



Examining the role of WASH services within peace- and state-building processes

Findings from Tearfund programmes in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of South Sudan

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Responsibility for the contents of this report, however, rests with its authors.

The logo for Tearfund, featuring the word "tearfund" in a white, lowercase, sans-serif font inside a dark blue rectangular box.

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Abbreviations

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| BCZCCMP | Bureau Central de Zone de Santé Church and Community Mobilisation Process |
| CHASE | Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (DFID) |
| CLTS | Community-Led Total Sanitation |
| CPA | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| DFID | Department for International Development |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| FCAS | Fragile and conflict-affected states |
| GoSS | Government of South Sudan |
| IDP | Internally displaced person |
| INGO | International non-governmental organisation |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| NSP | Non-state provider |
| PB | Peace-building |
| PEAR | Programme of Expanded Assistance to Returnees (UNICEF) |
| PPSSP | Programme de Promotion des Soins de Santé Primaires |
| PSG | Peacebuilding and statebuilding goals |
| RoSS | Republic of South Sudan |
| SB | State-building |
| SFCG | Search for Common Ground |
| SPLM/A | Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army |
| WASH | Water supply, sanitation and hygiene |
| WDR | World Development Report |
| WHO | World Health Organisation |
| WRAPP | Water for Peace and Recovery Program |
| WSP | Water and Sanitation Program |

Executive summary

Fragility, conflict and processes of state transformation can be challenging contexts for basic service provision. But the relationship is not one-way. Practitioners have been increasingly concerned with understanding the impacts of the way services are delivered on conflict, fragility and state-building – for example, through application of the Do No Harm framework (Anderson, 1999) or forms of conflict analysis (e.g. Tearfund, 2009).

Indeed, the influence of service delivery on peace and statehood has been recently asserted in mainstream policy discourses: ‘Just as mounting fragility and deteriorating services can be mutually reinforcing tendencies, improving services may enhance social and economic recovery, overcoming fragility in a virtuous upward spiral’ (OECD, 2008a, page 21). The importance of service delivery is also recognised in the newly agreed Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) (OECD, 2012). A review of recent evidence, however, finds that while many contributions are asserted, there is little in the way of rigorous evaluation to test the impact of service delivery on peace-building and state-building outcomes (Mason, 2012, forthcoming; Carpenter *et al*, 2012). This suggests that greater insights are needed into how (and how far) services can meaningfully contribute to peace-building and state-building processes, alongside practical guidance for how best to achieve this. A number of multi-year research programmes are currently exploring these very dynamics over the next few years, such as the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (Carpenter *et al*, 2012).

In the shorter term, this synthesis report presents the findings of a one-year research project funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) and implemented by Tearfund and ODI, which explored the links between Tearfund’s service delivery of water supply, sanitation and hygiene programmes and wider processes of state-building and peace-building in two fragile and conflict-affected states. Working to support these processes was not an explicit objective of Tearfund’s WASH programmes. However, as they were implemented, Tearfund project staff and partners began to gather *ad hoc* evidence of state-building or peace-building impact (Murray and Keiru, 2011). This research provided an opportunity to analyse these impacts more systematically in two countries (the Republic of South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC), and to identify entry points to support these processes more effectively in the future.

South Sudan and DRC were not comparative examples. Instead, they highlighted the range of programming experiences and possible entry points for state-building and peace-building, in two very different contexts. Looking across both countries, we found that Tearfund employed a range of modalities for its WASH programmes in fragile states. These included those rooted in community mobilisation and engagement (including sensitisation around sanitation and hygiene) as in Central Equatoria, South Sudan, and often implemented through a local partner. They also included programmes directly implemented by Tearfund and largely focused on hardware construction (i.e. boreholes and latrines) as in North Kivu, DRC, and in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, South Sudan.

This variation, in part, reflected underlying contextual factors. In Central Equatoria, there has been greater stability, arguably allowing for greater opportunities for longer-term, community-based engagement. Interviews in DRC also revealed that choices of programme modalities reflected perceptions of the security and stability of different regions. In practice, however, our analysis suggests that some of these relatively fixed categories (such as forms of humanitarian or development programming) hid realities where it was not easy to separate the two, and where responding to immediate need remained an on-going concern but did not negate the need to prioritise support for wider institution-building.

A number of key findings emerge from our analysis. Firstly, our research points to the need to challenge assumptions that the delivery of WASH services *per se* will contribute to positive peace-building and state-building effects. Drivers of these processes are complex and often

reflect historic legacies and systemic features not easily shaped by any one intervention. In the project sites visited, WASH was not a central driver of conflict, nor did it have the perceived state-building benefits of services such as education. This suggests that we need to put WASH services into context and to have a fuller understanding of the range of sector and cross-sector assistance needed to support peace-building and state-building in many countries.

Secondly, despite this note of caution, WASH service delivery can be hugely important in many fragile and conflict-affected countries. For any WASH programme in these countries, a mindset shift is needed to better take on board the implications of peace-building and state-building. Too often, forms of conflict sensitivity, for example, have existed in policy documents but have not been translated into changes for programming options: the 'so what' for programming decisions was not always apparent on the ground. Bridging this gap will require concerted efforts to take seriously conflict risks but also to look for opportunities to support 'state- and society-building' at local levels, and to engage more proactively with conflict and community dynamics.

This implies a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, while non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Tearfund have committed to undertake forms of conflict and context analysis – often drawing on forms of Do No Harm analysis – these are too often not put into practice. Fulfilling these commitments should be a key first step, and would help to minimise any possible risks or negative effects of programming. To do this, it will need to become more than a 'tick-box exercise'. Just as adding 'gender sensitivity' into programmes has not equated to changing entrenched gender roles and inequalities, so too forms of conflict analysis have fallen short of being effectively mainstreamed into operations.

On the other hand, there is a danger that conflict and context sensitivity is interpreted in a reductionist way, to mean limiting adverse risks and the avoidance of 'doing harm' (to projects and communities). Our analysis shows that, even at the micro level, decisions on *how programmes are implemented* can have both positive and negative implications for local conflict and community dynamics. While concepts such as 'state-building' and 'peace-building' may seem remote from realities on the ground, there are a number of intermediate entry points where programming decisions can impact on these wider processes. Breaking these down into different types – and using analysis to understand which entry points matter most in which settings – should help to further operationalise approaches to maximise the positive impacts on these broader processes, and to ensure that this becomes an integrated part of programming, rather than an optional add-on.

From our desk-based review and fieldwork analysis from DRC and South Sudan, we therefore identify at least five intermediate entry points for WASH services in relation to peace-building and state-building dynamics. These are:

- **Visibility:** Paying particular attention to who is visible in the delivery of WASH services (and assessing the risks of INGO visibility relative to other actors and agencies)
- **Collective action:** Supporting strengthened capacities for collective action and collaboration between and within different groups for the production of services, as part of 'state- and society-building'
- **Inclusion:** Mapping groups who are marginalised from accessing or using services (either across society or as a result of a specific conflict/context and relative power relations), and identifying resulting conflict risks
- **Accountability:** Mapping the nature of accountability relationships on the ground between different groups for service delivery (including local actors such as religious leaders or chiefs)
- **Opportunity:** Identifying any entry points where broader links can be made to enable economic or other opportunities.

Each of these has implications for key programming options, from the choice of modality, to identification of partners, to identification of project sites. They have implications for the funding for service delivery programmes too. Current funding approaches are not always seen as 'fit for purpose' to support the types of approaches most needed in conflict-affected

contexts. Particular challenges identified include short timeframes for funding, low tolerance of risk or uncertainty, and prescriptive models of what can be funded.

Taken together, our findings suggest the need for realistic and feasible expectations for WASH services in terms of wider processes of state-building and peace-building. We echo the concerns of others that assumptions should be challenged, around whether these processes are always improved by, or should be the main priority for, basic service delivery (see World Development Report – WDR, 2011; Carpenter *et al*, 2012). Nevertheless, we find that there is considerable scope to strengthen *how WASH programmes are delivered* in these contexts, in order to take much better account of these wider processes, and there is considerable scope to share practice on how this has been done effectively in different contexts.

As the PSGs are being discussed and debated, this is an ideal opportunity to reflect on the practices of all those who contribute to WASH service delivery in fragile contexts and to strengthen practice in line with the principles of those goals. We hope these insights can also inform broader discussions on the relationship between other areas of service delivery and these processes.

1 Introduction

1.1 Research aims and key definitions

This synthesis report presents the findings of a one-year DFID-funded research project implemented by Tearfund and ODI, which explores the links between service delivery of water supply, hygiene and sanitation and the wider processes of state-building and peace-building in fragile and conflict-affected states.

The research focused on Tearfund's water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions implemented through the 'Capacity Building to Improve Humanitarian Action in the Water Sanitation and Hygiene' programme, funded by DFID's Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE). The objective of the programme was to increase the capacity of Tearfund Operational teams, local partner projects and local government departments in conflict-affected and humanitarian contexts to support improved access to potable water, sanitation and public health education, resulting in sustainable improved health, well-being and dignity for grassroots communities.

The contribution of WASH service delivery to peace-building or state-building was not a specific objective of the Capacity Building programme, and was subsequently not included in the logical frameworks of country projects. As such, there has been no initial baseline, or on-going monitoring or evaluation of the impacts of WASH service delivery on these goals. However, as the programme was being implemented, Tearfund project staff and partners began to gather *ad hoc* evidence of state-building or peace-building impact, for example of increased community cohesion, increased capacity for local conflict resolution and improved capacity of local government (Murray and Keiru, 2011).

This research project provides an opportunity to analyse more systematically the impact of the Capacity Building programme on peace-building and state-building in two countries (South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo), and to identify entry points to support these processes more effectively through future WASH service delivery programming.

The goal of the research project was therefore to help future Tearfund programmes 'support effective water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) service delivery in ways that maximise their contribution towards peace- and state-building' (PB and SB).

The specific research questions which guided the research were:

- To what extent and in what ways can the processes of improving access to WASH make an explicit contribution to peace- and state-building in Fragile and Conflict-affected States (FCAS)?
- Given the impact WASH service delivery can have on peace- and state-building, what does effectiveness look like in FCAS and how can it be measured?
- What diagnostic tools or indicators might guide future WASH service delivery programmes in FCAS, to help maximise the extent to which they can contribute to peace- and state-building?

These research questions contain a number of potential assumptions. Firstly, that WASH service delivery has an impact on peace-building and state-building and, secondly, that the two can be mutually reinforcing. However, throughout, research sought to identify and isolate potential routes of impact of WASH service delivery on peace-building and state-building, so that assumptions about causal links could be better isolated and examined. Possible tensions between peace-building and state-building endeavours were also explored.

