

# Church-based community mobilisation models in East and Southern Africa

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## Glossary

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
CCMFD	Church and Community Mobilisation for Development
CCMP	Church and Community Mobilisation Process
CCRePs	Church and Community Resource Persons
CEP	Church Empowerment Programme
CORPs	Community Owned Resource Persons
ECAP	ESSA Christian AIDS Programme
ESA	East and Southern Africa
ESSA	Evangelical Seminary of South Africa
FBO	Faith Based Organisation
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HQ	Headquarters
IGT	Information Gathering Team
KHC	Kale Heywet Church of Ethiopia
MUD	Mara and Ukerewe Diocese
NGO	Non-government organisation
NIDP	Narok Integrated Development Programme
NPDC	Narok Programme Development Committee
NRIDCCS	Nakuru Region Inter Diocesan Christian Community Services
OD	Organisational Development
PAG	Pentecostal Assemblies of God
PEP	Participatory Evaluation Process
PRA	Participatory Rapid Appraisal
PWA	Person with AIDS
SHG	Self Help Groups
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
YEAT	Yei Ecumenical Awakeners Team
ZOE	Zimbabwe Orphans through Extended Hands

## Executive summary

### Introduction

The aim of this report, commissioned by the East and Southern Africa Team, is to raise the team's awareness of the various models of church based community mobilisation existing across their region, and provide an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each of these models. The report is based on interviews with all the team's Desk Officers and Regional Advisers and on a comprehensive review of all relevant partner documentation.

### Overview of the models

This report provides an initial overview and assessment of five church-based community mobilisation models based on the work of 11 Tearfund partners in the East and Southern Africa region.

The models are:

*An organisational change model.* A review leads to a strategic plan for bringing about change at all levels of the church (national/ diocesan/ local) so that it is better structured and envisioned to bring about change at grassroots level through its local congregations (1.1.1). The model tends to be adopted by churches in organisational crisis (1.1.2). The reach of the model can be huge (e.g. Project Gilgal will impact 5000 local KHC churches and their communities) (1.1.3), it takes several years before its impact is felt at local level (1.1.6) and it requires large amounts of resources (1.1.5).

*A local church mobilisation model.* Individual local churches are envisioned and mobilised to respond to the needs in their community by setting up basic church-run projects (1.2.1). The model does not seek to mobilise communities, or to envision whole denominations (1.2.3). This model tends to be adopted by para-church agencies that have a strong theological commitment to working through the local church (1.2.2). Such a model can be used while keeping resources to a minimum (1.2.5). Communities can feel the impact of the programme within a few months of it being initiated with the church (1.2.6).

*A community mobilisation model.* A church development department works directly with the local community structures in mobilising the community to identify and address community needs, helping them to initiate, manage and resource sustainable development initiatives (1.3.1). The process bypasses the local church. The model tends to be adopted by churches and organisations that have become dissatisfied with less participatory approaches to community development (1.3.2). The model allows for only a few communities to be worked with at any one time (1.3.3). The impact of the programme is felt almost immediately by the communities, as the programme works directly with them (1.3.6).

*A church and community mobilisation model.* The partner church engages with the theology and practice of holistic ministry at all levels (national level where appropriate; diocesan/ district level; deanery/ area level; local church level) so that it becomes envisioned and mobilised to act as an agent of community mobilisation, enabling communities to identify and address their needs (1.4.1). The model tends to be adopted by churches dissatisfied by the ineffectiveness of existing community development work and who want to establish a more holistic approach to their work (1.4.2). The process requires a large amount of resources (1.4.5) and takes upwards of two years before the community begins to feel its impact (1.4.6).

*A household mobilisation model.* The church development department works directly with individual households in targeted communities, mobilising them to take simple initiatives to address poverty issues in an integrated way, so that gradually the standard of living for the whole community is improved (1.5.1). The model is used as one of a range of tools, and is used in those communities that are particularly needy and benefit from more intensive support and input (1.5.2). The model can only be used in one or two communities at a time because of the time demands it places on staff (1.5.3), and takes about three years in each community (1.5.6).

## **Analysis of the models**

The strengths of the *organisational change* model are that its impact is far reaching (2.1.2.1), it creates an organisation that is committed to, and structured around, the outworking of its mission (2.1.2.2), and when effective, it provides very good value for money (2.1.2.3).

The weaknesses of the *organisational change* model are that it is very vulnerable to failure (2.1.3.1), it models top-down change (2.1.3.2), it empowers individuals rather than the whole church (2.1.3.3), its focus is on the church, not the community (2.1.3.4), and its impact is inevitably dissipated by the time it reaches the grassroots level (2.1.3.5).

The strengths of the local *church mobilisation* model are that it can be issue-specific (2.2.2.1), it can lead to tangible results in a short space of time (2.2.2.2), it does not need to divert costs into maintaining a bureaucracy (2.2.2.3), and it can provide excellent value for money (2.2.2.4).

The weaknesses of the local *church mobilisation* model are that it relies heavily on the commitment of the church pastor (2.2.3.1), it is vulnerable to changing church priorities (2.2.3.2), it does not enable specialist interventions in addressing needs (2.2.3.3), it does not facilitate community empowerment (2.2.3.4), and it does not provide a macro approach to addressing the root causes of issues (2.2.3.5).

The strengths of the *community mobilisation* model are that it is effective in changing the attitudes and thinking of the community towards their own development (2.3.2.1), it helps to initiate a high level of community involvement in community decision-making and projects (2.3.2.2), it significantly improves the quality of leadership at community level (2.3.2.5), it helps to establish effective community-owned structures to manage community development (2.3.2.6), it stimulates significant church growth (2.3.2.7), and it stimulates quick results in comparison to other church-based community mobilisation models (2.3.2.8).

