to insecurity and preventing them from cultivating land.

Concurrently with the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs declaration of the East African food crisis (March 2017), the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) - followed by Tearfund (TF) - launched a successful fundraising appeal. According to humanitarian needs, Tearfund identified four countries (South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somaliland) affected by drought where to implement the programme through its network of longstanding partners.

The 1st phase of this humanitarian response for the targeted countries was promptly deployed in March 2017 by TF and partners and lasted up to September 2017, followed by a second phase that ended in September 2018. Both phases of this broad operation aim at responding to food insecurity, by increasing access to food, water and basic needs through cash, food distribution, WASH intervention, and livelihood support.

### 2.1 Projects' Status at the beginning of the evaluation exercise

The focus of this evaluation is on Phase 2 response, from October 2017 to September 2018, assessing 6 projects implemented in South Sudan (SSD), Ethiopia and Somaliland by Tearfund and partners, as detailed in table 1 below.

Country	Project location	Implementing partner	Sector	Project title	Project duration	Total budget allocated (GBP)
Ethiopia	Dillo District	EKHC-DC	Unconditional Cash Transfer	Dillo Emergency Response Cash Transfer Project	4 months	670,500
Ethiopia	Koran Mula District	EGCDWO	Unconditional Cash Transfer	Koran Mula Emergency Cash Transfer project	4 months	323,000
Somaliland	Sool and Sanaag region	WCDO	Unconditional Cash Transfer and WASH	CORDS	6 months	533,700
Somaliland	Sool and Sanaag region	WCDO	Unconditional Cash Transfer and WASH	CORDS II	4 months	323,000

South Sudan	Juba	ACROSS	Unconditional Cash Transfer	Emergency Relief Support to Mahad and Don Bosco IDPs	4 months plus 3 months cost extension	463,700
South Sudan	Aweil East	CEDS	Unconditional Cash Transfer, CFW and Livelihood support	Emergency FSL and WASH for vulnerable HHs in Aweil East	8 months	538,100

Table 1 – List of assessed projects

During the evaluation, all projects were completed except for the *Koran Mula Emergency Cash Transfer* project (Ethiopia), whose last cash distribution was planned for the last week of October, and the *Emergency Relief Support to Mahad and Don Bosco IDPs* (SSD), which delayed the last cash distribution to mid-October, after the evaluation end date. Tearfund participated with its in-country staff to the operation in SSD and Ethiopia, in collaboration with the partners, while in Somaliland the agency is funding the World Concern Development Organization (WCDO) and acts as a donor in the framework of a long-term partnership.

## 2.2 Scope and purpose of the evaluation

As stated in the evaluation TOR, the goal of the exercise is to: “*Assess the relevance, efficiency and impact of Tearfund Phase 2 response to providing lifesaving support to drought affected communities in East Africa*”

The key objectives are:

- Determine the relevance of Tearfund interventions in meeting the needs of those most affected
- Determine the effectiveness and efficiency of Tearfund response in providing lifesaving assistance to drought affected communities
- Determine the impact of responding through local partners in terms of developing their own response capacity
- Assess the Quality Standards of the interventions with a focus on Impartiality and Targeting, Accountability and Gender

Besides pursuing the above key objectives, the evaluation aimed at drawing learning for TF and partners, by promoting the real-time discussion of field assessment results and, during the debriefing held with each of the partners, gathering their feedback on the preliminary findings.

## Section 3 – Methodology

The evaluation methodology applies OECD-DAC and ALNAP guidelines<sup>1</sup> and standards for the evaluation of humanitarian action, while also assessing compliance with Tearfund Quality Standards (QS). The DAC criteria adopted for this evaluation are Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact and Coordination, combined with TF QSs of Accountability, Impartiality, Targeting and Gender, which have been considered as part of the Relevance. The exercise adopted a qualitative approach, using a mixed methodology of direct observation,

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<sup>1</sup> Evaluating Humanitarian Action using the OECD-DAC Criteria, ALNAP/ODI 2006 - E.g. Hallam, A. and Bonino, F. Using Evaluation for a Change: Insights from Humanitarian Practitioners. ALNAP Study. ALNAP/ODI 2013

consultation with the project staff, semi-structured interviews and consultations with the beneficiaries, local authorities, community leaders and other relevant stakeholders, such as Service Providers (SP).

The exercise started with a desk review of the relevant documentation shared by TF and partners and was developed in accordance with the exercise methodology, as detailed in the Inception Report (annex 1). Despite the very tight schedule of the field mission, the activities have been largely implemented as foreseen at the inception stage, with the necessary adjustments to cope with the limited time available for field visits, as detailed in annex 3 (implemented field work plan). Some of the project sites identified in the tentative work plan were replaced with more accessible sites, after discussion with the in-country staff.

In addition to the documents making up the IR, the consultant drafted the interview guides (beneficiaries and stakeholders), which were validated after being tested during the first consultations in Juba (see annexes 4 and 5). The guide reflects the research questions detailed in the Evaluation Matrix and the preliminary field feedback. The qualitative approach was, however, preserved by encouraging an open discussion to promote the collection of comprehensive information from the beneficiaries.

### **Accuracy of reported results**

The activities conducted, along with the number of beneficiaries met and stakeholders consulted, are detailed in annex 3. The list of consulted persons is also annexed to this report (annex 6).

The preliminary findings have been discussed with each partner at the end of the field assessment during on-field debriefing, and feedback has been incorporated in this report, gathering consensus on the findings reported herein. Main recommendations have also been discussed and ultimately developed as the result of the debriefing discussion.

The overall performance against the DAC criteria has been rated 1 to 4 using the scale in table 2 below, as recommended in the evaluation TOR.

0	1	2	3	4
Low or no visible contribution to this criterion	Some evidence of contribution to this criterion but significant improvement required	Evidence of satisfactory contribution to this criterion but requirement for continued improvement	Evidence of good contribution to this criteria but with some areas for improvement remaining	Evidence that the contribution is strong and/or exceeding that which was expected of the intervention

**Table 2 – DAC rating definition**

### **Evaluation team**

The evaluation was conducted by Gigliola Pantera, independent consultant and evaluation leader, assisted by Ms. Marina Kobzeva, TF Quality Standards Specialist, during the assessment in South Sudan, and by Ms. Lauren Kejeh, TF Humanitarian Impact and Learning Officer, during the field work in Ethiopia and Somaliland. Tearfund designed a RACI chart detailing roles and responsibilities of the evaluation team members prior to the field assessment. The team was supported by four independent translators appointed by the local partners.

### **3.1 Limitations and restrictions**

- The consultations with the humanitarian stakeholders (specifically with the cash working group lead/members) was ultimately not performed in any of the three countries visited, due to challenges faced by TF and partners in scheduling the meetings with the concerned NGOs/UNOCHA, thus limiting the assessment of coordination (see also section 6.5).
- Tearfund relevant staff in Ethiopia (Programme Manager, Country Director) were not available for briefing and/or debriefing, thus hampering a comprehensive discussion of the preliminary findings before reporting. Briefings and participated debriefings were nevertheless held with the two partners (EKHC and EGCDWO).
- Challenges of field work management in Ethiopia. The decision to assess projects in both Dillo<sup>2</sup> and Koran Mula resulted in spending the largest amount of time to move from one location to the other. In Dillo, the communities' participation in the consultations was limited due to the time elapsed since the project end (June 2018) and the lack of information on the evaluation plan. A small number of beneficiaries attended the FGDs, while the District task force was not available for consultation. The visit to randomly selected HHs was not feasible due to time constraints and unavailability of the beneficiaries.
- Weekly catch-ups between the evaluation field team and UK HQ were not scheduled due to the mission's tight schedule and the erratic internet connection.
- The large amount of information gathered during the field assessment cannot be altogether reported herein, nonetheless more details were discussed on real time during field work and debriefings.

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<sup>2</sup> Details of the places visited and activities performed can be found in annex 3

## Section 6 – Key findings

### 6.1 RELEVANCE

Rating<sup>3</sup> (0: low, 4: high): 3

**Summarized findings:** The Cash-Based Intervention (CBI) was found to be relevant to address immediate basic needs, such as food and water, and flexible to address other unpredicted needs, as largely confirmed by the people consulted in the three countries (South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somaliland) covered by the evaluation. Participation of local authorities and communities was high during the project's implementation and monitoring, while the design of the response was developed by the project staff based on the needs assessment results. Community-managed targeting, an approach that involves the local leaders in the selection of the beneficiaries, was found to be relevant to ensure understanding of the vulnerabilities perceived by community members and acceptance of the selection results. On the other hand, community-managed targeting cannot fully prevent from bias unless projects perform a consistent vulnerability scoring of potential beneficiaries, while strengthening community understanding and application of targeting criteria so as to reduce the likelihood of the exclusion/inclusion errors found during the evaluation. In some cases, the identification of the beneficiaries is further challenged by the lack of ID cards, as observed among IDPs and pastoralists in South Sudan and Somaliland; the partners addressed the registration challenges working with local Service Providers to issue cards or perform biometric registration. Partners developed accurate strategies to ensure information about the beneficiaries and access to feedback communication, in compliance with Tearfund QSSs; however, direct communication from the most marginalized people and project management need to be strengthened by coping with illiteracy and social patterns of exclusion. Projects mainstream gender equality, and women are largely represented among beneficiaries (about 50%) and community-based committees, which is likely to have a positive impact on their empowerment. However, women awareness of the project process was lower compared to men, and inadequate for some of the groups consulted (e.g. in Dillo and Koran Mula). Relevance to address women protection and deeper causes of vulnerability was limited, and projects missed an opportunity to reinforce the existing resilience strategies developed by women groups. Gender equality among partners' staff was overall challenged by local social patterns of marginalization, hampering women recruitment and long-term availability of female staff.