Where possible, the research also highlights the differences between water supply, sanitation or hygiene services, which may affect the potential for impact on peace-building or state-

building. This allows some examination of the extent to which the nature of the service being delivered shapes the specific impact on these processes, and whether one type of service may have a stronger potential for positive impact than another.

1.2 Research methodology

There were a number of key stages for this research. A desk-based literature review examined the current evidence base of WASH service delivery and peace-building and state-building (Mason, 2012, forthcoming), and this informed the development of a conceptual framework and research methodology.

South Sudan and DRC were selected by Tearfund and ODI as case study countries for this project. These countries were selected according to the following criteria:

- Current status of the programme (on-going or closed)
- Interest in taking part shown by Tearfund country office and their ability to host ODI researchers
- Ability to access the project field sites, given the existing security situations and the duration of field research (two weeks in each country)
- Type of WASH intervention implemented by Tearfund (including water, sanitation and hygiene interventions and different hardware/software approaches)
- The geographical expertise of ODI and existing ODI partnerships.

Fieldwork was then conducted in selected sites in South Sudan and DRC, using the following three stages of analysis:

1. Political economy analysis: Political economy analysis was conducted to understand the key institutions, actors and incentives towards peace-building/state-building, as well as drivers of conflict for DRC and South Sudan. This included a specific focus on the WASH sector to identify existing levels of collaboration, accountability, legitimacy and capacity of the state. Initial review of secondary literature was tested through qualitative fieldwork (interview-based) to triangulate and give depth to the findings.
2. WASH service delivery modality: The 'what, who and how' of WASH service delivery in Tearfund project sites were identified through secondary literature (project proposals, annual reports, mid-term evaluation), and then verified by ODI researchers in the field.
3. Routes for potential impact on peace-building and state-building: The potential relationship between WASH service delivery and peace-building and state-building were unpacked into five 'routes for influence', drawing from the conceptual framework.

ODI researchers were in Central Equatoria and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states in the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) from April 14 to 27, 2012, and visited five project sites in two of the four states in which Tearfund is implementing WASH service delivery with either partial or full support from the DFID WASH Capacity Building programme. In DRC, ODI researchers were in North Kivu and Maniema provinces in DRC from June 2 to 16, 2012, and visited two of the four project areas currently being supported by the DFID WASH programme in DRC. In both countries, semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions were held with stakeholders in country to identify how WASH service delivery (elements of what, who and how) manifests itself across the five above routes, and subsequent impact of the programme on state-building and peace-building. This synthesis report brings together analysis from both country case studies, and presents implications and potential areas for future Tearfund diagnostics.

2 Assertion and evidence: examining the literature

2.1 The state of debate

Fragility and conflict provide challenging contexts for service provision, in terms of the extent and types of needs, and the kinds of services that can be provided. But the relationship is not one-way. Practitioners have for some time been concerned to understand the potential impacts of the way services are delivered on conflict and fragility – for example through application of the Do No Harm framework (Anderson, 1999) or forms of conflict analysis (WaterAid Nepal, 2006; Tearfund, 2007; Tearfund, 2009).

The influence of service delivery on peace and statehood has been increasingly asserted in mainstream policy discourse which posits that services, delivered in the ‘right’ way, can actively contribute to peace and statehood: ‘Just as mounting fragility and deteriorating services can be mutually reinforcing tendencies, improving services may enhance social and economic recovery, overcoming fragility in a virtuous upward spiral’ (OECD, 2008a, p.21). This hypothetical ‘reciprocal’ relationship is shown in Figure 1 (left).


DFID’s ‘How to Note’ for measuring and managing development results in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations requires that ‘all interventions in all sectors in FCAS [fragile and conflict-affected states and situations] should contribute to tackling conflict and fragility, as a primary or secondary set of objectives’ (DFID, 2012a, p.25). Among ‘interventions’ in general, service delivery is no exception. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States¹ includes ‘manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery’ as one of five ‘peace-building and state-building goals’ (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2011).

A review of recent literature, however, finds that, while many contributions are asserted in the literature, there is little in the way of rigorous evaluation to test the impact of service delivery (and different forms of service delivery) on peace-building and state-building outcomes (Mason, 2012, forthcoming). This is perhaps not surprising, given that such outcomes are often intangible and relate to people’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviour. But it does suggest that, before embedding peace-building and state-building into

the design and monitoring of all service delivery in fragile and conflict-affected situations, it is important to consider how (and how far) services can meaningfully contribute to peace-building and state-building processes, and the types of practical guidance needed to best achieve this.

In terms of peace-building and a country’s transition out of conflict, WASH is sometimes given special status as an immediate, humanitarian priority alongside health, while other services such as education may be longer-term considerations ‘to provide a sense of normalcy and shared values’ (*Ibid*, p.6). Others have argued that establishing security is a prerequisite for all

Figure 1: Hypothetical reciprocal relationship between WASH services and peaceful, stable states and societies



Source: Kooy, Mason & Wild (unpublished)

¹ The New Deal was presented and endorsed in 2011 at the Fourth High-Level Conference on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea. It has been endorsed by numerous fragile states, donors and multilateral institutions (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2011). www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document

other goods and services (OECD, 2010). Special status for WASH has also been asserted in terms of it being seen as relatively politically neutral (OECD, 2008a, p.9) and offering greater opportunities for community and private sector involvement in service provision itself (Ndaruhutse *et al*, 2011) compared to other services.

One key feature of the evidence base is the multiplicity of definitions in use, with varying interpretations of the key terms. To ensure consistency, we adopt some common definitions, set out in the Box below. These terms are not without problems, and there has been significant debate within the literature. The eroding of distinctions between peace-building and state-building is also problematic. Throughout this report, we aim to distinguish between these two as separate processes, with their own dynamics. Moreover, it is important to recognise that peace-building and state-building may not always be mutually reinforcing. For example, imperatives to secure a 'peace dividend' by providing basic services in the immediate aftermath of conflict may facilitate the delivery of services through non-state actors, which in the longer term, may undermine the wider (state-building) goal of developing government capacity. This has been explored in the WASH sector by the World Bank Water and Sanitation Program (WSP), which described it as a 'capacity conundrum' that has important implications for service delivery.

Box 1: Key terms and concepts

Peace-building: Peace-building refers to 'those actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalise peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict... and a modicum of participatory politics... that can be sustained in the absence of an international peace operation' (Call and Cousins, 2007; cited in Rocha Menocal, 2009). Over time, the concept has become much more expansive, and there is increasing awareness of the importance of state institutions, while still emphasising the centrality of non-state actors and bottom-up processes in building peace (Ibid.). DFID's definition refers to establishing 'positive peace', characterised by 'social harmony, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and social and economic development' (DFID, 2010), which emphasises the expansive nature of some definitions.

State-building: 'State-building' is a commonly used term that encompasses deliberate actions by national and international actors to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions and build state capacity and legitimacy (Rocha Menocal, 2009). This is in line with DFID's definition of state-building, which emphasises the state's capacity, institutions and legitimacy, and the political and economic processes that underpin state-society relations (DFID, 2010). State-building is not only about the state in isolation – the quality and nature of the relationship linking state and society are also crucial (Rocha Menocal, 2009). As an objective, state-building is often discussed in terms of how the international community can support fragile states and those emerging from conflict, whereby increasing the legitimacy and authority of the government is essential for maintaining peace.

Fragility: Defined by DFID as a characteristic of states 'where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor' (DFID, 2012b). The OECD also emphasises ability to 'meet... expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process' (OECD, 2008b, p.16). The concept of fragility can apply to situations as well as countries (World Bank, 2011a).

2.2 Five potential routes for impact

Drawing from the literature, five potential routes appear to have been commonly identified through which service delivery can impact on peace-building and state-building:

- **Visibility**, which relates to the presence of the institutions (including the state) and infrastructure associated with stable societies.
- **Collaboration**, which entails processes for joint-working between state and society, or within society, which can reinforce cohesion.
- **Inclusion**, which relates to the involvement of all in political, social and economic life and the levelling of inequalities which lead to grievance.

- **Accountability**, which concerns responsiveness to citizens' needs and implies a two-way dialogue rather than a top-down process.
- **Opportunity**, which concerns the ability for citizens to participate in the economic, social and political activities of 'normal' life.

These routes were identified, following the initial review of the literature (Mason, 2012, forthcoming), to provide a framework of analysis in developing research questions. They are by no means presented as definitive. Other authors have used other headings to categorise the links between service delivery and peace- and state-building. Moreover, the field research revealed greater evidence for some of the routes for impact, than for others. Nonetheless, they usefully summarise the main themes and issues debated in the evidence available to date.

Visibility

The visibility of the service provider, whether state or non-state, is a common theme in the literature, not least because it is assumed to have a significant effect on how citizens' perceive and attribute the benefits of service improvements (or deterioration). This is highly dependent on citizens' prior expectations, which are likely to vary within and between services. The OECD's concept of 'output legitimacy' or the World Bank's 'performance legitimacy' (World Bank, 2011b) may thus depend on citizens having some basic expectations that the state will act as provider, or at least guarantor or regulator, of services. This gives rise to concerns that modes of service provision which operate outside state structures, relying on non-state providers (NSPs) without even any visible public regulatory oversight, may undermine incipient development of state-society relations because the state is not seen as a provider of services. This can work in tension when the immediacy of basic needs in the aftermath of conflict necessitates reliance on NSPs (Rocha Menocal, 2009; Batley and Mcloughlin, 2009), with implications for who is seen to be visible as service providers.

Several approaches have been put forward to build in more visible roles for the state even where it is lacking in capacity (or not appropriate) to act as service provider. Coordinated action by government, NGOs and international agencies in Timor Leste's health sector, for example, saw a gradual shift from emergency services provided by INGOs, through an interim health service which developed performance indicators and agreed standardisation with the NGOs, eventually contracting them directly, until a revitalised ministry of health could assume overall management of the system and district-level facilities (Klaus and Cliffe, 2002, cited in World Bank, 2011b).

Some studies point to ongoing realities of a plurality of service providers, and avoiding binary distinctions between the roles of state and non-state actors. The WDR 2011 proposes a 'best-fit' approach to reform, avoiding premature overloading of state institutions through a reliance on a diverse mix of state, private, faith- and community-based, and traditional institutions simultaneously – citing the example of the education sector in DRC, which was largely sustained by religious groups through the 1990s (World Bank, 2011b). Similarly, the OECD has identified contracting out of certain functions, on a time-limited and legally accountable basis, as a useful option to build state capacity incrementally. This grants it a strategic oversight role, while ensuring immediate needs are met through the most appropriate available provider (OECD, 2010).