The weaknesses of the community mobilisation model are that it is vulnerable to changes in the external environment (2.3.3.1), it is heavily reliant on community volunteer facilitators (2.3.3.3), it does not change decision-making institutions above community level (2.3.3.4), it does not give sufficient emphasis to influencing and gaining the ownership of the church structures that support it thus making it isolated and difficult to replicate (2.3.3.6), and it does not utilise the full potential of the local church (2.3.3.7).

The strengths of the church and community mobilisation model are that it achieves high levels of ownership at diocesan/district church levels (2.4.2.1), its use of Bible studies to mobilise the church is very effective (2.4.2.2), it provides for excellent skills transfer from the consultant to the local facilitators (2.4.2.3), and it creates an environment where replication is encouraged (2.4.2.4).

The weaknesses of the church and community mobilisation model are that it struggles to get full ownership of the process by the local church (2.4.3.1), it places exceptional demands upon the volunteer facilitators (2.4.3.2), it inadequately supports the community appointed resource persons (2.4.3.3), it relies on a high level of capacity within the organisation to support the process (2.4.3.4), and the length of the process makes it vulnerable to external factors (2.4.3.5).

The strengths of the household mobilisation model are that it brings about long-term and comprehensive change (2.5.1.1; 2.5.1.4), it targets the poorest in the communities (2.5.1.2), and it involves minimal overheads and costs (2.5.1.3).

The weaknesses of the household mobilisation model are that it relies heavily on experienced development staff (2.5.2.1), it does not lend itself to easy replication (2.5.2.2), and it is not holistic in its approach (2.5.2.3).

## **Conclusion**

The evidence from this initial overview report is that church-based community mobilisation programmes are good value for money, build the capacity of local staff, prompt significant church growth, and lead to major impact upon the lives of poor communities, both in the short and long term (5.1.1).

The *community mobilisation* model brings about significant change in communities over a relatively short period of time, and of all the models, it has to date had the greatest impact (4.4). The *church and community mobilisation* model seeks to build on this model by increasing the involvement of the local church. It is not clear as yet whether such an approach is successful. There is concern that the initial focus on the church may impede effective community mobilisation, may not sufficiently change the attitudes of the church, and may make the process too time-demanding and costly. If these concerns are adequately answered, then the *church and community mobilisation* process should become the main model adopted by Tearfund partners (4.5). If not, the *community mobilisation* model is a highly effective alternative model.

The *organisational change* model is appropriate in situations where the organisation lacks the vision, capacity or structures to implement *community mobilisation* or *church and community mobilisation* programmes (4.1).

The *church mobilisation* model does not lend itself to more integrated approaches to addressing poverty, but as one of a range of approaches to address a crisis as large as, for example, the HIV/AIDS epidemic in southern Africa, where basic care can make a significant impact, it is very valuable (4.2).

The *household mobilisation* model is best used alongside other programmes, and used in contexts where community mobilisation processes have failed to engage a number of the poorest households in the community (4.3).

## Recommendations

It is recommended that Tearfund continues to support church-based community mobilisation programmes (5.1.1) and continues to enhance its unique position in this field by supporting further research and learning (5.1.2).

It is recommended that further research is done, in particular, into the *church and community mobilisation* model, involving learning reviews and evaluations of key partners (5.2.1). Learning reviews and evaluations of Project Gilgal (5.2.2), ZOE (5.2.3) and the Diocese of North Kigezi's programme (5.2.4) would also be of immense value.

It is recommended that the East and Southern Africa Team receive further input on the various models of church-based community mobilisation (5.3.1) and that an assessment tool is developed for their use (5.3.2).

It is recommended that the various consultants, regional advisers and key partners are brought together to review learning from the various models (5.4.1), and that the next Regional Partner Workshop should include a review of the church-based community mobilisation models (5.4.3).

It is recommended that the *community mobilisation* model and the *church and community mobilisation* model are written up in the form of handbooks that can be used by consultants and partners (5.4.2).

## Introduction

### Aim and methodology of the report

This report was requested by the East and Southern Africa team. The aim of the report set out in the Terms of Reference (see Appendix 17) is to raise the awareness of the team in the various models of church based community mobilisation existing across the East and Southern Africa region. The report provides both an overview of the work of each of the partners reviewed, plus an in-depth analysis of the models of church-based community mobilisation identified. The report was commissioned to give the East and Southern Africa team a better understanding of this model of work taking place across their region, so as to be better informed in the shaping of future strategy in this area.

The research was carried out through interviews with all Desk Officers and Regional Advisers in the region, plus an interview with one of the key partners being reviewed. In addition, over 110 documents were reviewed, including proposals, six monthly and annual reports and evaluation reports.

### Overview of the partners reviewed

The research involved looking at 11 Tearfund partners chosen by the East and Southern Africa team:

- Urban Ministries, Kale Heywet Church, Ethiopia
- Project Gilgal, Kale Heywet Church, Ethiopia
- Diocese of Mundri, Sudan
- ACROSS, Sudan
- Pentecostal Assemblies of God, Soroti, Uganda
- Diocese of North Kigezi, Uganda
- Narok Integrated Development Programme, Diocese of Nakuru, Kenya
- Mara and Ukerewe Diocese, Tanzania
- Diocese of Ruaha, Tanzania
- ZOE, Zimbabwe
- Evangelical Seminary of South Africa, South Africa

All 11 have been involved in some form of church-based community mobilisation programme.