#### 6.1.1 Relevance of the CBI to the people needs

The Cash-Based Intervention was largely acknowledged by consulted communities and leaders as relevant to address food insecurity and cover the basic needs of the targeted beneficiaries during the project's duration, as food and basic items were available in local markets. The Cash Transfer Programming (CTP) was welcomed by everybody, particularly because of the flexibility in the use of cash, thus enabling beneficiaries to cover the different needs identified by each of them.

Tearfund partners gathered need assessment data by combining the consultations with local administration and communities (see section 6.1.2) with discussion with the Humanitarian Community and Clusters as well as interviews of the potential beneficiaries. Partners in South Sudan and Ethiopia performed needs assessment along with a baseline survey. WCDO developed the baseline survey only, assessing the needs and, meanwhile, building a database to be compared with the project end line evaluation data (see section 6.4).

Relevance to address food insecurity during the project was found to be high, as most respondents were using the cash to buy food and water, which were identified as priorities during the consultations. The

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<sup>3</sup> See table 2 above for rating definition

unconditional/conditional cash distributed was found to be adequate to purchase food and water for about one month as forecasted by the six projects at design stage, to address immediate food security needs during the lean season. In some cases (SSD and Ethiopia), the effectiveness of the cash distribution to cover the lean season was affected by a significant delay in the implementation (see section 6.3.1); however, the intervention should still be considered relevant even when conducted during the rainy season, as the massive loss of livestock has so far hampered any recovery for the affected population. The use of unconditional cash was generally found to be appropriate due to the high vulnerability of the assisted population, whose resources were depleted during the recurrent droughts faced over the last years, thus challenging compliance with the target requirements for a conditional cash distribution.

The *Emergency FSL and WASH for vulnerable HHs* project implemented in Aweil East (SSD) is a good example of cash-based assistance tailored to the different vulnerabilities; it distributes unconditional cash to those unable to work, while other vulnerable persons receive conditional cash as a remuneration (CFW) for working in the rehabilitation of public infrastructures, such as feeder roads and dikes. This strategy scaled up relevance, by implementing the rehabilitation of the community assets selected on the basis of their own community development plans, increasing access to market/hospital and environmental protection.

A different case is the *Emergency Relief Support to Mahad and Don Bosco IDPs* project (SSD), where relevance to food security needs was found to be limited. Most of respondents in both IDP camps use cash for purposes other than the basic food needs targeted by the emergency response, such as health care, school fee payment, travel expenses for family reunification, clothing, and payment of debts. Beneficiaries consulted during the evaluation did not mention purchasing food or access to a diversified ration as a priority. Investments in basic NFIs were also not observed during HH visits. An important element of food security is the consistency of the WFP monthly food distribution to the two IDP camps - lasting since 2013 -, which is likely to increase the food availability in the area as rations are regularly sold on the local market. Although the project targeted people that were not registered by WFP, access to food was found to be improved for all the HHs in the camps because of community solidarity mechanisms; in Don Bosco camp the church delivered food assistance to non-registered HHs. The case of IDPs confirms the relevance of the CTP approach, which proves to be a flexible assistance approach, likely to address people's priority needs even if changes are significant compared to the needs assessed at proposal stage. However, the needs assessment performed by ACROSS failed to further investigate existing mechanisms that are relevant to determine access to food.

The CTP was also found to be overall appropriate in Dillo and Koran Mula (Ethiopia), where respondents confirmed to be able to cover the different needs identified by the beneficiaries themselves. Relevance to address food insecurity during the projects was high here, as most respondents were using the cash to buy food or to cover other major needs due to the emergency.

The CTP was therefore relevant to address urgent food needs throughout the three countries assessed, given its rationale of being an emergency response. Additional needs were nonetheless identified by the respondents, such as livestock restocking, increased availability of water and access to basic services (e.g. health care and schools). The communities in Somaliland expressed the need for an improved access to water through the rehabilitation of *berkards*<sup>4</sup>, which are likely to provide multipurpose water to be also used for livestock. Feedback from the field confirm these needs such as to justify and require the development of a continuous strategy to link the communities to recovery interventions.

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<sup>4</sup> Rainwater is traditionally collected and stored in natural tanks dug into the ground and protected by roofs.

### 6.1.2 Community participation, targeting and accountability

The programme is marked by a close proximity to communities and local authorities, which demonstrated a good knowledge of project activities in all the three countries visited. Overall, targeted communities have a long-term experience of collaboration with humanitarian and governmental stakeholders providing support to displaced people and host communities hit by an increased pressure on the limited local resources.

Local authorities played a key role in the identification of the places to assist e.g. in Ethiopia, where partners conducted the needs assessment in collaboration with the Governmental Task Force at Zonal and District level, according to the drought-related vulnerability of the population along with the coverage by other NGOs. High commitment of governmental actors in leading the clusters and orienting the humanitarian response was also found in Aweil East (Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, SSD). **Community Committees** deal with the humanitarian actors with similar schemes in the countries assessed. In Ethiopia, these committees have been previously set up by the government implementing the Productive Safety Net Programme<sup>5</sup> (PSNP). Similarly, in SSD, the Community Development Committees of local authorities work in coordination with IDP leaders to identify the most vulnerable community members. In Somaliland, Community Committees, which are composed of IDPs and host community representatives, also existed before the project; therefore, said committees were appointed as the main actors of vulnerability targeting in accordance with the strategy adopted by other humanitarian actors operating in the same places. Committees are usually composed of IDPs and host community representatives, counting 10 to 14 members and including community leaders and community members. Women's representation within the committees is limited to the women's leader in SSD and Ethiopia, while in Somaliland there is no women participation in these boards.

Community leaders and committee members consulted had full information about the schedule of the distribution, cash amount, items distributed and project duration, while understanding among beneficiaries reached different extents, e.g. in Somaliland information proved to be accessible and well-understood by all the groups consulted, both women and men, leaders and beneficiaries, while in Ethiopia women and, in general, the beneficiaries were lacking basic information on the project duration and targeting strategies; the same applies to the IDP camps in SSD. The groups consulted in Aweil (CEDS) demonstrated to be fully aware of the assistance process.

Feedback from stakeholders largely confirmed partners' **consultations with the communities** during the implementation, however the nature of the assistance was decided at programme level and *only then* beneficiaries were informed, so that their participation in the project design was limited to choosing the type of assistance they wished to receive. Understanding of the accountability was found to be extremely restricted in SSD IDP camps, where consulted leaders stated that, since the people receive assistance for free, they cannot decide about the kind of support.

#### Community-managed targeting

Applying a community-managed approach, targeting was done by the communities themselves, along with local authorities. They selected the individuals who would receive the cash, developing the beneficiary list. Targeting criteria were developed by the project and then communicated to the communities, which acted as decision-makers in the selection of beneficiaries. It should be stressed that a more efficient procedure would consist in a participative process for the identification of vulnerability indicators, then undertaking *independent decision-making* for the selection of cash transfer beneficiaries.

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<sup>5</sup> Established in 2005, PSNP is aimed at enabling the rural poor facing chronic food insecurity to resist shocks, create assets and become food self-sufficient. PSNP provides multi-annual predictable transfers, as food, cash or a combination of both.

The people interviewed were overall aware - though to different extents in the three countries - of the targeting process, whilst a comprehensive knowledge of the vulnerability criteria was lacking for most communities consulted. The committee members were largely applying their own perception of vulnerability and poverty rather than the detailed criteria developed at the projects proposal stage, such as the presence of malnourished persons, women/elder/children heads of household (HoH), number of meals per day, etc. In Aweil (CEDS) consulted communities showed a good understanding of the different vulnerabilities which lead to the selection between unconditional/conditional cash or livelihood assistance. Basic targeting criteria, as a huge number of family members and loss of livestock, were also understood among people consulted in Somaliland, where WCDO efforts have been effective in making women aware of the process despite the challenges due to the social context. Feedback from the communities met in Ethiopia (both in Dillo and Koran Mula Districts) showed conversely inadequate understanding of the criteria (as well as of project duration) especially among women that believed they had been selected by chance. Poverty was mentioned as the unique criteria for the selection by IDPs in Juba. Selection criteria were not properly understood, but consistently accepted by beneficiaries (and non-beneficiaries) because of the community-managed targeting, as leaders can leverage people and mitigate complaints. The lack of an evidence-based selection strategy through scoring (see below) was probably crucial in hindering the understanding of targeting criteria and their application.

The **different awareness** seems to be due to strong local leaderships hampering the direct communication between the project field staff and the beneficiaries, as well as to different capacities to address the social patterns of exclusion and marginalization (e.g. women groups staying aside during FGDs) at the sensitization meetings and the quality of implementation.

In Ethiopia (EGCDWO), the activities foreseen under outcome 2, which were aimed at *ensuring participation and accountability to affected population* (and including the development of feedback communication), were implemented after the screening of beneficiaries and the validation of the lists for cash distribution had already been done, thus hampering people participation in the key steps of the selection process.