Collaboration

Collaboration refers to processes for joint-working between the state and society, or within society, and is highlighted by the OECD as a further potential route for service delivery to reduce risk of conflict (OECD, 2008a). This reflects the notion that social capital will be reinforced, for example around collective action, by relying on and developing community structures to prioritise, plan and implement development projects. Increasingly, evidence shows that forms of participatory approaches cannot be guaranteed to build greater collaboration or contribute to more effective service provision. Indeed, forms of participatory processes in planning can often be challenged by the wider political economy and the nature of dominant power relations. Case study analysis points to the importance of supporting collaboration in ways which work with underlying incentives and, in some cases, fostering

forms of collective action that encourage contributions from a range of stakeholders, including communities themselves, to improve service delivery (e.g. Wild and Harris, 2012).

Attempts to evaluate experimentally the impact of a number of community-driven development and reconstruction projects in fragile contexts on the development of social capital have also shown mixed results. One study in Liberia suggests measurable positive impacts on community cohesion (Fearon *et al*, 2009), but others have revealed limited evidence for such outcomes (Beath *et al*, 2011; Avdeenko and Gilligan, 2012; Casey *et al*, forthcoming). This has come as a challenge to received wisdom that working in a community-driven manner, for example by helping to initiate and support community-level institutions for decision-making and management, will reinforce cohesive social attitudes and behaviour.

In terms of WASH, Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) is a well-established community-driven approach to reduce open defecation relying on community dynamics such as peer pressure. In its CLTS programme in the village of Surkh, Afghanistan, Tearfund observed that close collaboration between households occurred around latrine construction, partly facilitated by the topographical layout, whereby the large village was divided into small hamlet communities (Tearfund, 2010, cited in Ndaruhutse *et al*, 2011). In Pakistan, a local NGO helped facilitate collective action within informal settlements and slums to address chronic sanitation problems. Known as the Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute, it focused on dialogue with the Karachi city authorities, together with social facilitation and technical support to local residents (Bano, 2011; Sansom, 2011). Pre-existing community dynamics are widely recognised as 'conditioning factors' for approaches such as CLTS (Movik and Mehta, 2010) but the corollary, i.e. whether collective action approaches for WASH can enhance community ties, remains under-explored.

Inclusion

The notion that service delivery can help mitigate social and political exclusion has also been put forward (Berry *et al*, 2004). This is conceptually related to the 'accountability' route, above, but concerns the implications of breakdowns in equitable state-society or intra-society relations for particular excluded groups. In recent years, some caveats have been placed on approaches to inclusion, to recognise the need to work in incremental ways in fragile and conflict-affected states. The OECD (2008a), for example, has argued that in some fragile contexts, the need to neutralise powerful interests needs to be balanced alongside inclusiveness as a criterion for service delivery. Similarly, the 2011 WDR called for 'inclusive enough' settlements, whereby inclusion of different factions should be sufficient to see through reform, but may not need to be all-inclusive at first (World Bank, 2011b).

In terms of WASH, gender can assume particular importance, given the role of women and girls in the collection and use of water, and in conflict prevention and resolution. Scott (2007) notes that gender issues are a particular gap in the literature on state-building. Tearfund's experience is analysed by Burt and Keiru (2011), who find that women played a key role in negotiating an inter-village dispute in South Kivu, DRC, over a water supply system. The role of women as WASH users, managers and potential peacemakers (or breakers) therefore merits further, separate investigation.

Accountability

Accountability has been extensively discussed in WASH service delivery generally (e.g. Locussol & van Ginneken, 2010). The WDR 2004 proposed supporting service-related accountability through the 'short route' (direct from citizen, as client, to service provider) where the 'long route' is dysfunctional (i.e. from citizens to politicians). Baird (2010) argues that the long route is likely to be particularly weak in fragile contexts, increasing the imperative to think about possible short routes for service providers and users. Overall, however, Ndaruhutse *et al* (2011) find that there has been little research across social service sectors as to how service-related accountability may contribute to peace-building and state-building. The link appears especially hard to assert, or test for, in the case of sanitation and hygiene, where demand (and therefore expectation of service providers) is likely to be more latent than in the case of water supply. This can stem from poor experience of sanitation

provision to date or because, while women are more likely to be aware of the benefits of sanitation (due to their roles in domestic tasks), they are less often involved in determining household investment priorities.

Moreover, there has been some criticism of more normative or prescriptive approaches to accountability, which adopt blueprint approaches to particular forms of accountability that may be ill-suited to local contexts (Rocha Menocal and Sharma, 2008). This highlights the need to examine the wide range of stakeholders and different types of accountability relationships that may be present. Nassef and Belayhun (2011), for example, argue that traditional tribal authorities are a core component of the overall governance system in Ethiopia's pastoral regions, and need to be integrated in order to understand and manage the potential for conflict over access to water and rangelands.

Opportunity

The extent to which improved services can enhance opportunities for economic participation and disrupt persistent poverty cycles (OECD, 2008a) depends on the service, with a more direct link discernible for financial management and justice services, than for social services. Accordingly, this first group of services is seen as central to 'performance legitimacy', as construed in the WDR 2011 (World Bank, 2011b). Nonetheless, there is evidence of the economic importance of social services, including WASH. In countries that have yet to attain the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets for water supply and sanitation, analysis by the WHO confidently estimates the economic returns from sanitation to be at least five times the cost (two times in the case of water) – principally in terms of time savings (c. 70% of benefits for both water and sanitation in all regions) and healthcare savings (Hutton, 2012). The WDR 2011 also points to the importance of employment opportunities, especially for youth, as a group particularly at risk of alienation from the state and society. But the potential role of services, including water, in fostering employment opportunities, for example by creating a conducive environment for the private sector (World Bank, 2012) does not appear to have been discussed in detail.

Reflections on the evidence

The relative paucity of the evidence has been outlined in relation to the different routes for impact. At the same time, those routes have been articulated in various ways and help to highlight some of the potential mechanisms for supporting or taking account of peace-building and state-building dynamics. Ultimately, service delivery approaches which ignore issues of peace and statehood will, at best, do nothing to resolve underlying constraints or, at worst, exacerbate grievance and other drivers of conflict and social disintegration. But the caveats are also clear.

First, for each of the potential routes identified, the evidence needs to be strengthened. More generally, the review suggests there is little or no evidence to support an assumption that basic service delivery should be seen as inherent to achieving peace-building and/ or state-building; indeed, a growing body of thought suggests that other sectors and services (security and justice, roads and infrastructure) may be more significant (see, for example, OECD, 2008a; World Bank, 2011; Putzel and DiJohn, 2012; Carpenter *et al*, 2012). However, there may be intermediate opportunities for WASH to contribute to peace-building and/or state-building, which we explore in this report. For instance, evidence suggests that if service delivery is to aim at broader goals than effective and sustainable services, it must understand the particularities of conflict and instability in any given context, and adapt in targeted ways to that context.

These insights from the literature helped to frame the analytical approach and research for this project, and all the routes above were explored in relation to the two case studies; however, researchers also looked for other potential 'routes for impact'.

3 New insights: case studies in DRC and South Sudan

Fieldwork in DRC and South Sudan provided an important opportunity to contribute to some of the evidence gaps identified in the previous section; in particular, through qualitative analysis at local project sites, the project aimed to explore how these processes play out on the ground and the realised or potential impacts of selected WASH services. In the remainder of this report, lessons are identified from both country case studies, although in light of significant contextual differences, these two are not treated as comparative examples. Instead, they highlight some of the range of programming experiences and possible entry points for state-building and peace-building, in two very different contexts. They draw on two case study reports, which provide a fuller account of the findings in each country (Kooy and Wild, 2012; and Kooy and Bailey, 2012, both forthcoming).

3.1 The context in DRC

The Democratic Republic of Congo is commonly described as a post-conflict context. However, the reality of the DRC is more complex. Two wars, between 1996 and 2003, devastated a country already run into the ground by decades of rule by Mobutu Sese Seko. Presidential elections held peacefully in 2006 were won by Joseph Kabila, marking the official end of the post-war transition. Subsequent presidential elections took place in November 2011 and Joseph Kabila was declared the winner.

Despite these positive steps, there has been on-going conflict in eastern DRC, rampant corruption, human rights violations and a security sector that remains in desperate need of reform. The Congolese government is not held in high regard by its citizens. Trefon (2009) cites quotes such as 'the state doesn't do anything for us', and 'the state is so present, but so useless' that illustrate this and reflect tendencies of state officials to use their position to benefit themselves rather than serve their populations. Attempts to reform this system are hindered by the fact that most of the people within it would lose out from any such reforms, and thus block them (*Ibid*). This makes for a complex environment for aid agencies and donors seeking to promote development, peace-building and state-building and address humanitarian needs – objectives that are not always perfectly compatible with one another.

In the WASH sector, there are significant limitations of access, with only 40% of Congolese citizens thought to have access to an improved water source,² and significant disparities between rural and urban areas (Ministère du Plan et l'Institut National de la Statistique 2010). The limited financial resources allocated to the sector means that new facilities are rarely built and existing ones seldom maintained (DRC, 2006). In a country where water resources themselves are abundant (UNEP, 2011), the majority of residents rely on self-supply from unprotected sources (rivers, unprotected wells) with no state involvement in implementation, operation, management or financing.

In general, there is therefore very limited provision of WASH services by the government and the WASH sector is fragmented, with little state presence at village level. Sector institutions have all but collapsed following the two periods of conflict, and infrastructure was abandoned and destroyed. Recovery has been slow, hampered by on-going insecurity in the east, an absence of political will to push through institutional reforms, and the huge gap in institutional capacity required for decentralisation. The sector is in the midst of fundamental reforms initiated by the new Constitution (2006), and the Decentralisation law (2008), which will move responsibilities away from central government. The central government's reluctance to decentralise authority has, however, delayed the process, and in reality there has only been devolution of responsibility without the necessary financing and capacity. There is no

² Meaning a water source that, by nature of its construction, is protected from external contamination (and in particular protected from faecal matter).

nationwide policy or planning for rural water supply, and there is no clear ministry responsible for rural sanitation and hygiene, with roles split between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Environment.

As a result, the WASH sector is almost entirely funded by donors (95%), but actual disbursements to the sector have lagged behind commitments (AMCOW, 2010). Donors remain reluctant to implement projects through government agencies. For example, UNICEF's support to the DRC national programme of *Village Assaini*³ is formally a 'government-owned and implemented' programme, yet the budget for hardware and software implementation for rural water supply and sanitation activities is channelled through partnerships with NGOs, who then taken on the responsibility for implementation in tandem with government partners. Exacerbating the fragmentation of the sector between government agencies is the lack of coordination and harmonisation in donor strategies for the sector.

3.2 The context in South Sudan

The long history of conflict in South Sudan continues to shape the context for both service delivery and for processes of state-building and peace-building. Following Sudan's independence in 1956, violent clashes degenerated into the first North-South civil war (1955–1972). These patterns of internal conflict continued in the second North-South civil war (1983–2005). The second civil war, fought between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), was brought to an end by the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.