Two partners are NGOs (ACROSS and ZOE), one is a theological college (Evangelical Seminary of South Africa), and the other eight are part of denominational church structures. Of these, one is a national denomination (the Kale Heywet Church of Ethiopia, which incorporates both Project Gilgal and the Urban Ministries department), five are dioceses or districts (Diocese of Mundri; Mara and Ukerewe Diocese; PAG Soroti; Diocese of Ruaha; and Diocese of North Kigezi), and one is a local level development department (Narok Integrated Development Department).

These partners are almost all long-term partners with Tearfund, averaging over 13 years of partnership each. Only ZOE has been in partnership with Tearfund less than five years.

While the majority of the partners are working in relatively stable rural communities, four (ACROSS, Diocese of Mundri, PAG Soroti and ZOE) are working in war situations or in situations of high instability and violence. Only one partner – Urban Ministries – is working in urban areas.

Four of the partners had only been involved in basic forms of development prior to starting on the programme under review (ACROSS, MUD, Diocese of Mundri, and Diocese of Ruaha), and only one (Diocese of North Kigezi) had been involved in participatory development processes before.

### Getting the most from this report

It is not anticipated that anyone will read the whole of this report in one sitting. Here are some guidelines to help get the most out of it for your needs.

1. Start with the Executive summary, conclusion and recommendations
2. The Models section (section 1) provides a factual overview of each model: the purpose of the model, the inputs it needs, the time it takes, and its impact to date. It also provides a step-by-step guide to the process. You may just want to dip into those models that most interest you.
3. The Analysis section (section 2) looks at the strengths and weaknesses of each model and what can be learnt from them. Again, you may want to dip into those models that are of particular interest.
4. The Comparisons section (Section 3) compares the five models against 25 different criteria, ranking them for each one. This section may be helpful to read in full, as it may prompt questions or spark interest in some models that you may have previously skipped. If you are in a hurry, Appendices 1-5 give a series of tables that compare the five models.
5. Appendices 6-16 provide in-depth profiles of each of the 11 partner programmes reviewed for this report. They contain a mixture of factual information and analysis. I would recommend that Desk Officers and Regional Advisers read the profiles for partners in their sub-region, particularly if this report is disseminated more widely, as some of the profiles are quite critical of the programmes. The profiles are also worth reading if you want to find out more information than is contained in the main body of the report about a particular model. Just look up those partners that have adopted that model.

## 1. Models of church-based community mobilisation programmes

### Introduction

There are large numbers of church-based community development models, and there are many community mobilisation models. Even when these two approaches are merged, the number of potential models of church-based community mobilisation is large. The 11 ESA team partners that are the focus of this report can best be understood as representing five different models:

- *An organisational change model.* The capacity of the church at both diocesan/national and grassroots levels is built, so that it is capable of mobilising and supporting community initiatives.
- *A local church mobilisation model.* A para-church agency mobilises local churches to respond to the needs in their community. The community are beneficiaries rather than participants in the process.
- *A community mobilisation model.* A church development department works directly with the local community structures in mobilising the community to address community needs, bypassing the local church.
- *A church and community mobilisation model.* The church at diocesan/ national and local levels is envisioned and mobilised and becomes the agent of community mobilisation, enabling communities to identify and address their needs.

- *A household mobilisation model.* The church development department works directly with individual households in targeted communities, encouraging and advising on change.

## 1.1. The organisational change model

Two partners adopted this model: the Kale Heywet Church (KHC) of Ethiopia and the Diocese of Mundri in Sudan.

### 1.1.1. Aim of the model

The aim of the model is to help facilitate change at all levels of the organisation so that it is better structured and envisioned to bring about change at grassroots level through its local congregations.

### 1.1.2. Reason for adopting the model

Both KHC and the Diocese of Mundri were in organisational crisis. Both had very weak organisational structures and were lacking in capacity to bring about effective change. The Diocese of Mundri had no clearly defined vision, structures, systems, policies, strategies or programmes; it was very poor in communicating with donors, sending in random and unrelated proposals; and it had large amounts of personnel resources, in the form of its church members and staff, which remained largely untapped. KHC was still struggling with the legacy of being part of a communist state, with a large and unwieldy bureaucracy and a rigid hierarchy, which caused a bottle-neck in decision-making at the national and zonal levels of the church, and stifled initiative and participation at the grassroots levels. These factors meant that neither church was able to develop effective responses to meet the immense needs of their communities. The church structures and organisation itself needed to be changed before they would be ready to look to changing the community.

A significant difference between KHC and the Diocese of Mundri is that while KHC itself initiated the *organisational change* process, and then approached Tearfund to support it, the Diocese of Mundri agreed to a process that Tearfund was recommending and initiating. The lower level of ownership of the Diocese of Mundri is an important factor in the relative success and failure of the two change processes.

### 1.1.3. Scope of the model

The scope of the *organisational change* model adopted by both these partners was to change the entire organisation. Neither partner, however, sought to include the wider community in the scope of the change process. An assumption was made that if the church was changed, it would be empowered to change its community.

In the case of the Diocese of Mundri, the scope of the process meant bringing about change at diocesan leadership level, arch-deanery level, and local church level.

In the case of KHC, this meant bringing about change across the whole denomination of 5000 churches and 5 million members, working with the national headquarters, with every zonal and district office, and with every local church.

Such an undertaking, even at just diocesan level, is huge.

### 1.1.4. The process step-by-step

The two partners had key common elements of their processes – initial review of the organisation and re-setting the vision and mission; providing training for different levels of the organisation; providing specific skills training for key implementing staff – but the processes are sufficiently different to be worth recording them separately.