To monitor the **selection results**, partners' community mobilizers visited 15 to 20% of beneficiaries, randomly selected from the lists received, while the people who were not in the lists were generally not screened. Most of the people registered by the leaders as vulnerable were acknowledged by the partners' vulnerability assessment, and lists of potential beneficiaries were regularly adopted for cash distributions. However, the recording of data related to the HH vulnerability assessment was not consistently performed by the partners, thus challenging the retrospective evaluation of targeting results. Project beneficiary databases give limited details on vulnerability (only one criterion is recorded, except for CEDS database which is more detailed) and inconsistency was found in the application of the criteria (e.g. elderly aged 50 to 55 years, lactating women without specifying if they are HoH, lactating men and other incongruities). The projects lack a scoring system allowing ranking vulnerability on the basis of evidence, and clearly explaining why or why not the assistance is delivered.

Community-managed targeting was also the approach used to identify the infrastructures needing rehabilitation (**CFW**); identification was jointly done with the concerned ministries, which were also responsible for monitoring the works. Assets were acknowledged as relevant to the needs of the population consulted (e.g. road to hospital/market).

### Likelihood of exclusion/inclusion errors

Likelihood of exclusion was found, as the vulnerability assessment ultimately concerned the HHs identified by the leaders. The screening should cover, instead, a broader sample of affected population, so as to ensure the inclusion of the most marginalized households in the beneficiary lists.

The community-managed targeting was found not to be fully compliant with Tearfund's Quality Standards (QS), which strongly advocate for accountable targeting of the most marginalized and poor people. The decision taken at community level is not preventing from the selection of people with more power in the community, while targeting strategy is not really ensuring the inclusion of the most vulnerable because the decisions are taken by the leaders and there is no scoring system to show how the targeting of the most vulnerable was done.

The HH random visits in Somaliland confirmed the challenges of this approach. Out of 7 randomly selected beneficiaries, at least 2 were not matching the targeting criteria (Wirir: community leader working as teacher, Waridad: women's leader running a shop).

The case of the IDP camps in South Sudan is an example of challenging application of the targeting criteria. The project implemented by ACROSS targets HHs that are not registered by WFP for the monthly ration, though receiving the food from Don Bosco foundation. According to the FGDs with women in Mahad IDP camp, several beneficiaries of the cash programme were included in the WFP intervention. In addition, existing supportive mechanisms among displaced people facilitate the access to food for most HHs, which were found to be less exposed to food insecurity compared to other contexts where food assistance is not provided.

Despite the overall close proximity to communities, there is considerable room to enhance the accountability of this targeting strategy, such as the initial registration of a much larger universe of potential beneficiaries or a more detailed definition of some targeting criteria

### **Identification of the beneficiaries**

In South Sudan and Somaliland, the lack of official **identification documents**, which is often faced in case of IDPs and pastoralists, needed to be addressed by the partners. The beneficiary identification, which was part of community-managed targeting, used people governmental ID cards, whether existing or issued by the Service Provider (SP) during the registration process. The challenge of an accountable identification of selected beneficiaries, who often lack an ID card when they live in the outreach area, was differently addressed in the three countries according to the strategies adopted by the SPs that were implementing the cash distribution on behalf of the humanitarian actors (see also section 6.3.3).

Discussion with CEDS and TF in Aweil highlighted the challenge of identification since the same names are used by several community members. This problem was partially addressed registering all three names and involving community leaders and *Bomas'* authorities to account for beneficiary identity and mitigate any conflict. The identification was further challenged as the most vulnerable people struggled to reach the distribution points and were replaced by their family members.

Unlike other SPs using ID cards, the Alpha Bank operating in South Sudan registers the beneficiaries identified by the partners in a biometric database for CTP. The cost of the biometric registration service - 0.5 USD/beneficiary - seems well worth the investment as the system is likely to speed up the process while reducing the sources of errors. However, this strategy cannot address any hindrance to attending cash distribution (e.g. disability, sickness or any other impediment faced by the registered beneficiary). As reported by the IDP community in Don Bosco, 21 HHs could not receive cash during the distributions due to problems in identification using biometric profiling. The registration of an alternative HH member, which had already been discussed between Alpha Bank and the partners (ACROSS and CEDS), was not yet implemented due to duplication of costs and time to be invested in the process.

## **Accountability and feedback communication**

Partners were found to be accountable to consulted communities, which overall expressed satisfaction for the quality of the implementation. Project's design generally complies with TF recommendations and an accountability plan is developed by the partners as part of the project proposal, following the QS training delivered by TF.

The use of signboards to inform people was consistent during the field assessment for WCDO (Somaliland) and CEDS in Aweil (SSD), whereas it was not confirmed during the assessment in Ethiopia. The suggestion boxes were available during cash distribution according to project reporting and photographic documentation; however, their use was not mentioned by any beneficiary during consultations. Illiteracy and the fact that suggestion boxes were available only during the distributions limited the use of the suggestion boxes.

In Ethiopia, Community Complaint Committees were available during cash distribution to gather any feedback. In Goraye and Cirrattee, the community was not aware of the committee, while in Dillo Magaala there was evidence that the complaint committee was known to the beneficiaries and was working. However, complaint committees seemed not to be appropriate to deal with exclusion as they were involved in the development of the beneficiary lists. In the other localities, the feedback was only provided during distribution by the project staff or through community leaders. Although this was the overall acknowledged feedback communication mechanism, it does not allow the most vulnerable populations to provide feedback to the organization's staff that are not associated with the implementation.

Partners used toll-free telephone numbers, and although the use of the numbers was usually well understood by community leaders, evidence of awareness among the beneficiaries was only found in Somaliland. Calls are addressed to the project's coordination staff, however, the availability of the managers to deal with beneficiaries is obviously limited and projects need to identify a person in charge within the M&E department to facilitate an effective communication.

During the evaluation, however, a few complaints were shared spontaneously by non-beneficiaries participating to the FGDs. Overall, the acceptance of the decisions taken by the leaders was high notwithstanding the fact that cash assistance targeting is likely to raise tensions within communities. Some tensions were nevertheless reported in South Sudanese IDP camps assisted by ACROSS, as reported by leaders and project staff. To mitigate risks for the recipients of cash distribution, the project staff and community leaders confidentially managed the details of the assistance (beneficiary lists, cash amount, calendar of the distributions). Lack of information is likely to affect the accountability to the community and non-beneficiaries, while reducing the probability to identify any bias. In addition, feedback comments/complaints were only collected from the beneficiaries as a strategy, due to the high number of requests of assistance coming from non-beneficiaries.

Registers recording complaints and reporting how they had been addressed were not consulted during the evaluation as information is archived in hard copies.

The feedback complaint mechanisms, though existing, need to be strengthened to be effective. The most marginalized members of the community should have access to communication tools enabling direct feedback to project staff not involved in the project implementation. Illiteracy hinders the access to information on signboards and the use of suggestion boxes, while the toll-free telephone numbers shared by WCDO in Somaliland are likely to be used. However, social patterns are likely to restrain people from speaking and there is the need to create opportunities for open communication with the most vulnerable groups during project monitoring and besides the distribution days.

### 6.1.3 Gender equality

Gender equality is mainstreamed in projects' design and implementation. Partners advocate for women participation in existing Community Committees, however the selection of members depends on the decision of the local community, e.g. in Somaliland there is no women representation in the CC. On the other hand, women are largely represented in the committees set up by the projects: 3 out of the 5 members of the Complaint Committees and 50% of WUC (Water User Committee) in Somaliland, where women play a relevant role in spreading the hygiene messages to other women of the community. During the discussion with WCDO staff we learned that being admitted as a committee member is considered a great achievement, as women are normally not allowed to speak in Somaliland rural communities.

Furthermore, most of the beneficiaries are women (over 50% on average), which increases their access to cash and will probably increase their participation in decision-making in the HH, to different extents depending on the context and interference of men.

Women participated in the assessed projects to different extents, showing a different understanding of the process as discussed in session 6.1.2 above. Projects' challenges in delivering programme information and ensuring feedback mechanisms reflect **women awareness and participation**, as observed in Dillo and Koran Mula (Ethiopia) where women said that they were not realising they should receive cash on a monthly basis, as well as in SSD IDP camps, where e.g. women beneficiaries largely believed that the selection was haphazard. In Somaliland, WCDO made efforts to cope with local social patterns of women exclusion, promoting women participation in awareness sessions and ensuring that messages reach the women's groups. As confirmed during the evaluation, discussion and delivering of messages are more effective when working with all-female groups, whilst the presence of men or community leaders prevents women from speaking out and participating. Women's groups are uncommon across the three countries, whilst they need to be promoted by the projects as a tool to pursue women's empowerment.

Woman-Head-of-Household (**WHoH**) is largely used as a vulnerability indicator, though this is not evident in the complex Muslim society model, where more than one woman may depend on the same man. In SSD, the condition of conflict-related widowhood is a complex protection issue as women are considered the property of their husband family and they are usually handed over to one of her husband's brothers, who usually takes limited care of the widow and her children and is likely to interfere with the use of the distributed cash. Existing community-based mechanisms and local authorities' protection barely prevent from abuses; there is therefore a need for the development of links with groups external to the household, e.g. promoting the association among women and access to health and psychosocial support.

#### 6.1.3.1 Women's empowerment

Despite gender equality being mainstreamed and women targeted, there is still room for improving the projects' strategy to achieve greater women empowerment. The short-term duration of the projects prevented from setting up women's groups or strengthening existing solidarity mechanisms. In SSD, the evaluation observed women saving cash in groups through an arrangement called Sonduk, with the allocation of credit among the members according to a fixed schedule, so as to enable investments in small scale business or to cover HH's extra needs. The participation in Sonduk spontaneously increased during the project, due to the increased availability of cash, however partners lacked a strategy to strengthen the community-based management of savings as a way forward to scale up resilience and women capacity to cope with unpredicted needs. Similar strategies should conversely be consistent during the implementation of CTP.