The CPA established a six-year interim period (dated from July 9, 2005) during which South Sudan would have the right to govern affairs in its region and participate equitably in the national government. The CPA also stipulated that, after the interim period, South Sudan would have the right to vote in an internationally monitored referendum, which was held in 2011 and resulted in a vote in favour of secession. The creation of the independent state of the Republic of South Sudan on July 9, 2011, has marked the start of processes of state-building for this new country. Despite these historic developments, a number of issues remain unresolved and the political economy of the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) continues to be significantly shaped by its relations with Sudan (AfDB, 2011), as shown in recent and ongoing clashes along the border. This has had significant effects on basic services. Primarily, it has significantly disrupted their delivery, due to on-going patterns of conflict and violence.

RoSS has extremely poor WASH indicators, with huge deficits in water supply and sanitation coverage as a result of decades of conflict and under-investment. 2010 data shows that only 55% of the population have access to improved sources of drinking water, and 80% do not have access to any toilet facility (SSCCSE, 2010). Water and sanitation indicators in South Sudan are some of the lowest in the world and the MDG water supply and sanitation targets are distant goals in both rural and urban areas (AMCOW, 2010). While the country has substantial water resources, these are unevenly distributed across the territory and vary substantially between years, with periodic major flood and drought events.

The government has stated its intention to meet the expectations of its people, including through the provision of basic services and the effective management of public resources. However, it currently does not have a primary role in relation to delivering some basic services, such as water and sanitation, and has yet to develop an effective role as a regulator of NSP provision in these areas. While there was evidence of high citizen expectations for what the new country/government would deliver post-independence, there are reportedly low expectations specifically for service provision (CfBT, 2012). A multi-donor evaluation in fact found that the predominance of non-state actors – including in WASH – may have further de-legitimised state-building processes, as most South Sudanese people reportedly did not see the state as a provider of many of these services (Bennett *et al*, 2010).

³ Village Assaini is a UNICEF supported programme, which funds the capacity building and institutional strengthening of relevant government agencies, while channelling funds for hardware and software implementation of rural water supply and sanitation activities through partnerships with NGOs.


While sector policies and institutions are evolving, they are not yet functional and most provision is funded by donors and delivered by NGOs, with significant implications particularly for state-building processes. The institutional set-up for the water sector is strongly interlinked with the newly established federal and decentralised administrative system of local government but still faces challenges, as the lower tiers of government have not yet been harmonised with the institutional needs of the sector. A large percentage (75%) of water sector financing is provided by donors. While there are some large bilateral sector donors (notably USAID), overall humanitarian and development assistance is mainly delivered through pooled financing mechanisms, including for WASH (Kooy and Wild, 2012). Much of this funding has been channelled through humanitarian mechanisms and delivered by non-state service providers. There have been more recent efforts to move towards longer-term development financing, with some large INGOs moving to capacity building and support rather than service delivery. In light of this diversity, a key challenge has been the lack of coordination of WASH services, with multiple actors involved in funding and delivering services.

3.3 Service delivery modalities

As the section above reveals, DRC and South Sudan offer two very different contexts, with different historical legacies, drivers of conflict and patterns of state-building. However, there are some similar trends, in terms of a dominance of humanitarian models, large amounts of external assistance and problems of fragmentation and coordination. Together, this has had important implications in terms of the selection of service delivery modalities.

For the purpose of this study, the service delivery modality comprises three concerns: the 'what, who and how' of service provision. These are likely to substantially shape how any potential gains for peace-building and/or state-building play out. From a technical standpoint, the 'what' question often dominates, and can be divided into several sub-issues. First of all, there is the broad subsector, i.e. water supply, sanitation or hygiene. Next, distinction is made between rural and urban contexts. In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, internally displaced person (IDP) camps could be argued to represent another category. A third component often used to characterise the 'what' of WASH services is the level of the service. According to one definition, service-level may itself 'be set through a combination of engineering factors (what is easy/possible) and social and political factors (what is politically acceptable, the cost, the desire and capacity of a community to press for improvements, and historical norms)' (Moriarty *et al*, 2011, p.3). The development of so-called 'service ladders' has helped systematise different levels of service: the IRC WASHCost project defines the rungs of a drinking water service ladder as: no service, sub-standard service, basic service, intermediate service or high service, based on a number of indicators (quantity, quality, accessibility and reliability) (Moriarty *et al*, 2011).

Figure 2: Service delivery dimensions: subsector, urban/ rural context and service level



Source: Authors' own

These three issues are represented graphically in Figure 2 (left) and are most often used to distinguish different types of service under the WASH umbrella. The 'who' of service provision is bound up with, and can even determine, what service is provided and how it is provided. This is particularly the case in post-conflict situations, for example where lack of government capacity may require the use of significant levels of non-state service providers (including international organisations) as part of the immediate, emergency response.

At the same time, the 'how' question is to some extent answered via the 'what' and 'who' questions: for example, in most rural contexts in developing countries, the choice of what technology to use, and who

implements, will be a technical exercise based on hydro-geological context, technical complexity, available skills and cost. Boreholes, for example, will usually be drilled by specialist subcontractors who have access to the necessary machinery. But beyond construction, and looking to the financing, planning and upkeep of services, multiple roles and different degrees of participation for community, state, private enterprises and NGOs are possible. That these issues are so intertwined hints at the fact that, on the ground, selecting an appropriate service modality is rarely a straightforward, linear process. This is particularly the case in fragile contexts, necessitating context-specific assessment rather than generic guidance and typologies.

The modalities employed in DRC and South Sudan

The contexts for the Tearfund projects examined in both DRC and South Sudan are both predominantly rural, though the South Sudan case study also included a returnee camp and a peri-urban community in Aweil Central county. Beyond this broadly rural context, however, the precise details of 'what', 'who' and 'how' varied significantly across the four case study sites and across the two countries. The specifics are captured in Table 1.

Table 1: Overview of Tearfund WASH service modalities in DRC and South Sudan

| What | Who – NSPs | Who – government | How (additional details) |
|---|--|--|--|
| DRC: Tongo. Tearfund focuses on technical advice, specific capacity building activities and learning events, rather than direct implementation, carried out through its own Operations unit rather than local partners. Project linked into government-implemented, UNICEF-funded <i>Village Assaini</i> ⁴ programme. Classed as humanitarian, through involved in activities which could be perceived as more development-oriented. Strong emphasis on involving government agencies from the beginning. | | | |
| Rural water supply: gravity-fed systems, spring catchments, reservoirs, piped distribution | Finance and project management by Tearfund; construction by private contractor; labour from households; facilitation and oversight by local churches and traditional authority; participation in training and events by military | Site selection, technical assessment and registration and supervision of WASH committee following Tearfund departure by various government agencies | <i>Village Assaini</i> approach. Community-based operation and management (WASH committee); repairs financed by households. Tearfund pay <i>per diems</i> and a small fee for government involvement |
| Household sanitation: latrines | Supervision from Tearfund; construction and finance by households; leadership, coordination and motivation by local churches and traditional authority | No government involvement to date; aim is to involve BCZ (Zone Health Bureau) at later stage | Community-led total sanitation combined with <i>Village Assaini</i> . Zero subsidies for household latrines |
| School sanitation: latrines | Finance and project management by Tearfund; construction by private contractor; planning by parents' committee | | |
| Hygiene education: water safety plans | Hygiene training by Tearfund to local leaders (including military commander); hygiene education by local churches | | |
| DRC: Maniema. NB: Tearfund has not yet commenced implementation – details below relate largely to programme planning and overall logic. Tearfund will aim to increase access, promote latrine construction through CLTS and sensitise villagers around water, sanitation and health practices. Strong emphasis on involving government agencies from the beginning. | | | |
| Rural water supply: protected springs | Finance and project management by Tearfund; construction by private contractor; labour from households | Site selection (in collaboration with NGO partners), technical assessment and registration and supervision of WASH committee following Tearfund departure by various government agencies | As per Tongo; community-based management, including collecting user fees, by village WASH committees. No conflict analysis conducted |
| Household sanitation: latrines | Supervision from Tearfund; construction and finance from households; | BCZ will be involved | As per Tongo |
| Hygiene education: hygiene and water safety sensitisation | Training by Tearfund; no government involvement to date | | |

⁴ A national programme started in 2006 with the ambition to reach 2,850 villages by 2012, supported by UNICEF. The programme has incorporated more community involvement from its original form, and combines hygiene education and awareness with diagnosis, community action planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. Though the approach is broadly followed in the Tongo case study site, the villages are not fully integrated in the UNICEF system or registered for the associated reward scheme.

| | | | |
|---|---|--|---|
| South Sudan: Central Equatoria. Tearfund works through Across, a network of churches providing a range of development and humanitarian interventions. Strong community mobilisation component. No explicit theory of change but emphasis on hand-washing and disease reduction, and associated training, advocacy and facilitation of community initiatives around water and sanitation. | | | |
| Rural water supply: training on water treatment | Training provided by schools | None | Church and Community Mobilisation Process ⁵ led to identification of WASH services as a village development need. Timeline determined by villagers Project only provides software; hardware (latrines, well-lining, boreholes) must be financed from local resources |
| Household sanitation: School hygiene committee training, water treatment, latrine maintenance | Leadership and motivation from local churches, via Across; mobilisation and engagement with government by traditional authorities; also community (community development committee, WASH advocacy teams, school hygiene committees and volunteer village hygiene promoters) | | |
| Hygiene education: hygiene promotion, hand-washing, food preparation and solid waste hygiene | | | |
| South Sudan: Aweil Centre county. Case study covers three different settlement types: returnee camp, village and peri-urban community. Tearfund provides 'humanitarian relief' directly, providing new permanent WASH facilities and maintaining existing services to address the needs of returnee and host communities. | | | |
| Rural water supply: borehole construction and repair, spring protection (camp); rainwater harvesting tanks (school); training pump mechanics | Service provision by Tearfund (most visible actor delivering WASH services) Consultation on needs identification, leadership and coordination by camp headmen | Site selection, needs assessment and approval of work plan by government by state/county government, but not visible during implementation Intention to have a government counterpart, but staff limited and unskilled, especially at county level Monthly coordination meetings held at state level | Fully subsidised approach at returnee camp (humanitarian) Free water supply hardware; communities contribute labour and local materials (wood for well protection) Village WASH committee operates, maintains and finances repairs For sanitation, cement slabs are free; households are responsible for super-structure |
| Household sanitation: emergency (plastic slab) and household (cement slab) latrines | Borehole drilling by private sector contractor Transport of materials and construction labour by households | | |
| School sanitation: latrine block construction and rehabilitation | Management, financing of repairs and operation by village WASH committee Oversight and facilitation of households' activities by traditional authority | | |
| Hygiene education: Training of local leaders; school health clubs; water storage; water treatment training | | | |

As the Table above sets out, Tearfund has employed a range of modalities for its WASH programmes. These range from those which are rooted in community mobilisation and engagement (including sensitisation around sanitation and hygiene) as in Central Equatoria, South Sudan, which is implemented through a local partner, to programmes directly implemented by Tearfund and largely focused on hardware construction (i.e. boreholes and latrines) as in North Kivu, DRC, and in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, South Sudan. These were often classified as either 'development' initiatives (i.e. community-led) or humanitarian, operational support.