#### The Diocese of Mundri Process

1. *Review and strategy workshop.* A workshop for diocese staff developed a vision and mission for the diocese, and through a SWOT analysis, and through analyses of personnel resources, the external environment and activities, developed a strategic plan.
2. *Senior pastors and church leaders workshop.* This workshop sought to share the strategy with key church pastors and envision them, so that they could then go and communicate it to their churches.
3. *Strategic planning workshops for women, youth and pastors' wives.* These workshops aimed at developing strategies for releasing the potential of these groups, which to date had been left untapped by the diocese.
4. *Stewardship training.* Materials were developed and training delivered in churches on stewardship, with the aim of encouraging all levels of the church to become more self-reliant.
5. *Training in church finance & administration for key staff.* 4-5 key diocesan staff attended training at CORAT in Nairobi.



## The KHC process

- 1. Review of KHC.** A fundamental review took place of KHC's ministry, with a SWOT analysis and review of ministries at national and zonal levels.
- 2. Launch of organisational change programme.** The review led to a decision to embark on an *organisational change* programme for the whole of the church. A consultant worked with a "Strategic Core" within the KHC leadership (22 representatives of the Board, HQ and Zonal leadership) training them in change management and strategic planning over the course of 5 workshops. This resulted in the design of an *Organisational change Plan*
- 3. Formation of change management team.** A Change Management Team was formed out of the Strategic Core to manage the implementation of the change plan.
- 4. Development of the training programme.** A Training Team of 4 people was established to implement the training programme, which was a key component of the change plan. The aim of the programme was to train the entire KHC membership in key issues identified by the review process: teamwork and facilitation skills, initiating and managing projects, and pastoral ministry. Manuals on these topics were written by the consultant and then contextualised, translated and produced by the Training Team.
- 5. Delivery of the training programme.** The training modules were delivered to all 5000 local churches within KHC using a cascade model: the consultant trained the Training Team (4 people), who in turn trained Zonal-level trainer of trainers (300+ people), who in turn trained two leaders from each local church (3,300 people), who in turn trained their congregations. Some church members took the training a stage further and provided informal training for their neighbours in the same materials.

A key element at each level of training was attitudinal and lifestyle change. Trainers were expected to model what they were teaching (e.g. teamwork), and those being trained by them would assess the extent to which the trainers actually did do this.

KHC Headquarter staff, in addition, received awareness raising training and training on managing organisational change.

**6. Ongoing consultancy support.** The consultant visited Ethiopia every six months to work directly with the training team and change management team, providing training, monitoring progress and encouraging reflection on the process.

### 1.1.5. Inputs needed

The level of input required for this model is enormous. For it to be effective, significant time and resources have to be invested in it.

The Diocese of Mundri process involved approximately 60-70 days of consultancy input, over 20 weeks of key staff time in attending training outside the diocese, and cost over £64,000.

The KHC process, over 7 years, involved approximately 300 days of consultancy input, the employment of 4 full-time staff, the time of over 3,600 people to be trained and train others, the production of over 50,000 training manuals, and cost over £335,000.

### 1.1.6. Timeframes

The length of time that an *organisational change* model takes varies according to the size of the organisation and the priority given to it in terms of resources and time. However, it is a process that takes years rather than months.

The Diocese of Mundri process took two and a half years and yet still ended prematurely.

The KHC process is still on-going seven years after it started.

### 1.1.7. Results

The results of an *organisational change* model will vary significantly from one organisation to the next, as is shown by the two partners reviewed in this report.

The Diocese of Mundri, as a result of the process, has developed a clearer vision and mission, and has a strategic plan. It is now much less keen on requesting outside assistance, and is seeking to be much more self-reliant in addressing relief and development issues. It has also established a liaison office in Nairobi. However, it is difficult to point to any other clear tangible results from the process, and it has had minimal impact on the local church or the wider community.

KHC, on the other hand, is able to point to far more impact resulting from the process. A fuller account can be found in the KHC Project Gilgal Profile in the Appendix, but the main highlights include:

- Numerous income generation activities being developed

- Literacy centres being built, and adult literacy classes started
- A 40% drop in the typhoid, malaria and child mortality rates in four communities where a dispensary was built
- Attitudinal and leadership style changes amongst national, zonal and district church leaders, leading to greater openness, transparency, consultation and team working.
- District and local churches showing a much greater willingness to self-initiate rather than waiting for directives from higher in the organisation
- Examples of significant church growth – in one community a whole tribe of 5000 people came to faith as a result of reconciliation work inspired by the process.

## 1.2. Local church mobilisation model

Two of the eleven partners used a local *church mobilisation* model in their work: ZOE in Zimbabwe and the Evangelical Seminary of South Africa's Christian AIDS Programme.

### 1.2.1. Aim of the model

The aim of the model is to envision and mobilise local churches to respond to needs in their community. The model does not seek to mobilise communities, or to envision whole denominations. Rather it works through individual local churches, trying to encourage them to set up basic church-run projects.

### 1.2.2. Reason for adopting the model

Both organisations adopted this model of approach as a response to the HIV/AIDS crisis unfolding in southern Africa. Both organisations had a strong theological commitment to working through the local church. The founder of ZOE was convicted by the biblical call for the church to care for orphans; the Evangelical Seminary of South Africa (ESSA) by its commitment to holistic mission. By focussing directly on local churches, both organisations have been able to bring about change at grassroots level in a short space of time.

### 1.2.3. Scope of the model

The focus of the model is purely on local church pastors and their congregations. The organisations seek to envision pastors who then envision their congregations.

Unlike other models, the local *church mobilisation* model does not seek to envision the church at diocesan or district level, nor try to work through church development departments. It goes straight to the local church. Nor does the model seek to mobilise the wider community. The focus is on helping the church meet the community's needs. It adopts a welfare or client-provider model between the local church and its community.