Gender equality and women's empowerment should be primarily promoted within the organizations' staff. Women representation in the partners' teams met during the evaluation was limited to the WCDO Health and Nutrition Officer, while women were not part of the permanent staff teams met from ACROSS, CEDS, EKHC and EGCDWO. The evaluation mainly worked with partners' boards and permanent staff. However, there are records of women employed as project field staff, but their contracts had ended when the projects had finished so they were not available to participate in the evaluation. The local social patterns of marginalization challenge the availability of qualified female staff and their ability to cover long-term positions. Women staff covering key positions is conversely crucial to increase an in-depth understanding of gender issues and to develop empowering strategies while enhancing communication with the assisted population. In addition, mixed teams are likely to promote major changes in male team members' understanding of gender equality, along with women access to relevant roles. In the long term, a similar strategy could have a positive impact on women's empowerment as they will be able to influence humanitarian policies and trigger a behavioural change within the organizations, which is likely to ultimately have an impact on the local society.

## 6.2 EFFECTIVENESS

**Rating (0: low, 4: high): 3**

**Summarized findings:** *The consultation with the beneficiaries and the HH visits overall confirmed the achievements reported by the partners. The cash transfer amount was consistently set according to the Cash Working Group recommendations, based on the local assessment of MEB (Minimum Expenditure Basket). The amount was tailored either to the individuals or the HH, the latter strategy resulting less effective due to challenges in the definition of the HH size. On the other hand, the cash distribution duration mostly depended on the availability of funds rather than on an accurate context analysis. Cash distributions were performed in collaboration with local SPs following alternative modalities, however the mobile cash transfer was found to be the most effective to limit delays and ensure security. Delays in the implementation affected the delivery of the assistance during the lean season and jeopardized the consistency of cash monthly distributions, generating uncertainty and hindering the possibility for beneficiaries to plan how to use the funds and any related investment. Nonetheless, cash distribution was found to be effective in meeting and exceeding basic needs during the projects' duration, although access to dietary diversity was challenged by the poor availability of livestock products. Livelihood support was effective in scaling up technical skills and resources; the implementation of logistic procedures caused delays while not preventing from an inadequate quality of the items distributed, which seems to suggest that a cash for livelihood approach would be more effective. Conditional cash could also be adopted for WASH items to better fit with people needs. Practice of hygiene messages needs to be improved by promoting the inclusion of non-beneficiaries. Project monitoring is overall consistent, nonetheless tools could be further developed to ensure that evidence-based information is reported.*

Overall, the evaluation confirmed the achievements reported by TF and partners. People consulted confirmed that the assistance was received according to the design. The evaluation randomly selected 2-4 HHs per project site for the semi-structured individual interview and HH visit, to verify the accountability of the information reported in the projects' database. Beneficiaries were acknowledged as such by the communities and their identities confirmed in SSD in both the IDP camps and Aweil (random visits to livelihood beneficiaries), as well as in all project sites visited in Somaliland. In Dillo (Ethiopia), the random assessment was finally not performed due to limited availability of beneficiaries and time. In Koran Mula, only 4 out of the 10 randomly selected names were acknowledged as beneficiaries by the community and leaders, while only 2 were available.

## 6.2.1 Achievements of the CBI

### 6.2.1.1 Unconditional cash distribution

The unconditional cash distribution is largely by far the main strategy adopted by the partners; it covers over 90% of the total funds allocated to the 3 countries captured, during the second phase of the EAC response.

#### Cash instalments

During the field assessment, the number of distributions and amount of cash received were confirmed to match reported data. Partners performed an accurate estimate of the **cash amount** to be distributed monthly, according to the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) adopted for the country and locations. The percentage of MEB covered by the partners in the three countries is directly linked to the IPC classification of projects' locations, in line with the Cash Working Group (CWG) guidelines.

In South Sudan, ACROSS covered about 50% of the MEB as targeted counties were classified as IPC3 in 2018, in accordance with CWG recommendations. However, the consultations with IDP communities in Juba detected discrepancies with respect to the cash amount distributed by other humanitarian actors such as World Vision, which distributed 5,000 SSP/month (25USD) to Gumbo host community. In Mahad IDP camp, Action Africa Help International implemented cash for work by distributing wages of 12,000 SSP/month (60USD) for 6 months. These discrepancies appear to infringe the clear recommendations made by the CWG in Juba. However, it should be noted that the value in USD has been affected by SSP inflation, the extent of which is difficult to calculate at the evaluation stage.

Instalments properly tailored to the local context were adopted by CEDS in Aweil East, as also emerged from the consultations with the CWG, which is led by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery in Northern Bar el Ghazal State. The meeting with the Ministry and his Deputy confirmed high compliance with the cluster recommendation for all NGOs implementing CFW that suggests the adoption of a monthly salary of 5,390 SSP, slightly above local salaries (100 SSP/day for daily jobs) to limit the exposure to protection and security risks.

In Dillo and Koran Mula (Ethiopia), the cash amount was calculated based on the government food ration standard per person per month (200 birr/person/month), by registering the number of family members and calculating the amount accordingly, therefore HHs with different compositions received different amounts. The interviewed SP discussed the challenges faced in the preparation of the envelopes tailored to the HH size. In addition, the project faced endless complaints as the size of the HH often increased between the registration and the distribution. However, eventually the assistance could not be tailored to the number of family members due to the governmental recommendations that set a maximum of 6 persons per HH to be considered in planning the distribution.

In Somaliland, WCDO distributed an amount covering 80% of the MEB as estimated by the Cash Working Group. The amount (102USD/month) was also intended to cover water needs. The evaluation found a significant difference compared to the amount distributed to the same population by Concern Worldwide (60USD). WCDO instalment seemed nonetheless justified by the severity of the crisis in the pastoralist areas covered (IPC 4 during project implementation) as communities had limited or no access to food and water.

Despite the coordination efforts within the CWG and FS Cluster, different amounts distributed to cover similar needs in similar contexts are inconsistent with the pillars of the CTP and need to be addressed.

#### Implementation

In SSD and Ethiopia, **delays in the implementation** hampered the delivery of the assistance in the dry season. The distribution to the IDPs in Juba was foreseen from April to July, but implemented from July when the

rainy season starts. Similar discrepancies were found in Dillo and Koran Mula. It has to be stressed out that distribution delays limited people empowerment as they could not rely on cash and plan how to use it, whereas people get the most from assistance when cash distribution is implemented on a regular basis. The accuracy in determining the amount to cover monthly needs is also frustrated by an uneven access of beneficiaries to cash, as beneficiaries have to cope with gaps in the assistance that expose them to additional frustration and uncertainty, prevent them from any investment and often expose them to debt (see also section 6.4.1). Uncertainty was exacerbated by the late communication of the dates for the cash distribution, as reported by IDPs in Juba and beneficiaries in Dillo and Koran Mula - they were usually informed only one or two days before -, and by the limited awareness of the project's expected duration. Overall, delays in the implementation are related to efficiency gaps (see section 6.3.1) or insecurity<sup>6</sup>.

The strategy adopted by WCDO in Somaliland was found to be the most effective in ensuring cash transfer on a regular monthly basis, using mobile technology. Cash distribution and payments of purchased items are made using the **mobile transfer** (ZAAD, implemented through Telesom), which proved to be effective in improving security and cash management according to the field feedback. ZAAD is largely used in Somaliland, though vulnerable community members were not familiar with its use. This strategy helped beneficiaries to cope with remote supply, as food items were only available in Burao city and transported to the villages by truck based on the orders placed. The project improved the knowledge of beneficiaries by directly briefing the people during the consultations with the communities, as Telesom can build on its long-term experience since it started using this approach in 2014. In addition, Telesom contributed to the beneficiaries' education in the use of mobile telephones and in the management of their customer accounts. No major challenges in cash management were highlighted by the people consulted during the evaluation. The system also facilitates secured savings for the beneficiaries using the same account.

The use of mobile cash transfer was found to be effective in making cash distribution management easier, with positive effects on the organization's capacity to follow the monthly distribution schedule, whose consistency was largely appreciated among consulted people. The widespread dissemination of ZAAD payments - even in the most rural areas - makes this strategy effective in enabling the population to cope with the progressive depletion of local resources through remote purchasing, thus preventing new displacements of people abandoning their home villages. However, the end of the assistance raises major concerns due to the high dependency on the assistance because of a lack of any local resource to cover basic food and water needs.

Unlike the deep analysis performed by the partners to set the cash transfer amount, the **number of months** for the unconditional cash distribution seemed rather related to the availability of funds than to an accurate analysis of needs. Cluster and CWG were also unclear about the recommended duration of the CBI, which appeared to be a widespread strategy throughout the countries assessed. According to the humanitarian response design, cash assistance is aimed at covering the lean season, however the different duration of the projects (2<sup>7</sup> to 6 months) does not consider it consistently. In addition, people exhausted resources hinder any prompt recovery in the new agricultural season, unless as a result of a livelihood support, which was not addressed by the partners except for CEDS (SSD).