⁵ The Church and Community Mobilisation Process (CCMP) has been deployed by Tearfund in numerous countries, and essentially involves local churches acting as facilitators in mobilising communities to determine and address their development priorities and needs.

In part, these seem to reflect some of the underlying contextual factors. In Central Equatoria, there has been greater stability, arguably allowing for greater opportunities for longer-term, community-based engagement. Interviews in DRC also revealed that choices of programme modalities reflected perceptions of security and stability of different regions. In practice, however, our analysis suggests that some of these relatively fixed categories (e.g. humanitarian/development) may hide realities where both approaches are needed and realities where responding to immediate need remains an on-going concern but does not negate the need also to prioritise wider engagement. We reflect further on this, and its implications for peace-building and state-building, in the following sections.

4 Implications for peace-building and state-building

This project did not seek to evaluate Tearfund's WASH programming in DRC or South Sudan, which – as set out above – had particular targets in sanitation, hygiene and water access. Instead, it sought to explore opportunities (potential or realised) for wider effects on state-building and peace-building processes. This section reflects on how the different modalities described above seem to have affected these processes in DRC and South Sudan, drawing from country case study analysis (see Kooy and Bailey, 2012; and Kooy and Wild, 2012, both forthcoming).

4.1 WASH programming and peace-building processes

Turning first to peace-building processes, insecurity and conflict undoubtedly remain an on-going concern in parts of both DRC and South Sudan. Parts of eastern DRC, for instance, continue to be hotspots for armed fighting, with around 200,000 citizens in North Kivu thought to have been displaced in 2012 alone. Similarly, the political economy of South Sudan continues to be significantly shaped by its relations with Sudan (AfDB, 2011). Agreement has not yet been reached on the demarcation of the border between Sudan and South Sudan (including oil fields). This came to a head earlier this year, leading to new bouts of conflict in the border regions and a new round of peace talks. This is alongside high numbers of returnee communities, previously living in Sudan or elsewhere. This is a core component of the wider context for delivering WASH services (alongside other basic services) in both countries.

Our findings highlight that in the project sites visited for fieldwork, in both DRC and South Sudan, access to WASH services *per se* was not a central driver of armed conflict. This partly reflects the sites selected for fieldwork. In South Sudan, for example, the research team did not visit any programmes based in pastoralist communities (where conflict over access to water for livestock has been highlighted by others) and nor did it visit areas characterised by higher levels of water scarcity. More broadly, both countries have a range of historical legacies, systemic features and regional geopolitics which continue to shape significantly the main drivers of conflict, and are not limited to conflicts over (or necessarily shaped by) access to WASH services themselves (see Box below).

Box 2: Main conflict drivers for DRC and South Sudan

Main conflict drivers for DRC include (drawn from Gambino, 2011):

- Prevalence of ethnic identities rather than one unifying national identity
- Competition over land tenure and ownership
- Regional and international geopolitics (including spill-overs from neighbouring conflicts, relations with Rwanda and so on).

Main conflict drivers for Republic of South Sudan include (drawn from de Waal, 2007; Pantuliano *et al*, 2008):

- Historic centre-periphery inequalities
- High levels of armed groups or militia
- Transit and reintegration of returning populations
- Banditry (including cattle raids).

This is an important point for nuance. It highlights the extent to which conflict dynamics can be driven by a wide range of factors, many of which may be of a different dimension compared with basic service delivery. Nonetheless, in many of the project sites visited, a number of examples were identified where underlying peace-building dynamics, including tensions within and between groups, could *spill over* into access to WASH services. A number of opportunities were also identified where Tearfund-supported projects could or had helped to ameliorate some of these tensions through decisions on programme implementation.

Understanding how programmes are implemented

In DRC, a strong finding of this project is that tensions or conflicts related to WASH service delivery were often related to the nature of the programme itself, in terms of how it was delivered and implemented. Some of the sites examined in North Kivu, for example, revealed tensions between military and non-military groups and communities, where local military presence was seen to use or appropriate water points and WASH facilities, without contributing to their construction or maintenance. This could manifest itself in tensions and conflicts with the wider community. While these are linked to wider causes of armed violence (i.e. civil/military tensions across DRC), they were not drivers of conflict *per se*, and there was no evidence of any wider effects for peace-building outside WASH services (for example, in terms of wider effects on land issues, banditry, civil-military dynamics and so on), which suggests the need for realistic appraisals of these local conflict dynamics.

In the Republic of South Sudan, in areas around Aweil and close to the border with Sudan, tensions were also identified, in this context between returnee and host communities, which could spill over into tensions over access to a range of WASH services. For instance, fieldwork highlighted complaints from some of those within returnee communities, who felt that their needs were not being met: chiefs in the Apada returnee camp complained that 'the government has forgotten the returnee community'. There were also signs of resentment from host communities, evident in the peri-urban community in Nyala *payam*, and examples of competition between host and returnee communities, including for WASH services.

While this is reportedly more prevalent in other states of South Sudan (such as Upper Nile or Unity states), it was evident at a lower scale of competition in the Tearfund project site in Majongrak village, where there were reports of frequent conflicts in the queue for water at a hand pump in a host community village. This was combined with wider patterns, for example where local *payam* offices were a target for resentment, as they were seen to be directing externally funded projects towards favoured communities. This was also manifest in tensions over who uses water sources or facilities and who contributes to their maintenance.

This suggests that the design of WASH interventions may be particularly important in shaping whether they have the potential to address intra- and inter-community tensions related to

water access and water management, even where the national and regional conflict dynamics associated with armed violence remain outside the scope of these interventions. In other words, WASH interventions may have the potential to bring communities together around the common goal of increasing access to water and sanitation, and in the process reduce hostility towards, or resentment between, different groups. Conversely, when not enough attention is paid to the wider context and to conflict drivers, projects themselves have the potential to cause further conflict.

Scope for supporting collaboration and greater inclusion

In addition, a number of examples were identified where Tearfund WASH projects seemed to have supported greater collaboration, in terms of supporting processes for joint-working between state and society, or within society, which helped reinforce cohesion and could ameliorate potential tensions. This appeared to be most effective where it linked communities with the capacity to engage in collective action and the co-production of services.

In areas of Central Equatoria, South Sudan, for instance, (less affected by security risks at present but still recovering from legacies of conflict), the application of Tearfund's Church and Community Mobilisation Programme (CCMP) seemed to be particularly helpful in fostering greater collaboration and cohesion between and within communities (see Box 3). In the village of Goja, for instance, Tearfund's partner organisation, Across, worked through the church in local communities and was able to bring together community members, enabling them to address collective action challenges and to co-produce various services together. This included new well construction, where community members contributed stone, brick and sand and a local community-based organisation provided labour and cement, with the involvement of the county government.

Box 3: Tearfund's Church and Community Mobilisation Programme

Tearfund's Church and Community Mobilisation Process (CCMP) had its origins in forms of Participatory Evaluation Processes (PEPs) implemented in East Africa in the 1990s. Evaluations in the 2000s reportedly highlighted that local churches were often not involved in PEPs. The CCMP was designed to contribute towards addressing that gap.

The first step of the process involves church mobilisation. Through Bible studies, church communities are reportedly mobilised to identify what is needed at local levels. This might include digging a local well or providing assistance to particular vulnerable groups. Emphasis is placed on churches managing their own response to an identified need. With CCMP, a local church is facilitated to engage in dialogue with the non-church sections of the community, around identified areas of need. The aim is for the local church to help enable the wider community to address and manage its response to particular problems, acting as a facilitator to community-managed initiatives (Tearfund, 2012).

This process reportedly takes significant time (estimated at around 18 months for initiatives to take hold) and it is reliant on strong facilitation. Tearfund has been implementing this approach with the Anglican Church in Kenya, Tanzania, DRC and South Sudan, among other countries (*Ibid*).

Crucial to its success was the fact that the programme allowed communities to realise their own resources, including contributions to construction outlined above, as well as their own ability to make changes in their homes and local environments (for example, in terms of hand-washing and other sanitary practices). There seems to be much greater scope to recognise this as a core feature – and value added – of Tearfund's support in this region and it potentially helps to support stronger societal structures, in the process potentially supporting very localised peace-building.

Significantly, Across staff focused as much on their engagement with traditional leaders or chiefs at local level as with church leaders, reflecting the relative strength of chiefs within local communities in South Sudan and within local state structures too. While there is some evidence that chiefs' roles and influence may have been weakened by patterns of conflict and displacement, they seemed to play key roles in the villages visited, not just in bargaining and mediation between groups, but also in bringing communities together to take collective action.

Across staff involved in the WASH programme were skilled at playing to some of the interests and motivations of these leaders: they were reportedly approached first, to ensure their support for the process, and appeals were made in terms of their benefits (for instance, in status) from improvements within the community. This could be further capitalised on, for example by facilitating the presentation of issues and airing of complaints that may shape local peace-building. Similarly, in the peri-urban community in Nyala *payam* close to Aweil town, greater collaboration among women in the community was noted. Motivated by hygiene-awareness training, a women-only water management committee worked together to improve their spring well, with the assistance of hardware from Tearfund.

In DRC, some projects were able to go one step further, and to help broker relations between different groups. In parts of North Kivu, the inclusion of the military as a stakeholder group for WASH projects, including senior military representation, was viewed as important in securing their buy-in and in helping to raise issues which had caused tensions with the wider community. Crucially, in this case, military groups were brought in as constructive participants – encouraged through their participation at key workshops and their employment as labour to contribute to WASH construction. This reportedly needed to be handled carefully by local staff, to ensure that the military's authority was appropriately recognised, and there were challenges in light of the on-going turnover of troops, but building relationships was reportedly productive.

Again, this highlights the importance of *the process* for project implementation. In addition to examples of outreach with the military, some projects, such as those examined in Majongrak in North Kivu, usefully involved communities in site selection, and other key decisions on project implementation. This reportedly helped to ensure their buy-in to the process and helped to manage perceptions (and address any potential conflicts). This approach seemed to be most suited to modalities focused on community mobilisation; however, there may be considerable scope to incorporate elements within modalities focused on hardware construction too.