This means that in one sense, the scope of the model is quite narrow, as who the organisation will work with is narrowly defined. However, the number that it works with can be very large. ZOE, for example, works with hundreds of churches throughout Zimbabwe.

### 1.2.4. The process step-by-step

Both ZOE and ESSA adopt a similar approach to the implementation of the model. They both seek to envision pastors and then their congregations. The ZOE process is as follows:

#### 1. Initial interest

ZOE waits to be asked by a church leader(s) in an area to come and assist them in looking at an appropriate response to the issue of orphans in their community. Once this initial interest has been registered ZOE asks the interested pastor or leader to contact other church leaders in the area so that ZOE can come and talk with a group of pastors together. The interested pastor who initiates this workshop often goes on to become the 'area coordinator'.

#### 2. The envisioning workshop for pastors

ZOE challenges pastors at the workshop with specific verses of Scripture on caring for orphans. The pastors find this easy to connect with, and recognise the authority of the Bible. Participatory training approaches are used to maximise the theological and local knowledge the pastors have to look at the role and responsibility of the church and the local orphan issues that need to be addressed. A key message during the workshop is that the first need of the orphans is not material, but love, care, support, nurture – needs which can only be met by local resources. At the end of the workshop participants are asked to identify people in their churches who have a vision and gifting for this ministry as well as drawing up lists of orphans within their communities. The people identified are known as the volunteers. These workshops are facilitated by the Director or volunteer Area Coordinators who themselves are church pastors with first hand experience of the ZOE approach.

#### 3. Volunteer workshops

Pastors attending the Envisioning Workshop go back and share the vision with their congregation. Often as a result of this a number of people within the congregation will want to get involved in caring for orphans. The pastor then requests ZOE



to come and lead a volunteer training workshop. The pastor takes responsibility for organising the venue and the logistics for the training. These training events are run by Area Co-ordinators.

Workshops for new volunteers look at such issues as: finding orphans; visitation; record-keeping; identifying people's essential needs; HIV/ AIDS and how one contracts it; and involving existing community structures. Follow-up workshops for more experienced volunteers include subjects such as: giving advice on food and health; child abuse; child counseling; and income generation ideas.

#### *4. Visitation programmes by volunteers*

Each volunteer cares for no more than 5 families, and fewer if they are caring for child-headed families. They aim to visit each family at least once a month. When they visit a home, they seek to identify the needs, look for signs of abuse, listen to the families, help them practically where possible, share resources with them where available and share something from the Bible and pray with them. Experience has shown that the fact that the volunteers come back regularly to the household and listen and care has a significant impact in itself, particularly if the household has been abandoned by the extended family. Common activities that the volunteers get involved with include simple feeding advice, advice on seeking medical help, repairing thatch, and preparing land for child headed households. The volunteers are encouraged to expect God to give them a scripture for each visit to share with the household.

#### *5. Monthly reporting meetings*

Every volunteer is given a notebook and pen in which they record every month the names of the people they visited, when they visited, the needs and issues they saw; and what they did. They then report this information back at a monthly meeting of pastors and volunteers. This provides accountability, and is also the forum in which volunteers can share problems they uncover which have been too much for them to solve on their own.

#### *6. Church involvement*

The churches take responsibility for the volunteers, supporting them in their work. They also take the initiative in responding to some of the needs of the orphans, whether through having regular offerings or by offering practical help such as repairing their homes. From the outset there is no expectation of ZOE providing resources. It is clear that it is a church activity and a church responsibility.

#### *7. Specialist training and exchange visits*

As churches and volunteers get more involved in the work of caring for orphans, they begin to want further skills to provide greater assistance to those they are caring for. ZOE provides training in income generation projects, in micro-enterprise programmes, in psychosocial support and child counseling, and proposal writing, all at the request of local churches.

Volunteers and area co-ordinators are encouraged to go and visit each other's visitation programmes to learn from one another. ZOE makes available some funds for this purpose.

The ESSA process differs in that it is less specific as regards the outcomes of the church training. ZOE's approach has a specific focus on training churches to set up visitation schemes, whereas ESSA's approach encourages churches to do a needs assessment and situational analysis before they determine their response. ESSA also provides more generic training and support to a co-ordination group within the church once they have decided on a response to the issues.

### **1.2.5. Inputs needed**

This model has the potential to require a relatively small amount of input for significant return.

The ZOE process involves 3 full-time staff and 32 volunteer area co-ordinators, who invest time in running monthly meetings and providing training, and costs less than £15,000 per year.

The ESSA process requires significantly higher levels of input, requiring 5 full-time staff, and costs just under £56,000 per year.

Part of the reason for this difference in the two organisations is that ZOE have kept their organisational costs to a minimum, in order to remain as a purely facilitative agency to churches rather than becoming an implementer of programmes. ESSA, on the other hand, are an established theological institution, with all the on-costs that this entails. Also, the ZOE process is a much simpler one and can be led by volunteers much more easily than the more analytical approach adopted by ESSA.

### **1.2.6. Timeframes**

As the model works directly with local churches, it does not take long before there is some tangible impact at local community level.

The speed of the process depends on the commitment and enthusiasm of the church. In the case of ZOE, the timeframe from the pastor expressing interest to trained volunteers beginning to visit orphans can be as little as 3-6 months. With ESSA, those churches that are very keen are able to finish their training in little more than a month and start planning their church-based projects. Other churches take near on a year to get to the same stage.

The ZOE process also enables a large number of churches to get involved in a short space of time. With volunteer area coordinators now in place the rate of expansion is not restricted by a staffing bottleneck. Consequently, in 2002, the number of churches and volunteers involved with ZOE almost doubled.