## **Results**

Despite some challenges in meeting the monthly distribution schedule and the erratic duration of the projects, cash distribution was found to be **effective in meeting and exceeding the basic needs** during the

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<sup>6</sup> As reported by EGCDWO and EKHC, access to field was limited in August by ethnic-based conflicts between Somali and other ethnic groups residing at Jigjiga and nearby regional towns.

<sup>7</sup> The Koran Mula Emergency Cash Transfer Project carried out only 2 monthly distributions, tailoring the duration of the assistance to the funds available rather than to the number of the beneficiaries.

projects' duration, according to the people feedback. The field assessment confirmed the availability of food, water and basic items on the local markets, which became affordable for the beneficiaries receiving the unconditional cash. However, it should be stressed out once more that the exhaustion of local resources in remote pastoralist areas challenge the access to well-supplied markets that are increasingly distant from the affected populations. Strategies like the mobile cash transfer allow the remote purchasing of goods, while other solutions are likely to increase the burden on women, e.g. in Ethiopia (Dillo project), women transport food from very far markets (more than 3-hour walking) to villages. Partners in Ethiopia did not develop any strategy to deal with an increased exploitation of women's work, which could be eventually related to the cash assistance.

Overall, the feedback from consulted beneficiaries confirmed their improved capacity to address basic needs. Besides purchasing grains and water, cash was also used to access health care, purchase clothes and pay school fees. The increased availability of cash, however, was not very effective in increasing dietary diversity for the people living in the remotest villages due to the unresolved dramatic effects of recurrent droughts on livestock and, consequently, on the access to livestock products such as eggs, milk and meat. IDPs in SSD invested in some sheltering improvement, however with a limited positive impact on their housing according to direct observation. Very few beneficiaries purchased livestock among the people consulted throughout the three countries.

## Challenges

Further to the considerations above, the evaluation work identified the specific challenges faced by some of the partners in ensuring the effectiveness of the implementation:

- In Juba, the third distribution to Don Bosco IDPs was not performed due to a discussion between ACROSS and the foundation's representative about the targeting approach. Indeed, the selection of beneficiaries (390 HHs assisted out of the 1500 living in the camp) raised tensions in the IDP community that was more used to receive *blanket* assistance. The high amount distributed (120USD, 51% of the MEB in Juba) was also controversial as local salaries were found to be far lower (e.g. 5,000 SSP is the monthly salary of a teacher in Gumbo). The last distribution was, therefore, directly implemented by TF soon after the evaluation visit.
- The project in Dillo carried out 2 distributions instead of four in the sites assessed during the evaluation, each covering 2 months, due to the volatile security situation limiting the access to the field. As discussed above, the effectiveness of an unconditional CTP is based on consistency of planning and distribution of cash according to people expectations and needs, on a *monthly* basis.
- In Dillo, the project selected a higher number of beneficiaries than the number actually receiving the cash amount. 110 persons, identified at a later stage, were ultimately not assisted due to fund shortage. During the meetings with Community Leaders and Complaint Committees, endless complaints were being made as these people are still waiting for the cash support. Grumbles are likely to affect the accountability of TF and its partner EKHC, and this issue must be addressed shortly to mitigate the tension in the local community.

### 6.2.1.2 Cash for work

The **conditional cash distribution** was only chosen by CEDS, among the 5 partners, as a strategy to respond to the EAC in Aweil East; money was distributed in the form of CFW that covers 5% of the total funds allocated to the evaluated projects. As recommended by the Sphere standards, the monthly salary was given against 12 working days per month. As discussed above, a wage of 5,390 SSP is fully compliant with cluster/Government recommendations.

On the other hand, the **three-month duration** does not reflect the cluster recommendation since at least 6 months should be allocated when the CFW concerns the rehabilitation of public assets. The short-term support affected the results as far as the assets rehabilitation is concerned, as confirmed during the field visits in Awala and Manyel, where feeder roads were not completed after the project end, despite the partner's good management. The project's strategy to rely on community participation for the completion of the works seems not to be applicable to this context, where the high vulnerability of the population hampers any contribution on a voluntary basis, and food security for people and social rehabilitation are the priorities of the humanitarian response, as well as the project's objective.

The **completion of the assets** identified for the CFW is part of the organizations' accountability to the local population. To ensure achievements, the rehabilitation works should belong to the project outcomes and be adequately funded, thus avoiding any residual burden for the local communities or authorities. A similar approach would further scale up the value of the intervention, which nevertheless was found to be effective in addressing food security, while promoting the dignity and social reintegration of beneficiaries, whose contribution to improving public assets was indeed acknowledged by the whole community.

The quality of the works was monitored in collaboration with the Ministry of Infrastructures and the infrastructures will be handed over to the community after completion.

#### 6.2.2 Livelihood support in South Sudan

Basic livelihood support was implemented in full coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture, by distributing agricultural inputs (seeds and tools), which were welcomed and effectively used by the beneficiaries. The project encouraged groundnut cultivation in groups, thus yielding a good harvest for the current year, while sorghum was grown at HH level, but it was attacked by fall armyworms that are largely affecting the production.

Consulted beneficiaries expressed appreciation for the **agricultural** training received while reporting the techniques - such as the use of plant nurseries or cropping in distinct rows - acquired during the project. An increased awareness on the use of natural pesticides (i.e. neem tree leaves) was largely achieved, though they are useless to control the fall armyworm, a plague needing a wider strategy to deal with<sup>8</sup>.

The procurement procedures implemented in Juba ensured a good quality of seeds and compliance with the Ministry requirements, though the identification of vendors in Aweil significantly delayed the distribution from March to May, hopefully still respecting the planting season because of a delayed 2018 rainy season with respect to forecasts. Given the availability of quality agricultural inputs in Aweil East, conditional cash grants would have probably been more effective than procurements in providing a timely assistance, which is mandatory, as delays can undermine agricultural support.

The same consideration can be done for **fishing** kits, which - during the consultation with the fishermen beneficiaries - were considered inadequate to their needs (e.g. hooks too big for local fishes, too heavy long lines and nets, insufficient irons, etc.). Fishermen are still using their own old material, while waiting for more adequate kits from the project. The situation should be urgently clarified by CEDS, while once more *cash for livelihood* is found to be more appropriate to the context as quality material is available and identified by the beneficiaries<sup>9</sup>.

Livelihood was effective in restoring people dignity, while promoting aggregation of producers and technical upgrade. However, projects need to develop a strategy to cope with the challenges due to the

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<sup>8</sup> FAO has engaged in pest control through its Sustainable Management of the Fall Armyworm in Africa programme launched in 2017.

<sup>9</sup> Fishermen attending the FGD showed samples of material fitting to their needs.

time elapsing between planting and harvesting or the restrictions of the fishing season. Food security must be ensured for the whole project's duration (e.g. buffering food shortages).

### 6.2.3 Water and hygiene promotion in Somaliland

Besides the unconditional cash distribution, the WASH activities implemented in Somaliland by WCDO during CORDS I and CORDS II projects were found to be appropriate to trigger a behavioural change in the **hygiene practices** of assisted communities, such as water storage and hand washing. Water User Committees (WUC) were set up and trained to deliver hygiene messages and promote the use of safe water in the community. At the same time, the project distributed hygiene items and water tanks. **NFIs** were distributed as planned and each of the HH visited during the evaluation (randomly selected) owned the purifiers, jerry cans and tank (1 for 5 HHs). The purifiers are consistently used, though two out of the 7 observed were broken. The quality of the jerry cans distributed during phase 2 was found not to be adequate and most of those observed were already broken. Besides, the 20lt jerry cans were too heavy for women to fetch the water since sources are normally at least 10-15 minutes far from the HH, therefore 15lt jerry cans would do better.

The quality of the tanks (1,000lt) was found to be good, and the large majority of them were well installed by the project on a cement support. In one of the HH visited in Wirir, however, the tank had not yet been installed, and the project did not authorize the beneficiary to fix it by himself. The accessibility to tanks was different for the five HHs sharing the facility, as observed in Waridad, where one beneficiary locked the tank within her own compound and another had the tank close to her house, while the other users were more than 200m away.

The provision of water tanks improved the likelihood of a safe storage of water, however the high costs limited the access to drinkable water, and most of the HHs consulted in Wirir and Xundhurgaal were not actually using the tanks. The beneficiaries consulted in Xundhurgaal stated that they are waiting for the water distribution from NGOs, as they cannot afford the costs of water supply. After discussion with the project staff, it emerged that tank sharing was found to be a challenge therefore, during any future intervention, the project would replace the 1,000lt tanks with 200lt tanks for the use of one HH only. This solution would be appropriate to cope with the difficulties of sharing costs and managing the use of the water among five families.

Although promoted through soap distribution, the practice of hand-washing was found to be limited as hand-washing points were not included in the design and they are not traditionally installed in the assisted communities. The cleaning of NFIs was found to be overall inadequate, jerry cans are indiscriminately used for the drinkable or multipurpose water fetched from the *berkards*, and caps are not commonly used.

It should be stressed that the **practice of** received **messages** was largely limited by the poor access to water and the lack of hand-washing points. The limited development of strategies to involve non-beneficiaries also contributed to hamper the spreading of the hygiene messages throughout the community. Non-beneficiaries consulted had limited links with the WUC members, who were mainly engaged in promoting hygiene among the people receiving WASH assets.

The use of **purifiers** was found to be successful and all the HHs assessed were currently using purified water for family needs. The chlorination kits distributed during CORDS I, which had been handed over to the WUC to treat the water of the whole community and that were still in use during the evaluation, have been replaced by purifiers at HH level during CORDS II. Their use at HH level was found to be consistent; however, this choice is likely to further exclude non-beneficiaries from the projects' benefits including access to safe and clean water.