Operationalising conflict sensitivity

Moreover, our findings underscore the importance of adopting a conflict-sensitive approach. At present, conflict sensitivity is recognised in Tearfund guidance but may not be fully or systematically operationalised in programming. For instance, conflict assessments or mapping, to determine the ways in which projects could positively or negatively impact on existing tensions/conflicts and strategies to address this, did not seem to be conducted systematically across those projects reviewed in DRC and South Sudan.

One common strategy seems to have been the hiring of local staff, working for Tearfund or its partner organisations, with strong local knowledge, particularly where they were from local communities and had good local networks. This can be useful but can be limited by changes to programme staffing and may not be comprehensive in the issues covered. An example from another project in DRC provides a useful illustration of conflict sensitivity that is mainstreamed into project implementation and processes, including through forms of community-level conflict mapping, and may offer some useful lessons (see Box 4).

Box 4: Conflict sensitivity as a core component of programming

A national NGO, PPSSP, has worked in eastern DRC on service delivery since 2002, and is a funded partner of Tearfund. In relation to WASH services, PPSSP is involved in a range of household sanitation/community sanitation activities, as well as support for a gravity-fed water system. It has reportedly adopted a more systematic conflict-sensitive programming approach, by involving the community in mapping local conflict dynamics. This was built into programme design, so that at the start of the programme, PPSSP staff conducted conflict mapping with local residents, working through village committees and trained by PPSSP. These groups identified local conflict issues, mapped their likely prevalence and were supported to identify collectively strategies to help mitigate or resolve possible tensions. For example, military-civilian tensions were identified as a possible conflict issue and the village committee was supported to meet with military commanders to ensure greater enforcement of rules on military contributions to collective cleaning and maintenance of water points. This provides a practical example of how conflict mapping can help identify potential tensions and strategies for how they might be addressed.

Lessons may also be learnt from the experiences of other agencies. For example, UNICEF's PEAR (Programme of Expanded Assistance to Returnees) Plus programme, also in DRC, is a useful example of how an agency has explored the potential contributions of its basic services programming to peace-building and revised its approach and expectations. A similar change in approach is also apparent for a programme in South Sudan, which initially sought to include peace-building objectives in relation to WASH, but subsequently reduced expectations and sought to diversify its responses to these processes (see Box 5).

Box 5: Realism in expectations for WASH and peace-building

Two experiences, in DRC and South Sudan, highlight the need for greater realism in terms of expectations for supporting peace-building as part of WASH interventions:

- In DRC, PEAR Plus is a multi-sector UNICEF programme, which aims to support durable solutions for returning IDPs in North Kivu, South Kivu, Katanga and Ituri through basic services (education, health and WASH) and child protection. When the stabilisation strategies were elaborated in 2009, UNICEF decided that PEAR Plus would be its contribution to stabilisation and that 'peace-building' would be a cross-cutting theme in the programme. UNICEF then engaged Search for Common Ground (SFCG) to determine the programme's likely impacts on peace-building. SFCG found that the programme had not taken into account how to mitigate or exacerbate conflict and that the intervention areas already had a low risk of conflict (Izzi and Kurz, 2009). These findings led to subsequent collaboration with SFCG so that the programme could include conflict analysis and a stronger peace-building component, rather than expecting 'peace dividends' to emerge organically. Principles underpinning the PEAR Plus intervention now include reinforcing community structures (e.g. related to health, education) and direct collaboration with the government and conflict sensitivity (and contributing to peace consolidation where possible).
- In South Sudan, the Water for Recovery and Peace Programme (WRAPP) specifically linked provision of WASH services with peace-building aims initially. Supported by USAID, and implemented with PACT-Sudan and local partners, it ran from 2004 to 2008. An independent evaluation found that while WRAPP eased tensions over WASH resources in areas with a high proportion of internally displaced persons and returnees, all of the conflicts that the interventions resolved related to those caused by the intervention itself (i.e. standposts, community management, user fees), and there was no evidence of reduced conflict through the provision of *hafirs* (Welle et al, 2008). Since 2008, PACT-Sudan continues to implement WRAPP, but without any direct peace-building objectives, in light of the lack of evidence in relation to broader peace-building objectives. Instead, it has separate programmes in peace-building and justice. A key recommendation from the external evaluation of WRAPP highlighted Do No harm as an often-neglected yet important aspect of conflict mitigation and highly relevant for WRAPP interventions in water supply and water resources management.

Despite the need for caution set out, there may be some important lessons from these experiences. The first seems to be the importance of conflict sensitivity in order to identify potential impacts on conflict (positive or negative). In DRC, UNICEF began by looking for links between its multi-sectoral intervention and peace-building, without having considered conflict and peace-building in project design. It has since made an impressive shift to considering local conflict dynamics – including those caused by the intervention itself – as well as possible 'bridges' and 'connectors' that might support peace-building.

However, both examples also highlight some of the potential limitations in aiming to use programming for basic services to impact peace-building. This is reinforced by the broader literature, which suggests that causal links between basic service delivery and peace-building or state-building are not clearly identified, and that other sectors or services may have greater impacts on legitimisation and conflict mitigation processes. (This is also flagged in a broader literature review by Ndaruhutse *et al*, 2011.) This suggests, in line with our findings, refocusing from aiming to impact on broader peace-building dynamics to identifying specific local entry points, and ensuring that analysis of local conflict dynamics is consistently and effectively incorporated into programming and implementation.

4.2 State-building implications

DRC and South Sudan offer very different contexts for state-building processes, reflecting very different historical legacies and state dynamics, and significant variance in perceptions of legitimacy and citizens' expectations.

In DRC, various studies have described the state in uniformly bleak terms: it is viewed as largely predatory or extractive by its citizens and seen as a 'failed state' (Trefon, 2010). This reflects the legacies of former president Mobutu Sese Seko, who promoted a predatory approach where public positions were frequently used for private gain, a pattern which continues today (Trefon, 2009).

South Sudan offers a very different context where, with the creation of the new Republic of South Sudan, the government is seen as having greater legitimacy, with higher citizen expectations for what the new country (and its government) will now deliver, although there are also concerns to strengthen accountability relationships. At the same time, high levels of non-state service providers mean there is limited understanding or awareness of the government's role in service delivery for some sectors (Ali, 2012), creating potential tensions between mismatched expectations and realities. These differing contexts offer very different entry points and openings for considering state-building implications.

Questions of visibility

Nonetheless, one striking finding is the extent to which INGOs are commonly seen as the main providers of WASH services with limited or no perception of the role of the state at local levels in both countries. This reflects the fact that in both countries, donor assistance provides the majority of the funding for the WASH sector, and INGOs (or NGOs) have been the primary implementing partners. In DRC, this is thought to be as high as 95% funding by donor support, whereas in South Sudan, this is likely to be around 75%. In both countries, there have been recent efforts to strengthen government oversight and reporting for NGO-implemented projects (see Box 6 below), but this does not yet seem to be influencing local perceptions or translating into recognition of changed approaches.

Box 6: Recent donor programming with a state building component

- In DRC, the *Village Assaini* programme aims to support improvements in WASH outcomes. Supported by UNICEF and with the Ministries of Health and Education, it provides institutional support to various government agencies and funds NGOs to implement water and sanitation. It is coordinated at the national level by government agencies, with further monitoring and coordination at provincial and local levels too.
- In South Sudan, donor funding has been commonly channelled through various pooled funding mechanisms. One example is the Basic Services Fund, established in 2005 and due to end in December 2012, to support the government to expand primary education, primary health and water and sanitation services. It is supported by a number of donors and has directly financed local and international NGOs to deliver basic services. In water and sanitation, there have been recent efforts to encourage NGOs to report directly to the Ministry for Water Resources and Irrigation.

In part, this reflects some of the messy realities in terms of moving from humanitarian to more developmental interventions in countries affected by conflict. Fieldwork analysis and our review of the broader literature reveal the prevalence of fairly fixed models for what constitutes humanitarian vis-à-vis development programming. Much of the support received in DRC and South Sudan to date has operated from a largely humanitarian standpoint, focused on meeting basic needs. In recent years, particularly with the creation of the new Republic of South Sudan, there has been some movement towards approaches seen as more developmental (such as working with government systems, through community engagement).

Yet, traditional categories of humanitarian or development seem to break down quickly in these contexts, where realities mean that the transition from one to the other is not linear, but

rather cyclical, messy and contested. Despite this plurality, what is striking is how similar models and issues of visibility seem to be. This suggests that programmes are not yet fully adapting to differences, for instance at sub-national levels, and are struggling to transition effectively out of an emergency response focus.

This plays out in terms of fairly fixed local perceptions of NGOs as those who are responsible for service delivery, with little signs of shifts in attitudes (for example, recognition of the role of communities themselves or of some state actors as also having responsibilities). In one project area in DRC, Tearfund was still seen as the visible service provider, despite efforts to report to and involve local state agencies, and the state was not seen as having the capacity or legitimacy to provide services. As one respondent shared, 'Who is the government? Who are they? I have never seen them. They have not brought schools or clinics to the village.' While some local leaders in DRC did recognise that Tearfund projects had the approval of government, and to some degree their cooperation, the benefits were commonly attributed to Tearfund alone: 'The government shouldn't be providing more development, because then there would only be more corruption. It is better that Tearfund is here.'

Moreover, few citizens interviewed expected the Congolese state to be accountable to them. As one respondent noted, 'We do not depend on the government. The government does nothing. We prefer the NGOs. You see the state of the roads... the government sees this and does nothing.' A future project planned by Tearfund in Maniema seeks to support greater involvement of the government, which may help to increase its visibility in the targeted villages, where officials perform monitoring activities and technical assessments or are involved in sensitisation activities. However, where Tearfund is the direct implementer of support, it seems to remain the most visible actor. This partly reflects the nature of the Congolese context, where the state is seen as predatory by local citizens. In this context, it may not be appropriate for Tearfund projects to work to strengthen the visibility of the state at local levels. But, there may be greater opportunities to build communities' own sense of agency, in order to counteract the potential for over-reliance on external support. We return to this in the section below.

Similar trends were evident in South Sudan, although they manifested themselves in different ways. In the Aweil area, which has experienced higher insecurity in recent years as part of the border region, where there were gaps or problems with provision, villages waited to report to NGOs rather than reporting to local authorities. This reflects the dominance of more humanitarian approaches in these areas. But there were some differences between groups. Expectations for the state to provide WASH services appeared to be higher among returnee communities than for the host communities (also in relation to the quality/level of services) and, not unsurprisingly, there were more negative feelings held toward the state for not fulfilling these functions among returnees than for host groups. This concurs with other research in South Sudan (CfBT, 2012) and probably reflects the fact that many of these communities may have previously received higher-quality services, which has shaped their current expectations.