### **1.2.7. Results**

The results of the ZOE approach to the local *church mobilisation* model are extraordinary.

From 1992 to 2001 the programme grew from caring for 0 orphans to caring for 15,000. From January to December 2002, the programme grew to caring for 40,129 orphans (growth of 167% in one year). This growth was due to both the increase in vulnerable households due to the drought and unemployment situation in the country, and due to the number of new churches responding to ZOE.

During 2002, the number of volunteers grew from 550 to 1013 (growth of 84%) and the number of ZOE participating churches from 121 to 191 (growth of 58%).

Most churches that have started orphan care programmes have seen an increase in church attendance and those becoming Christians, though there is no hard data for this.

The results of the ESSA approach are, in comparison, somewhat more prosaic. In 2001, 24 pastors and 21 congregations received training. 10 congregations that have had training in home-based care have initiated caring projects in their communities, and one church plans to build a hospice accommodating 200 people. It has also been reported that in those churches that have had awareness-training, the number of people willing to declare their HIV+ status has increased.

Although it would be possible to argue that the initiatives taken by churches as a result of the ESSA process may be better contextualised to the local needs, the fact that the majority still end up with similar programmes to the ZOE process suggests that the ZOE process, with its far greater reach and number of beneficiaries, is a much more effective approach for addressing the issue of HIV/AIDS.

## **1.3. The community mobilisation model**

Two partners adopted this model: the Mara and Ukerewe Diocese (MUD) in Tanzania and the Narok Integrated Development Programme (NIDP) in the diocese of Nakuru, Kenya.

### **1.3.1. Aim of the model**

The model aims to mobilise and enable communities to identify and prioritise their needs, and then initiate, manage and resource holistic and sustainable development.

### **1.3.2. Reason for adopting the model**

This model has been adopted by churches and organisations that have become dissatisfied with more traditional, less participatory approaches to community development.

NIDP, for example, recognised that after 18 years of community development in Narok, there was relatively little to show for their efforts and the programmes they were running had no sustainability. A participatory evaluation process of their work highlighted a number of weaknesses, including the high level of dependence of the community on NIDP to initiate, manage and sustain programmes; the very low level of community contribution towards NIDP programmes; and the lack of community structures to steer the development programme in the area. In response, NIDP adopted a much more participatory approach to its community development work.

### **1.3.3. Scope of the model**

The *community mobilisation* model is focused on working directly with communities. It is church-based in that the implementing partner is a church development department, whether at diocesan or district level, but it does not seek to engage the local church or work through the diocesan or deanery church structures.

The number of communities that can be worked with initially is quite small, as time is needed to build up a pool of competent facilitators, training them through the facilitation of the process in a small number of pilot communities. In Narok, NIDP has worked with 12 communities in 4 areas; in Mara and Ukerewe, MUD has worked with 7 communities in 6 areas.

### **1.3.4 The process step-by-step**

#### *1. Identification of a consultant*

If the partner is new to the *community mobilisation* process, they identify and appoint a suitable consultant to work with them through the pilot stage of the process.

## 2. *Community relationship building*

The consultant and development staff visit the target communities and start to build relationships with the community leaderships. The process is explained, and their views and approval are sought.

Public meetings are held, organised by the community leaderships, to explain the process to the whole community. They are then asked to select 2-3 people from their community who will work alongside the consultant and development staff in facilitating the process. In the MUD and NIDP processes these were known as Community Owned Resource Persons (CORPs).

## 3. *Five-phase community mobilisation process*

Each community is worked with independently and is mobilised through a five-phase process:

- community description;
- information gathering;
- information analysis;
- community envisioning, goal setting and action planning;
- development committee selection, indicator setting and monitoring planning

Each phase involves a three-day workshop for the whole community, where the community is facilitated to discuss and share their knowledge and experience. Tools such as mapping, ranking, seasonal calendars, SWOT analyses, historical profiling and drama are used.

These workshops are facilitated by the development staff and the CORPs. Before each phase they attend training run by the consultant. They then immediately apply their training in two communities under the supervision of the consultant, and then reflect upon the process with the consultant. They then work in smaller teams in the remaining pilot communities independently, without consultant supervision. At their next training workshop, the consultant helps them to reflect on their experience and learn from and improve the process. Thus, at each phase of the process, the development staff and CORPs receive theoretical training, application under the direct supervision of the consultant, and independent application with facilitated reflection.

The outcome of the community workshops may be for the community to go away and gather more information or do more planning. This is organised by the CORPs, and often in the second phase, the community chooses to appoint an Information Gathering Team who work alongside the CORPs on behalf of the community in doing house-to-house interviews. In between workshops the development staff and CORPs have an important role in continuing to mobilise and support the process in each community.

## 4. *Formation of community development committees*

At the end of the fifth phase, the community is encouraged to select and appoint a development committee to oversee the implementation and monitoring of the community action plans.

In Narok, the communities appointed different types of committee: village development committees, area development committees to oversee issues that affected several communities, and sectoral development committees, such as dam committees and school committees.

The development staff then work with the committees in identifying their training needs, and then providing this training. This could include training in such areas as financial management; supervision, monitoring and evaluation; project cycle management; community action planning; and disaster management and preparedness.

## 5. *Ongoing support and capacity building*

With the establishment of community-owned development committees, the development staff step back from being project implementers and take on an advisory and training role in communities.

They continue to work with the committees providing support and training, facilitating them in the development of plans, organising exchange visits with other committees and study trips to other areas, and providing training as and where necessary.

The development staff also provide specialist input, advising on health or food security issues, and also help to develop community expertise. For example, in Narok, 20 community "para-vets" have been trained, and training is also being given to traditional birth attendants and healers.