#### 6.2.4 Project's monitoring

Even though overall effective, the project's monitoring shows significant room for improvement to achieve consistent and **evidence-based reporting**:

- Progress of indicators is detailed in the project's monthly reports. However, reported activities need to be linked to a Gantt chart showing the foreseen work plan and already implemented activities, to monitor any delay in the implementation in relation to context needs (e.g. agricultural season, lean season).
- As discussed under Relevance (section 6.1.2), the beneficiary screening results are not reported, while they should be recorded in a database to provide evidence of the score leading to selection or non-selection, to facilitate the monitoring of targeting strategies.
- All partners keep a beneficiary database providing gender disaggregated figures. Age is also reported, along with the main vulnerability criterion, except for EGCDWO and EKHC. However, the beneficiary database is poor since it lacks details on the type of beneficiary (host community or IDP) and total benefit received (amount per number of months). The vulnerability recorded is often very general and it is not assessed against transparent scoring and ranking criteria, thus hindering the monitoring of the actual application of the vulnerability criteria.
- Accountability of database needs to be strengthened: the HH visits detected discrepancies with respect to the information reported in the database e.g. gender or age of the beneficiaries as found in Mahad IDP camp in Juba (ACROSS), as well as in Waridaad and Xundhurgal (Somaliland).
- The PDM limits WASH assessment to the use of purifiers. Effective use of tanks and the practice of hygiene promotion messages are not adequately monitored and specific questions about the behavioural changes need to be developed as part of the PDM questionnaire.
- Market surveys were performed as baseline, while monthly monitoring of the impact on local prices is not performed. However, the PDM reports information about the beneficiaries' perception of market price fluctuations.

### 6.3 EFFICIENCY

**Rating (0: low, 4: high): 3**

**Summarized findings:** Partners were overall efficient in the implementation and reporting of the projects. The consistent use of a Gantt chart was deemed necessary for planning and reporting. The limited familiarity of some of the partners with CTP implementation resulted in significant delays, also due to TF's late management of grants and procurements. The cash response VFM is confirmed by high rates directly transferred to the beneficiaries compared to other approaches. Beneficiaries also took advantage of the favourable exchange rates. The collaboration with the SPs was crucial to the implementation of cash distributions, and costs are fully justified by security and logistic advantages

#### 6.3.1 Project management

Partners were overall efficient in the implementation of the projects, and they complied with TF requirements in terms of activity and financial reporting. Project management tools forwarded by TF to his partners were consistently adopted by all. Any amendment such as project extension was discussed with and approved by TF.

To ensure the implementation of Tearfund QSSs, **beneficiary participation and feedback mechanisms** are developed as a project outcome. However, the non-use of Gantt charts challenges the analysis of *when* these activities have been implemented, e.g. in Koran Mula, except for QSSs training, Outcome 2 of the project had not yet been implemented at the end of August. Activities ensuring participation and accountability to

communities need, conversely, to be implemented at the project beginning to promote awareness and spread the feedback mechanism information prior to beneficiary targeting. The project in Koran Mula first carried out the selection of beneficiaries, involving in the decision-making process the communities, which were not yet prepared to play their role in the project.

As discussed under section 6.2.1, the **delay in the implementation** was the main challenge to efficiency for the partners. The main reasons discussed with the teams are summarized below:

- The CTP preparatory phase required more time than expected, especially for partners not fully familiar with this approach (e.g. ACROSS and EGCDWO), due to the time to be allocated to targeting and especially to the registration of beneficiaries that was complicated by a lack of identification documents.
- The identification of the SP and the development of a partnership, if not already existing, can significantly delay the implementation as experienced by ACROSS, EKHC and EGCDWO. The identification of the SP must be done preliminarily, at the beginning of the year, developing a financial providers mapping and framework agreements/MoU to save time and ensure quality. This strategy has successfully been implemented by WCDO that has had a MoU with Telesom Somaliland for several years.
- The procurements implemented by Tearfund in Juba to supply livelihood inputs in Aweil significantly delayed the distribution of seeds (besides misunderstanding the technical requirements for fishing kits).
- WCDO and EGCDWO mentioned that Tearfund was late in processing grant agreements, causing the delay of the Koran Mula project, which started in July instead of April as planned. A similar delay resulted in shortening WCDO project's duration from 6 to 4 months.

### **6.3.2 VFM of the CTP**

The use of unconditional cash transfers is confirmed as efficient in scaling up VFM. The **amount directly transferred to the beneficiaries** via cash distribution represents nearly 68% of the total eligible costs of the project of emergency support to IDPs in Mahat and Don Bosco implemented in partnership with ACROSS. After consultation with local communities, TF and ACROSS decided to use the hard currency (USD), which was adequate to cope with local currency (SSP) inflation. Beneficiaries were able to gain a better exchange rate in the local market, if compared to the exchange directly managed by the SP and, therefore, subject to a lower government rate. As confirmed during the interview of Alpha Bank, they comply with the Central Bank exchange rate of about 150 SSP/1 USD, which is far lower than the market rate (200 to 220 SSP/1 USD). In addition, the project distributed large bills (100USD) that usually get better rates in the market compared to small bills. The risk for the beneficiaries to be cheated while changing money was mitigated by providing orientation and recommendations, as confirmed during the consultations. This strategy also partially justified the different amount distributed by ACROSS in comparison with other agencies (see section 6.2.1), as they lost money on the exchange rate.

Conversely, the project in Aweil East used the local currency following the recommendations of the CWG in Northern Bar el Ghazal State. CEDS adopted the Central Bank fixed exchange rate, thus mitigating the inflation impact.

The rate of funds transferred to the beneficiaries was also significantly high for the partners implementing CTP in Ethiopia (i.e. EKHC transferred 78% of the total budget to the beneficiaries, EGCDWO 70%). Projects implementing other activities besides cash distribution achieve a lower rate. CEDS directly distributed 53%

of the funds to the beneficiaries (considering cash and livelihood inputs together) and WCDO 59% (considering cash and WASH inputs together).

The different rates resulting from the different strategies are part of the project's design and depend on the characteristics of the activities themselves; they are obviously more costly for livelihood. Overall, all projects ensured high VFM<sup>10</sup>.

### 6.3.3 Efficiency of the cash distribution

Partners worked through Service Providers, which ensured the security during distribution, as well as the compliance with local Government requirements. SPs ensured cash management, transport and distribution to the beneficiaries. According to the projects' financial reports, the costs of services fluctuate between 2% (WCDO) and 6% (CEDS) of the cash amount distributed to the beneficiaries (EKHC 2.5%, EGCDWO 4%, ACROSS 5%). As expected, the mobile cash transfer was the less costly approach.

As discussed under section 6.2.1, Alpha Bank (SSD), Somali Microfinance Institution (Ethiopia) and Telesom (Somaliland) also performed the registration of the beneficiaries identified by the NGOs, using different approaches including biometric registration (Alpha Bank). These stakeholders are key actors of the implementation: they interact with communities to check identities of the people in the beneficiary lists and face any tensions arising together with the project staff. Considering the critical role played by these agencies, steady partnerships are therefore recommended.

## 6.4 LIKELIHOOD OF IMPACT

**Rating (0: low, 4: high): 3**

***Summarized findings:*** *The intervention had an overall positive impact on the objective of saving lives as confirmed with the improvement of indicators such as the Food Consumption Score and Livelihood Coping Strategy Index. For most partners consistency of impact assessment is nevertheless hampered by the lack of adequate monitoring based on the impact indicators, which have been developed and accurately measured only by one partner (WCDO). Positive impact on child nutrition and health was confirmed during the FGDs, though not supported by evidence-based data, which partners need to collect from health/nutrition actors. CTP was not affecting local market prices according to the beneficiary feedback, while market price monitoring data are missing. The intervention had limited expectations of a significant positive impact on community resilience given its design of being an emergency response, while the likelihood of dependency on cash assistance was found to be high. Women's participation to the projects had a positive impact on their empowerment, thought limited by the context features and lacking strategies to strength self-help mechanisms. Impact on partners' knowledge was found to be positive, due to QS trainings and the use of Kobo for screenings, while improved practices needs to be further strengthened.*

The intervention had an overall positive impact on access to food and basic needs as confirmed with the improvement of indicators such as the Food Consumption Score and Livelihood Coping Strategy Index, though limited to the duration of the cash distribution given the absence of an exit strategy.

The use of impact indicators was limited for most of the partners, who used performance indicators to monitor either Outputs or Outcomes, with the exception of WCDO that developed impact indicators at project Objective/Outcome level. Partners developed baseline surveys; however, during the evaluation, comparative end line surveys were not consistent as 4 out of the 6 projects ended in September. Between the two remaining, EKHC project ended in July and performed the PDM as end line assessment; however,

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<sup>10</sup> Calculation above is only related to value delivered to beneficiaries as cash or in kind and not to the *activity costs*.

analysis of the information gathered by the baseline and PDM could not ensure an effective benchmarking system. These reasons limited the analysis at the evaluation stage including the impact of livelihood activities that was not assessable due to the limited room given to this approach and because of lack of end line data.