Within Aweil, where Tearfund is the primary deliverer of the programme, its benefits are clearly credited to Tearfund (rather than to the government). In Majongrak village, the headman stated that he used to go to the *payam* office to request development and water supply in particular but 'there was never anything coming out of this'. The *payam* was perceived as non-responsive to local needs, and reportedly officials responded to these requests with the statement: 'Why continue to ask for something that will never come?' Moreover, residents in Majongrak were unclear as to the *payam's* role in approving or determining Tearfund project locations. Thus, even though Tearfund has trained and involved local government (county, *payam*) actors in conducting site assessments used to select project locations, the benefits of being selected for Tearfund interventions were not, at least in this case, attributed to or linked with state involvement.

In Central Equatoria, where there has been less insecurity in recent years and growing state capacity at county levels, again many of the benefits of WASH service delivery programmes were also credited to non-state providers (largely INGOs or NGOs), rather than to communities

themselves or to state actors who should have some formal responsibilities. All respondents interviewed identified non-state providers (often referred to generically as 'NGOs' by communities) as their primary source of assistance for service delivery; where there were gaps or problems with provision identified, villages reported that they would 'wait for NGOs to visit' rather than reporting to local authorities at *payam* or county level. Some of these dynamics may reflect the nature of the WASH sector, which has been less of a priority for the South Sudan government than, for example, education (which has particular state-building imperatives too). But it also reflects the lack of tailored strategies and the need for more nuanced approaches that recognise the extent to which humanitarian-to-development transitions are non-linear and will require a diversity of models, tailored to the local context.

In some cases, the high visibility of NGOs in these contexts may actually do harm to longer-term perceptions of their work. While the need to brand projects, and be visible on the ground, is often linked to the perceived need to be accountable for projects, our research highlights a perceived lack of accountability despite this visibility. Questions were raised by communities in parts of Central Equatoria, for instance, as to the accountability or responsiveness of these non-state providers. This is not a criticism directly levelled at Tearfund's programmes in the area, but it provides an important backdrop. In Goja, there were reports of four boreholes drilled by other NGOs in the vicinity but clustered in areas difficult for local populations to access, and with a lack of consultation with communities for the siting of these boreholes. This was a commonly repeated problem in many of the local sites, suggesting that visibility may not equate to greater accountability, unless sufficient measures are perceived to have been taken to consult and work with local stakeholders. In light of this, and the longer-term effects for state-building, NGOs in some settings may want to consider branding or forms of visibility that more obviously show their links with government and other local actors. As with other possible peace-building and state-building steps, NGOs need to judge whether this is appropriate for each context; as highlighted above, it may not be appropriate where there is, for example, a predatory state.

In practice, these dynamics reinforce the need to break down static categories of humanitarian or development programmes, and investigate further the range of hybrid models or approaches that can flexibly combine multiple components. For WASH services, this might include models that allow for a mix of hardware and software investments, or ones that support community mobilisation while also working towards greater state engagement or relationship-building. Projects often seemed to be characterised as one or the other, i.e. implementation of construction/hardware or of community mobilisation, rather than seeking to combine useful elements of both. It also implies the need for more process-driven approaches, focused on relationship-building with key stakeholders, to involve them substantively in choices on programme implementation and secure their participation and buy-in to reform processes regardless of the particular WASH modality. At the same time, it will mean more nuanced and adaptable strategies, which need to look quite different if they are implemented in Northern Bahr el Ghazal or Central Equatoria.

From state-building to 'state- and society-building'

The dominance and visibility of NGOs as a service provider can undermine strengthening the capacity of state institutions – what WSP has dubbed 'the capacity conundrum' (WSP, 2011a and 2011b). While many organisations make significant contributions to addressing WASH needs, less attention has been paid to consideration of the potential trade-offs in terms of who is associated with service delivery and who is held to account for the delivery of services. At the same time, in both countries, accountability relationships between state and society remain constrained, and are themselves still emerging in the case of the new Republic of South Sudan. This means there are twin imperatives, to both build up the institutional capacity of the state and to strengthen accountability relationships over time. Crucially, this needs to be anchored on feasible, realistic approaches that seek to build on local norms and institutions where possible.

In both countries, efforts to mobilise a range of stakeholders (state and non-state) to work collectively to address WASH gaps at local levels seemed to be particularly effective at both

addressing chronic service delivery problems and at supporting constructive relationships between different stakeholders (with potential state- and institution-building implications). This suggests that, rather than supporting a particular model, for example of accountability, greater efforts could be spent in brokering and facilitating local problem-solving between stakeholders. We call this 'state- and society-building' to signal the inclusion of a wide range of actors and relationships. It can be seen as part of a process of supporting accountability relationships over time, which begins with forms of trust-building and socialising to bring different groups together.

For instance, there were signs that the community mobilisation approach used in South Sudan, under the CCMP, helped to challenge some of these perceptions, and helped to build a greater sense of local agency rather than dependence on external support. Concrete examples were identified where the CCMP helped address perceptions of responsibility and facilitated communities themselves to address chronic collective action problems, from the management of sanitation facilities to the construction and maintenance of new infrastructure. Approaches that brought in government actors among other stakeholder groups to contribute to the production of services seemed to be particularly effective.

While the DRC offers a much more constrained context for these processes, some examples were identified where community mobilisation strategies had been supported and also included key state actors at the local level. Support by PPSSP, for instance, used a community mobilisation approach, but as part of this, it explicitly worked with state actors too, in this case, health zone workers who were seen as key influencers on sanitation practices. Some positive examples were put forward from this approach, particularly in one district, where a local health officer had been fining households for poor sanitation facilities and keeping the funds. This was reportedly highlighted by the work of PPSSP; the community was mobilised to help address it and the project was reportedly able to improve the accountability of this one state official.

One remaining challenge is how to bridge community-level initiative to a wider sense of collective action. In a village in Central Equatoria, South Sudan, one of the hygiene monitors stated: 'We are not so much bothered with government, especially with the current government: Across has opened our eyes to be self-empowered.' This attitude may mean that the benefits of collaboration remain located at the level of the individual community, rather than spilling over into their relationships with others, including local state actors. Therefore, where these types of initiatives focus only on mobilising the individual village or community involved, they may miss other opportunities to develop further links.

Undoubtedly, however, this needs to proceed in an incremental and realistic manner, which recognises capacity constraints on the ground. In many of the government offices visited in South Sudan, for instance, significant constraints were identified, including where the actual offices (at country levels) were newly constructed and lacked resourcing for transport, fuel and other supplies, as well as limited staff training and skills, to enable effective monitoring, oversight and participation by state officials. There was also commonly a lack of policy coherence, where the mandates for WASH services were not clearly defined and at times seemed to fall between those for water services and health services, creating confusion as to who should play a lead role.

Opening up possibilities for engagement in 'state- and society-building' would therefore need to proceed carefully, particularly in light of the potential incentive problems on all sides. These constraints suggest the need to identify some realistic entry points for incorporating greater (and more visible) roles for a range of stakeholders, including local state actors. In South Sudan, there may be increased demand on government services to repair boreholes, as in Central Aweil where broken boreholes were followed by requests for assistance to the *payam* and county government. This could provide one useful entry point for greater state-building engagement, where Tearfund could potentially both sensitise communities in terms of their own responsibilities for service provision, and help broker contracts or agreements between communities and state actors to co-produce or collaborate around certain services. In addition,

capacity building may be needed to help government in keeping up with potentially heightened demand and expectations.

In a context like DRC, however, this will necessarily be more constrained, and it may be inappropriate to support strengthening the visibility of the state. The example from PPSSP, however, discussed above offers one useful illustration of how to bring in local state actors, including support for collective identification of problems and the development of strategies to address them.

In practice, the degree to which Tearfund is able to facilitate changes in state-society relationships also depends both on the incentives and the capacity of the state institutions, as well as practical implications of the project timeline and duration of engagement. A longer-term development approach is being implemented in the WASH sector in the Aweil areas of South Sudan, through two NGOs, Dutch SNV and Swiss Development Corporation (SDC). They have been implementing WASH service delivery through state institutions, and have a particular focus on building the capacity of the county department for water and sanitation, through jointly conducted site assessments, project planning, budgeting, project implementation, and monitoring. The trade-off, noted by these NGOs and highlighted by Tearfund staff in interviews, is their inability to take part in humanitarian responses, as their programmes do not have the capacity for quick response. Addressing this could involve being much more explicit in the mandate for humanitarian response, and ensuring that this is time-limited to particular events, with a general preference for longer-term institution-building and support for sustainability. This reinforces the call for more adaptable, nuanced approaches that can account for the non-linear nature of the humanitarian-development transition. It is likely to require funding modalities and programme approaches that build this in explicitly. This is reportedly lacking at present, where much of the funding to date has been perceived as 'humanitarian' in its approach, with fairly fixed requirements in terms of what can – and cannot – be funded.

4.3 Towards new diagnostics

Ultimately, peace-building and state-building processes are endogenous, driven by particular features of each context. Recommendations for programming also need to be adapted to these context-specific dynamics. What may be most helpful is improved diagnostics for identifying and mapping potential entry points for engaging with these processes as part of WASH programming in any fragile country. The Figure below sets out an initial framework for exploring which entry points may be relevant in different contexts, and for understanding which might be addressed through WASH programming and which broader conditioning factors may need to be taken into account but are not easily impacted on in the shorter term.

Distinguishing between broader processes and those that will have particular implications for programme options and implementation is helpful. Interviews and discussions for this research reveal the potential for mixed messages here, and the importance of greater clarity in terms of what may – and what may not – have traction for WASH service delivery programming. Moreover, concepts such as 'peace-building and 'state-building' can often seem far removed from the realities of WASH programming on the ground. This does not, however, mean that WASH interventions can afford to ignore these broader processes, and the burden of proof rests on those designing and implementing such programmes, to demonstrate that they have taken them into account, or have good reason not to do so.


There remains a danger that the current policy discourse – including DFID's (2012) call for all interventions in all sectors in fragile and conflict-affected states to contribute to tackling conflict and fragility as a primary or secondary set of objectives – risks raising unrealistic expectations. In practice, some of the core drivers of these processes are complex and often reflect historic legacies and systemic features not easily shaped by any one intervention; moreover, addressing them is likely to require support across other sectors too.

In the country sites visited for this research, WASH was not a central driver of conflict, nor did it have the perceived state-building benefits of services such as education. In this respect, the

broader context of both citizens' perceptions and expectations, and of the nature and emergence of state capacity and legitimacy, could be usefully viewed as **conditioning factors** for WASH programming. They are key dimensions that shape the context for service delivery, and which set the boundaries for choices on programme modalities and approaches. In DRC, for example, the predatory nature of the state and citizens' low expectations are key features of the context in which Tearfund is operating, and they should shape choices on where and how to operate. In South Sudan, with the creation of a new republic, there are changes underway to the capacity and legitimacy of the emerging state and high levels of expectations from citizens. This also has implications for who Tearfund can work with, and how, in the delivery of services.