The CORPs continue to play an important role in helping to maintain the impetus of the mobilisation process, and often they become key players within the development committees.

### 6. Organisational change

The *community mobilisation* process may lead to structural changes within the partner organisation. The shift from being an implementer to an adviser on development programmes, and from initiating community strategies to responding to them, is a significant one, and naturally leads to organisational re-structuring.

In Narok, for example, a Narok Programme Development Committee was formed made up of representatives from the village development committees, as well as the local church and the diocese, to manage the work of the development staff and set the department strategy

### 7. Expansion of the programme

Once the organisation has been facilitated through the *community mobilisation* process by the consultant, it is able to then replicate the process with further communities without requiring further consultancy input. The training and mentoring role taken by the consultant during the pilot phase is now assumed by the development staff.

#### 1.3.5. Inputs needed

The *community mobilisation* model requires significant input.

*Consultancy:* the process needs approximately 120 days per consultant. Both NIDP and MUD used two consultants. (In MUD's case, one of these was a Regional Adviser.)

*Staffing:* the process needs a dedicated staff team of at least 4-5 people. The NIDP process benefited from having a staff team of 7 while MUD was certainly understaffed with only two.

*Community facilitator time:* the CORPs are required to give huge time into the process. In the MUD process 21 CORPs gave approximately 150 days of their time to the process over a two-year period (a total of 3150 days). The NIDP process was similar. In the NIDP process, four Information Gathering Teams of approximately 20 people each also gave time to the process.

*Community time:* the process required 15 days per community over a 6-9 month period during the initial mobilisation stage.

*Cost:* the MUD *community mobilisation* process cost £54,111 over two and a half years, averaging £7,730 per pilot community; the NIDP process cost £56,650 over the first two years, averaging £4,721 per pilot community.

#### 1.3.6. Timeframes

The *community mobilisation* model is an intensive process, which requires time. The NIDP process gives a good indication of this, requiring approximately four years from the initial preparation with the community to the phasing out of the development staff's involvement:

- Preparatory stage: 3 months
- Mobilisation process: 6 months (Total of 12 months to complete all 4 cluster areas)
- Formation and training of community based institutions: 12 months
- Further mobilisation and capacity building of communities: 12 months
- Phasing out of involvement: Anticipated approximately 12-18 months

#### 1.3.7. Results

The results from the *community mobilisation* process in Narok are very significant, especially as NIDP was only working with 12 communities and a total population of 11,093 people. Some of the highlights from the last three years include:

##### Education highlights

- Over 800 more children in nursery and primary schools
- 33 classrooms, 3 kitchens and 7 teachers' houses constructed
- 3 new schools (nursery, primary and secondary) built
- 134 adults attending adult literacy classes
- All schools formed committees, and 16 of these were trained.

##### Food security highlights

- 100 households increased their acreage under food cultivation
- 2 communities and 11 farmers cleared land and put up fencing against wildlife
- 306 kitchen gardens were established
- 105 food stores were built

- 56 cattle crashes were built
- 6 farmers and 1 whole community began micro-irrigation schemes
- 75 households started to keep poultry
- 17 households began to practice agro-forestry
- 18 "paravets" trained
- 5 farming groups formed.

### **Health, water and sanitation highlights**

- 3 dams were constructed
- 6 dams were de-silted
- The number of pit latrines and bathrooms increased
- There was an increase in the numbers of households boiling their milk and water
- 1 dispensary was built
- 36% reduction in the number of children suffering typhoid and diarrhoea.

### **Transport and communication highlights**

- More than 4 of the 10 communities improved roads leading to their villages
- 2 communities built bridges to improve access to their villages
- 2 communities built new roads totalling a distance of 24km.

### **Church growth highlights**

- The number of regular church attendees grew by approximately 93%
- 200 people became Christians
- 8 new churches were built and at least 5 were rehabilitated
- 75% of the congregations started regular mid-week fellowships
- 39 local preachers and evangelists were trained
- Evangelism Committees were formed and took initiatives without relying on outside support
- 13 missions were held.

The tangible results from the MUD process are not as many, in large part due to the under-staffing of the process that led to irregular support and monitoring of communities at key points in the process. However, significant tangible changes did occur in the seven communities. An external evaluation in 2000 found that all the communities could point to projects that had been implemented as a result of the process, all using mainly internal resources with very minimal external material input. For example, in Hamuyebe, the community was able to repair school buildings, construct teachers' houses, start digging pit latrines, and had started to cultivate coffee. In Kitembere, the community constructed a dispensary, pit latrines for the school, secondary school classrooms, a grinding mill, and 4 wells and water tanks, as well as individuals constructing at least 11 permanent houses for some households. It also improved the market stalls. In Wagate, the community built a dispensary and classrooms, a grinding mill, and water wells. They had also started constructing market stalls. Every community was able to build and produce structures and facilities using their own resources and collective efforts, and they all attributed this to the mobilisation process.

In addition, the number of Christians in the seven communities has increased by over 50%. In one community, the church has grown from four members before the process, to a regular congregation of 60 baptised members.

Significant other results from the two processes were the shift in attitude and thinking of development staff, communities and village governments. This is explored more fully when looking at the strengths of the *community mobilisation* model.

## **1.4. The church and community mobilisation model**

Four partners are using this model: the Pentecostal Assemblies of God of Soroti District (PAG); the diocese of Ruaha; ACROSS in Sudan; and the Urban Ministries Department of the Kale Heywet Church of Ethiopia. Of these, PAG Soroti started using the model two years ago, the diocese of Ruaha, 18 months ago, and both ACROSS and Urban Ministries less than six months ago.