An exception is WCDO's CORDS (1<sup>st</sup> phase ended in May 2018) which performed a comparative analysis of base and end line data to support the measurement of the project's Objective/Outcome indicators and overall project impact:

- Food Consumption Score (FCS) was effectively improved, as percentage of households categorized as poor in terms of food consumption at the baseline (98.2%, with 1.4% borderline and only 0.4% acceptable). These percentages were significantly reduced according to end line data (24.28% in poor category, 58.3% borderline and 17.39% of the households scored as *acceptable*).
- The Livelihood Coping Strategy Index (L-CSI) analysis confirms the positive trend, as emergency coping strategies (LCS crisis classification) were adopted by 20.65% of the end line respondents, while over 50% were classified in crisis at the baseline.

These results, however, are strictly related to the monthly access to cash, while likelihood to revert to the baseline scenario after the project end is very high.

The increased access to cash was, however, crucial to contribute to restoring the dignity of the most vulnerable persons and IDPs, reducing their dependency on donations from the host community during the assistance, giving them freedom to choose and empowering them with decision-making power. The consistent access to food during the assistance was likely to have a positive impact on child nutrition, reducing the number of malnourished children in consulted communities as reported by the women consulted during the FGDs. However, the project-related impact on malnutrition cannot be measured as baseline/endline data were not recorded by the partners and since other actors were intervening with nutrition programmes in some locations (e.g. in Ethiopia, the Government was implementing Plumpy'Nut distribution in several villages including Cirrathee and Goraye; Save The Children was implementing a nutrition programme in Xundhurgaal, Somaliland).

Despite the huge size of the CTP, there seemed to be limited negative impact on market prices according to the information gathered from the beneficiaries during the evaluation and confirmed by PDM results. Some strategies were developed by the communities, such as stopping purchases from vendors who increased the prices, achieving good results as vendors have not the market cornered on basic food items. Once more, a consistent Market Price monthly monitoring should be performed to provide evidence.

Impact on behavioural changes and people health of the hygiene promotion was difficult to infer due to gaps in project monitoring and a lack of correlated indicators in the PDM, as discussed during the evaluation with WCDO team. Assessment of the positive impact on child health was also hampered by a lack of direct or indirect monitoring e.g. trend of diarrhoea cases and skin diseases recorded at the health centres or by health/nutrition actors. During the consultations, women's groups in Somaliland reported none the less their perception of an improved health of their children, and the positive impact perceived was further confirmed by their consistent use of purifiers. The use of purifiers, both at HH level (CORDS II) or through the WUC service (CORDS) was found to be consistent during the field assessment, and consultations with beneficiaries confirmed the likelihood of a long-term positive behavioural change.

#### 6.4.1 Community resilience and coping strategies

The CTP had a limited positive impact on community resilience and their capacity to deal with any future similar disaster. The amount distributed prevented the beneficiaries from investments in small businesses or restocking, except for very few beneficiaries who purchased small animals like goats or chickens. The unevenness of the cash distribution for some of the projects assessed (both partners in Ethiopia, ACROSS in

SSD), further challenged any positive impact on resilience, as beneficiaries perceived the assistance as *gifts* randomly given to them, showing very limited understanding of their right to be assisted. On the other hand, feedback from consulted communities showed a strong likelihood of dependency on humanitarian assistance since the already limited business activities, such as charcoal production or firewood collection, were suspended due to availability of cash. Poor cash management was also due to projects' limits in carrying out a livelihood assessment to orient beneficiaries on the use of the allocated resources to start income-generating activities.

Likelihood of dependency on the cash assistance was found to be high for pastoralists who were the most affected by the recurrent droughts challenging any recovery and hampering re-stocking livestock. A potential negative impact is that the project could have been a pull factor for these populations pushing them to move with their animals. The harsh environmental situation actually challenges the development of early recovery programmes due to the exhaustion of local water and livestock resources, unless the emergency needs are concurrently covered.

Dependency on cash distribution resulted also in a negative impact on communities' capacity to identify their specific needs. As found out during the consultations, people analysis of gaps and resources was narrow, while the widely recognized priority need was an endless access to higher amounts of cash.

Livelihood support was found to be less prone to increase dependency, as confirmed by the consultations with farmers and fishermen, who are well aware of the gaps to be filled to increase production, transportation and storage.

CTP could have a better impact on community resilience by widening the use of the conditional cash (CFW) to the rehabilitation of key infrastructures, such as feeder roads or *berkards*, thus promoting the access to rural areas and multi-purpose water.

#### *6.4.1.1 Women's protection*

As discussed in section 6.1.3.1 above, the context of the operation throughout the three countries challenges the likelihood of a positive impact on women's empowerment. Besides, partners missed some opportunities to strengthen the existing mechanisms of mutual support, such as women group-based savings in SSD or grouping of women farmers.

The exploitation of women's work was common in all the communities visited, even though barely addressed by the projects. The increased access to cash caused, indeed, an additional burden for the women who fetched food and water walking from very far markets e.g. over three hours walking for women living in Cirrattee and Goraye (Ethiopia). The average walking distance to find water was 15- 30 minutes, in most cases carrying heavy 20lt jerrycans. When implementing CTP, the use of market supply is promoted compared to local productions, hence projects need to consider the distances from markets and develop adequate strategies such as the mobile cash transfer used by WCDO for the remote purchase of items later delivered by trucks or facilitate women's food and water transportation by providing charts to be managed by women groups.

The likelihood of a positive impact of the use of money is indicated by the fact that the large majority of beneficiaries are women, who are likely to ensure a thrifty use of the allocated resources to cover food needs for a long enough term, giving priority to child nutrition, as confirmed during discussions with women groups.

#### *6.4.2 Changes in partners' capacity*

Tearfund organized learning sessions bringing together partners for sharing and learning that were reported as useful by WCDO staff recently attending a convention.

The QS training was highly welcomed by the partners, who acknowledged the value of training in prompting the analysis of existing accountability mechanisms while introducing new tools e.g. WCDO introduced beneficiary cards recording the vulnerability level, benefits received and telephone number for feedback communications. In addition, WCDO introduced the *senior directors' leadership* meetings with communities, to facilitate the information flow from the most marginalized beneficiaries to the organization members that were not directly involved in the assistance. Quality standard trainings ensued from the implementation of some accountability mechanisms, but some of them were not effective as discussed above (see section 6.1.2).

The use of Tearfund's project management tools was consistent and had a positive impact on the partners' capacity. However, most partners use different tools while working with other donors, which challenges a long-term upgrading of their management capacity.

Tearfund invested in training for partners staff, e.g. introducing KOBOKOLLECT electronic as data collection tool during the emergencies. World Concern field staff have been trained and their capacity built on electronic data collection.

The use of KOBO was also successfully adopted by EKHC for the PDM. However, only raw screening data are reported by this partner, while data analysis and processing need to be strengthened.

## 6.5 COORDINATION

**Rating (0: low,4: high): 3**

***Summarized findings:*** As discussed throughout the sections above, partners largely coordinated their intervention with local authorities and humanitarian actors to design the response and target the beneficiaries. Bi-lateral field coordination and data sharing can be further strengthened.

The evaluation gathered indirect information to assess the coordination with humanitarian actors, while the governmental authorities were met in SSD and Ethiopia. The **coordination with local authorities** was consistent in the two countries and lead to the identification of the localities to be prioritized for assistance (see section 6.1.2).

In Ethiopia, the Government recommended the target of IPC3 areas, as WFP was providing food to IPC4 and IPC5, and project proposals were submitted for approval prior to the implementation. Authorities consulted in South Sudan were also found to be fully informed about the activities planned and, in some cases, (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture) they were part of the humanitarian community as cluster lead.

Partners' cash distribution through Service Providers was fully compliant with the approach adopted by most of the other NGOs. **Adherence to the humanitarian community approach** was ensured by the attendance at the CWGs. However, as discussed under *effectiveness* above, the partners consistent participation in the CWGs could not prevent from lack of consistency in the cash amount being distributed (see section 6.2.1.1). This was due to several factors including the local currency inflation observed for the South Sudanese Pound, as well as to donors' recommendations which oriented the implementing partners toward covering different percentages of the MEB, thus resulting in different cash amounts distributed. The FS Cluster and CWG keep on working to harmonize the MEB rates adopted, which is a crucial element of the CTP.

Despite the overall good participation in the humanitarian board, **partners overlooked the bi-lateral field coordination** with other humanitarian actors working in the same localities. In Juba IDP camps, for instance, the coordination with WFP was not fully effective in identifying the people who were not receiving food assistance to avoid any overlapping, according to the consultations with the beneficiaries, some of whom

declared that they had received the ratio; in Don Bosco IDP camp, people not registered by WFP were assisted with food rations by the church.

The coordination with nutrition actors to gather data concerning the trend of malnutrition for assisted people was also found to be limited, e.g. in Xundhurgaal WC failed to get data on the changes in malnutrition trend from STC, which implements a nutrition programme in the same site (see section 6.4).

## Section 7 – Conclusions

The evaluated East Africa Crisis emergency response, which was funded by Tearfund and DEC and implemented by 5 partners in South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somaliland, was found to be thematically relevant, as well as relevant to the context in addressing the urgent food security needs emerged after the recurrent droughts and escalation occurred in 2016. The gap in food security was addressed by the cash-based response, tailored to the local Minimum Expenditure Basket and ensured access to food, water and other basic needs for the people assisted. Livelihood and WASH activities have been successfully implemented as part of the response. The implementation through partners and their knowledge of the context ensured proximity to communities and local authorities, which were actively involved in the targeting of localities and beneficiaries, as well as in the monitoring of projects results, according to a *community-managed* approach.