What is needed is greater understanding of some of the intermediate entry points through which a given WASH programme might engage with these broader conditioning factors. We term these intermediate entry points '**mediating factors**', to refer to aspects of programme design and implementation that can play a modest role in mediating within state and society relations, and are more within the scope of a single-sector (e.g. WASH) programme to influence.

Figure 3: Identifying entry points for peace- and state-building



From our analysis, we identify five potential entry points or mediating factors, namely: visibility, collective action, inclusion, accountability and opportunity. Not all of these factors will provide entry points in every context – this is where forms of conflict and context mapping can help to strengthen understanding of the local environment and regarding the potential issues to be considered in programming choices. Moreover, the first three (visibility, collective action and inclusion) were more prominent as entry points in South Sudan and DRC; for the other two (accountability and opportunity), the evidence base is currently weaker and there were fewer examples to draw from based on our case study analysis.

Identifying entry points can draw on the Do No Harm framework (see Box 7 below). While this phrase has evolved into a synonym for 'avoiding negative impacts', in fact the origin of the Do No Harm framework is precisely related to understanding how interventions can exacerbate conflict or contribute to conflict mitigation. It recognises that aid can (unintentionally) cause harm or can strengthen peace capacities in the midst of conflict-affected communities, and that careful analysis is needed of the context. This includes the concepts of identifying 'dividers' and 'connectors'. Greater attention could be paid to identifying possible connectors

between WASH service delivery and conflict dynamics that might support peace-building where possible.

There is a proliferation of both conflict and context analysis tools. Many of them adopt a similarly structured approach to understanding the causes of conflict. Often, they have focused more on identifying the nature of these problems – i.e. the causes and drivers of conflict – and less on what these mean for programming choices. In practice, many organisations have struggled to fully implement or operationalise these tools (Woodrow and Chigas, 2009). The Do No Harm framework's focus on connectors and local capacities for peace is therefore helpful, as it explicitly looks for opportunities and building blocks for more effective interventions, as well as assessing some of the underlying dividers (Box 7). This should be a crucial step in operationalising greater conflict sensitivity, including providing a structured way of thinking through concrete options in terms of the 'who, what and how' of service delivery, and how this might be affected by (and in turn affect) peace-building patterns.


Box 7: Do No Harm analysis (CDA, 2004)

The Do No Harm Framework involves multiple stages of analysis, including:

- *Analysing dividers and tensions:* These might reflect deep-seated historical injustice or more short-term concerns.
- *Analysing connectors and local capacities for peace:* Examining how people, although they are divided by conflict, are also connected across sub-group lines. This might include access to markets and/or infrastructure, or common experiences, historical events, or shared attitudes. It also means identifying those who are able to maintain inter-group peace (e.g. elders or chiefs, police, clergy or others).
- *Analysing the programme:* Thorough review of all aspects of the programme, e.g. where and why assistance is offered, who are the staff (external and internal), how were they hired, who are the intended recipients of assistance, by what criteria they are included, what is provided, who decides etc. The interactions between these and the key dividers and connectors are then examined, to develop policy and programme options.

The Do No Harm framework, and its concepts of dividers and connectors, can therefore be one entry point for examining wider peace-building processes. However, at present, it is in the main focused on conflict issues, with less room to explore aspects of state-building – or state- and society-building – in a more forward-looking way. Nonetheless, paying attention to the wider institutional environment, and the nature of state-society relations, is likely to be crucial for any service delivery programme. Hence, Figure 3 identifies five entry points which may provide useful lenses for examining state-building, and elements of peace-building, reproduced below.

Figure 4: Mediating factors



The five key areas identified draw from the literature review and reflect the fieldwork findings. They are:

- **Visibility:** Examining the relative visibility of different stakeholders, including a range of state and non-state actors
- **Collective action and collaboration:** Identifying capacities for collective action and collaboration between and within different groups for the production of services
- **Inclusion:** Mapping groups which are marginalised from accessing or using services, either across society or as a result of a specific conflict/context and relative power relations
- **Accountability:** Mapping the nature of accountability relationships between different groups for service delivery
- **Opportunity:** Identifying any entry points where broader links can be made to enable economic or other opportunities.

In addition to analysing the drivers and connectors for peace, mapping which of these areas might apply to a given context and their implications for the 'who, what and how' of service delivery is likely to be key. This can draw on some key questions:

- **Visibility:** Who is seen as responsible for WASH service delivery in each location? What are the risks of branding and visibility of NGO activities in this context? What might be the benefits and trade-offs in seeking to strengthen state visibility?
- **Collective action:** What is the existing capacity for collective action, from the level of individual villages upwards? Who are the connectors which could help facilitate collective action? What are their interests and how can they be engaged effectively? Who might be the dividers and how can this be mitigated?
- **Inclusion:** What are the drivers of historic exclusion or conflict between groups? What are the potential risks in terms of perceptions of who accesses services? What is the scope for, and how feasible is, greater inclusion of different groups? What does this mean for choices for where services are provided, and to whom?

- **Accountability:** What types of accountability relationships exist at the local level? Which local actors have the potential to hold others to account for service delivery (e.g. local clergy, chiefs or elders, local networks and associations, civil society)? What are their incentives and how can collaboration be established? Who are the potential dividers?
- **Opportunity:** What are the potential spill-over effects to enable greater economic opportunity (livelihoods, health improvements)?

As with the Do No Harm framework, this analysis should be used as part of an assessment of key programme choices, such as: where and why services are being delivered; choices on staffing (external and internal); and choices in terms of who accesses services (criteria, what is provided and by whom).

5 Conclusions and recommendations

This one-year research sought to understand how Tearfund WASH programmes on the ground, in a selection of project sites in DRC and South Sudan, may have impacted on peace-building and state-building. It also looked at how future WASH programmes might be designed in order to have the most positive impact on these processes. It draws from only a limited number of project sites and it was not a formal evaluation. Instead, it used qualitative research methods to assess some of these wider processes, and the realised or potential entry points for WASH programming. Its findings are therefore selective, and draw on a limited evidence base. Nevertheless, we can identify four key areas for recommendations.

Firstly, the review of literature and relevant policy documents points to the presence of assumptions on the links between WASH programming and forms of state-building and peace-building which are not yet borne out by evidence. Processes of state-building and peace-building are themselves complex and dynamic, and reflect a wide range of historic legacies, incentives and systemic features. At times, overly simplistic assumptions – such as assumptions of the inherent ‘peace dividend’ of basic services – have been found wanting and this is borne out by analysis in South Sudan and DRC.

Secondly, while this sounds a note of caution in terms of questioning common assumptions, we also highlight the extent to which a mindset shift is needed, so that WASH programming (as with other sector programmes) adopt engagement with local conflict and community dynamics as a default position when working in FCAS, rather than as an optional add-on.

There are two dimensions to this. On the one hand, too often, conflict-sensitivity commitments exist in policy documents but are not translated into practice. Making good on these commitments and ensuring that any analysis is monitored and followed up throughout a programme cycle should therefore be an urgent priority. Nonetheless, these forms of analysis have often been interpreted in a reductionist manner – for example, to ensure programmes do not ‘make things worse’ or mitigate risks. This is hugely important, as was seen where tensions were inflamed in some project sites by perceptions of who had access to WASH services. But it may also miss opportunities to engage more constructively with conflict and community dynamics.

Thus, on the other hand, this conflict sensitivity could better translate into pro-active programming options. The key intermediate entry points identified in this research provide a structure to facilitate this translation from analysis to action, since each of them has implications for how programmes are implemented and choices of service modalities (the who, what and where of service delivery). This can take multiple forms – from addressing questions of who is visible to supporting greater collective action or inclusion, as well as realistic and incremental approaches to engaging with accountability relationships and potential economic opportunities. And there may be real potential for looking at actors who matter on the ground, including chiefs or local religious leaders, where organisations such as Tearfund might add particular value. Approaches such as the CCMP seem to be particularly helpful as a programme

approach that embeds building links and working with local actors such as churches as a core component.

This has implications for the funding of service delivery programmes too. Current funding approaches are not always seen as being 'fit for purpose' to support these approaches. Identified challenges include short timeframes for funding, risk perceptions and prescriptive models of what can be funded. This will also need to change to enable organisations such as Tearfund to maximise their contributions in this area.

In summary, key recommendations arising from this analysis include:

- **NGOs and donors need to make good on their commitments to conflict sensitivity**, ensuring that forms of conflict and context analysis are carried out and monitored throughout programme cycles.
- Engagement with peace-building and state-building, however, should not stop there. **NGOs and donors should examine those intermediate entry points through which they can more positively engage with these processes**. Grounded in local analysis, this means identifying where and how WASH service delivery contributes to issues of visibility, collective action, inclusion, accountability and opportunity.
- **However the nature of these entry points is highly context-specific**. They provide a more sophisticated framework from which to consider how peace-building and state-building benefits might arise from service delivery, but do not provide automatic solutions. **Careful analysis around each entry point should be used to guide decisions on how programmes are implemented** – including choices of partners, timeframes, balance between hardware and software investments, and how to work with local actors.
- **Donors need to ensure that funding models help support this**. Humanitarian funding, for example, may encourage more short-term, hardware investments and overlook particular opportunities. More flexible funding is needed, which can support mixed humanitarian-development models and which better reflects realities (and messy transitions) on the ground.
- **Researchers and policy analysts can also do more to contribute to this endeavour**, by testing assumptions and identifying intermediate entry points for programming. The five entry points provide an initial attempt at this, and would benefit from further scrutiny and testing in the field.

Much of what is discussed in these conclusions and throughout the report does not necessarily represent new insights. Indeed, Tearfund's own Quality Standard in Emergency Response and its Good Practice Guide to Conflict Sensitivity set out commitments to these approaches and are in line with our recommendations. However, these commitments are not adequately being put into practice.

We suggest that a mindset shift is needed, whereby the default position is to take aspects of peace-building and state-building processes into account. This should not be interpreted as 'justifying all programming in terms of these processes' and must avoid taking unproven assumptions as given. Rather, it means identifying some concrete areas where programming decisions (i.e. how programmes are implemented) can impact – positively or negatively – on local conflict and community dynamics. Figure 3 (see page 26) represents a suggested organising framework to identify some particular types of intermediate entry points and some key questions to be asked.

The openness of Tearfund to reflect on opportunities to deepen these approaches and to think through their application on the ground is therefore welcomed and it is hoped that these findings, and Tearfund's ongoing engagement, can help trigger wider discussions and debates for Tearfund, its peers and funders in how to address these shared challenges.

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