The programme mainstreams Tearfund Quality Standards, which have been consistently handed over to the partners by delivering *ad hoc* trainings and requiring a dedicated outcome as part of the project design. The implementation of the QSs faced challenges in providing full information and gathering feedback from the most marginalized beneficiaries, whose involvement in the project was largely filtered by community leaders. Partners' efforts to mainstream gender equality resulted in a high representation of women among beneficiaries and community-based committees. A wider contribution to women's empowerment was none the less limited, given the programme design and local social patterns.

Partners adopted up-to-date strategies to ensure effectiveness of the cash transfer, such as biometric registration of beneficiaries and mobile cash transfer, working in collaboration with Service Providers for the identification and distribution as most humanitarian actors do. The evaluation confirmed that the assistance reached the beneficiaries as reported, and that their basic needs were actually met, although the delays in the implementation faced by almost all partners affected the schedule of the cash distributions and, therefore, the foremost objective of mitigating food insecurity during the lean season. Besides delays, mostly due to the partners' development of new tools for the implementation of CTP, the project management was overall efficient, and it ensured high VFM and compliance with Tearfund's reporting requirements. However, differences in partners' performance were found to be significant; TF and partners in Ethiopia definitely need to make an effort to achieve the same quality of implementation ensured in South Sudan and Somaliland.

Despite the EAC response effectiveness in protecting the people during the assistance, the emergency response had a limited impact on strengthening people resilience and reducing risks of future similar disasters. The local resources, exhausted by the recurrent droughts and volatile political situation, need long-term investments to be restored, while the most vulnerable people are still in need of humanitarian assistance to survive. Even though a clear exit strategy was not developed, the long-lasting commitment of Tearfund and its partners in these countries is likely to ensure a follow-up for the population assisted, depending on humanitarian priorities and availability of funds.

## Section 8 - Specific Actionable and Prioritised Recommendations

### 8.1 Recommendations and lessons (Partners)

#### Recommendations to partners – Targeting

No.	Recommendation	Priority	Person(s) in charge
<b>1</b>	Include communities and beneficiaries in the development of targeting criteria and adopt clear and applicable selection or exclusion principles, in order to ensure that the vulnerability analysis fits the context.	Medium	Partner Field
<b>2</b>	After consultation with communities, perform independent decision-making for targeting. Extend the vulnerability assessment to the whole population affected (e.g. non-recipients of WFP ration, non-beneficiaries of the PSNP) by enlarging potential beneficiary registration in order to avoid the exclusion of the most marginalized.	High	Partner Field
<b>3</b>	Develop a more robust targeting for vulnerability ranking. Record in a database how decisions are made by using a scoring system and provide details of both selected and non-selected people.	High	Tearfund HQ Partner Field

#### Recommendations to partners – Accountability

No.	Recommendation	Priority	Person(s) in charge
<b>4</b>	Develop feedback mechanisms that allow the most vulnerable population, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, to be able to provide feedback, bypassing the leaders, to the organization's staff, but not to the persons involved in implementation. Suggestion boxes should be available for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries during the whole project. To cope with illiteracy, alternative solutions such as holding community meetings with the most vulnerable groups (e.g. women, elders) could be promoted.	High	Tearfund HQ Partner Field
<b>5</b>	Identify a focal person not involved in field activities to deal with feedback communication (e.g. M&E person). Record complaints and actions undertaken as part of the project archive.	High	Partner HQ/Field

### Recommendations to partners – Gender Equality

No.	Recommendation	Priority	Person(s) in charge
6	Ensure that women have equal access to project information as men, addressing social exclusion to the possible extent e.g. targeting <i>all-female</i> groups for awareness, promoting access to information and feedback communication.	High	Partner Field
7	Identify and strengthen the existing resilience strategies developed by women's groups, such as community-based saving systems (e.g. Sanduk), in order to increase understanding of small business investments and cash management when implementing CTP.	Medium	Partner HQ/Field
8	Promote the participation of women's groups, strengthening protection mechanisms among women and within the communities.	Medium	Partner HQ/Field

### Recommendations to partners – Effectiveness

No.	Recommendation	Priority	Person(s) in charge
9	Respect the schedule of payment days/dates and make sure that beneficiaries are aware in advance of the whole project calendar, in order to ensure compliance with CTP standards while promoting economic planning for the HHs.	High	Partner Field
10	Perform an adequate analysis of the emergency needs to be covered while deciding the number of months, in which to implement cash distribution. Allocate the funds accordingly, reducing the beneficiary population if necessary.	High	Partner HQ/Field
11	When implementing CFW for rehabilitation of community assets, consider where possible the accomplishment of rehabilitations as part of the project outcomes, developing performance-related indicators. Funds should be adequately allocated to avoid unfinished works remaining as a burden for the community.	Medium	Partner HQ
12	Promote strategies of inclusion of non-beneficiaries when implementing WASH, such as community-based chlorination (CORDS) to improve ownership of hygiene practices throughout the community.	Medium	Partner HQ/Field

### Recommendations to partners – Management and monitoring

No.	Recommendation	Priority	Person(s) in charge

<b>13</b>	Improve the consistency of the beneficiary database, recording age, family composition, head of household, vulnerability scoring and the full assistance received.	High	Partner HQ/Field
<b>14</b>	Ensure monthly monitoring of market prices when implementing CTP on a large scale, regularly gathering information from the markets used by beneficiaries.	High	Tearfund Field Partner Field

#### Recommendations to partners – Efficiency

No.	Recommendation	Priority	Person(s) in charge
<b>15</b>	Mapping of financial providers, in-principle agreements or frame contracts should be made with financial institutions (Service Providers) as part of the preparedness phase.	Medium	Partner HQ/Field
<b>16</b>	Delays in the workplan implementation affect the effectiveness of CTP in addressing priority needs during the lean season. The duration of the preliminary phase must be realistic, ensuring that the time required for beneficiary targeting and procurement to select the SP is considered.	High	Tearfund HQ Partner HQ
<b>17</b>	Delays due to procurement implementation and errors in the selection of adequate items can be addressed by adopting <i>grants for livelihood</i> whenever quality livelihood inputs are available on the local market. Provide technical support and orientation to beneficiaries, if appropriated.	Medium	Tearfund HQ Partner HQ/Field

#### Recommendations to partners – Impact

No.	Recommendation	Priority	Person(s) in charge
<b>18</b>	Develop a suitable exit strategy to mitigate the dependency from the cash assistance, trying to link communities with recovery interventions to restore local resources.	High	Partner HQ/Field
<b>19</b>	The use of conditional cash transfer (CFW) could be considered to a wider extent, further to an accurate context analysis, by targeting the construction/rehabilitation of key infrastructures (e.g. the <i>berkards</i> to improve access to water), thus contributing to restoring local resources.	Medium	Partner HQ/Field
<b>20</b>	Consider the distance from the markets since it is an additional burden for women, e.g. providing carts to women's groups to facilitate transportation of food and water.	Medium	Partner Field

### Recommendations to partners – Coordination

No.	Recommendation	Priority	Person(s) in charge
21	Strengthen bi-lateral field coordination with other humanitarian actors to avoid any overlapping, ensure harmonization of the CTP cash amount, and share relevant monitoring data on related sectors, such as health and nutrition.	High	Tearfund Field Partner HQ/Field

### 8.2 Recommendations and lessons (Tearfund)

#### Recommendations to Tearfund – Relevance

No.	Recommendation	Priority	Person(s) in charge
1	Ensure Quality Standards are implemented after the trainings, improve TF monitoring and develop tools to be shared with partners (i.e. feedback monitoring tools, beneficiary selection database).	Medium	Tearfund Field
2	Encourage partners to develop their own Accountability Plan independently, using their analysis of social patterns of exclusion and acting accordingly.	Medium	Tearfund HQ/Field
3	Encourage partners to promote gender equality within the teams, increasing women's representation among the staff.	Medium	Tearfund Field Partner Field
4	Develop a continuous strategy linking assisted communities to recovery interventions to restore and promote local resources while contributing to addressing the root causes of poverty and vulnerability in order to reduce dependency.	High	Tearfund HQ, Partner HQ

#### Recommendations to Tearfund – Effectiveness

No.	Recommendation	Priority	Person(s) in charge
5	Ensure that the availability of funds is not affecting the duration of cash distribution, which should be part of the CTP design along with the amount of cash. Consider instead a reduction in the beneficiary population.	High	Tearfund HQ Partner HQ

### **Recommendations to Tearfund – Partnership management and monitoring**

No.	Recommendation	Priority	Person(s) in charge
<b>6</b>	Include a Gantt chart as part of the project proposal and reporting, in order to better monitor any delay and related impact on the implementation effectiveness.	High	Tearfund HQ Partner Field
<b>7</b>	Limit the commodity procurements to the possible extent when implementing CTP, to avoid any risk of delays and supply of items that will not be appreciated by the beneficiaries. Replace procurements with conditional cash transfer whenever feasible according to goods availability on the local markets.	High	Tearfund Field Partner HQ/Field
<b>8</b>	Harmonize the project management tools with the partners to effectively build capacities over the long term.	Medium	Tearfund HQ
<b>9</b>	Improve timely grant management, to avoid delays in project implementation hampering people access to the humanitarian assistance.	High	Tearfund HQ
<b>10</b>	Encourage partners to provide evidence of feedback complaints reported and actions undertaken making available a consolidated database for monitoring and evaluation.	High	Tearfund HQ Partner Field