### **1.4.1. Aim of the model**

The partner church engages with the theology and practice of holistic ministry at all levels (national level where appropriate; diocesan/ district level; deanery/ area level; local church level) so that it becomes envisioned and mobilised to act as an agent of community mobilisation, enabling communities to identify and address their needs.

### **1.4.2. Reason for adopting the model**

As with the *community mobilisation* model, partners have adopted this model in large part out of dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of their existing community development work.

In PAG Soroti's and ACROSS' case, staff had become frustrated that existing programmes had struggled to gain local ownership, and that local energy and resources had remained unutilised, threatening the sustainability of the programmes.

In Urban Ministries case, there was a recognition that the department had moved away from its original methodology of working with communities in helping them to identify and respond to their priority needs, and had adopted a fixed approach of credit and water sanitation programmes instead. There was a desire to return to its more flexible, participatory approach.

Within the Diocese of Ruaha, there was a growing consensus that the food aid approach to development was not sustainable and was not helping communities to develop and become less vulnerable. Indeed, the bishop had become dissatisfied with other development approaches, and was prepared to lose development funding from donors because he didn't want to continue with programmes that he felt were either not working or being too removed from the work of the church.

With all four partners, Tearfund played an important role in suggesting the model to be adopted. This model was an adaptation of the *community mobilisation* model used in the Mara and Ukerewe Diocese and in Narok, with a greater emphasis on envisioning and mobilising the church prior to community mobilisation. This was in response to the evaluation of MUD in June 2000, which recommended that the local church should be involved far more in the process.

### **1.4.3. Scope of the model**

*The church and community mobilisation model works at a number of different levels:*

*National church level* – although PAG Soroti is just one of 56 administrative districts within PAG Uganda, the process has intentionally involved the national leadership at an early stage, inviting them along to the envisioning workshops.

*Diocesan/ District level* – the process engages with the senior leaders at diocesan/ district levels, envisioning them, and involving them in the selection of pilot churches and facilitators.

*Deanery/ Area level* – local pastors throughout the diocese are invited to be part of the initial envisioning and training, and some of these are provided with further training so that they can become facilitators.

*Local church level* – the process works directly with local churches – the pastor, lay-workers and the congregation. All four partners are in the pilot stage and all are working with between 6-8 local churches.

*Community level* – the process works with the communities in which the local churches are based.

The scope of ACROSS and Urban Ministries is slightly different. Urban Ministries is piloting a process that misses out the higher church levels and just works with the local church and the local community. ACROSS, as a para-church agency, has sought to envision its own board and senior staff to the process, and is working with four different denominations at diocesan level.

### **1.4.4. The process step-by-step**

*Stage 1: Raising the awareness of key staff*

Key staff have the opportunity to learn about the model and begin to think through how to contextualise it to their church and situation.

This may involve visiting other churches that are implementing a similar model (e.g. PAG Soroti staff visited MUD; ACROSS staff and board members visited Narok; the head of Urban Ministries visited *Church, Community and Change* churches in the UK), and attending relevant workshops (e.g. PAG Soroti staff attended the Tearfund partner forum in Nairobi).

*Stage 2: Envisioning workshop for diocesan/ district staff and pastors*

A workshop, run by a consultant, is held for diocesan/ district level staff, and church pastors and development workers throughout the area. The focus of the workshop is on the biblical basis for development and holistic ministry, and an introduction to the *church and community mobilisation* process. At this workshop, the participants also select the pilot churches to be worked with and appoint 15-20 people who will be trained as facilitators in the process.

In Soroti, 68 people attended the workshop (11 District level staff including the Overseer, Treasurer and Secretary; 27 pastors; and 30 development workers). In Ruaha, 32 people attended. And in the ACROSS process, pastors from churches of four denominations in the Yei area all attended.

*Stage 3: Initial training of facilitators*

The facilitators (the development department staff and those selected by the envisioning workshop) attend a workshop run by the consultant. This workshop covers the ground of the envisioning workshop but also trains the facilitators in how



to identify relevant Bible passages on holistic ministry and develop them into Bible studies, and how to envision local churches in holistic ministry.

In the PAG Soroti process the facilitators were known as “disciples”, and in the Ruaha process they were known as “pioneers”.

#### *Stage 4: Local church envisioning*

Immediately after the training workshop, the facilitators work with two of the pilot churches applying their training under the guidance and supervision of the consultants.

They facilitate Bible studies and discussions for the church congregation on holistic ministry helping them to discover what the Bible has to say about development and about the role of the church. These Bible studies can last 3-4 days. The consultant helps the facilitators to reflect on what they are learning, and how they can improve the process.

Over the next 6-8 weeks, the facilitators repeat the church envisioning process with the other 4-5 pilot churches, but this time without the involvement of the consultants. As well as the initial church workshops, the facilitators keep returning to the churches on a regular basis to give on-going support.

#### *Stage 5: Local church resource mobilisation*

The consultants run a workshop for the facilitators, reflecting on the progress and the learning from the process since the last workshop, and training them in skills in how to help churches mobilise and make use of their own resources (using Bible study materials).

The facilitators then work with two pilot churches applying their training under the guidance and supervision of the consultants. They facilitate Bible studies that help the churches to identify their own resources and help them to see that they do not need to be dependent on outside help to be able to improve their lives.

Over the next 6-8 weeks, the facilitators repeat the church envisioning process with the other 4-5 pilot churches, once again without the involvement of the consultants. As well as the initial church workshops, the facilitators keep returning to the churches on a regular basis to give on-going support.

Although not originally intended, this stage has led to churches in both the PAG Soroti and Diocese of Ruaha processes wanting to take some practical action of their own before mobilising the wider community. They wanted to gain confidence in the resource mobilisation process before they went to mobilise the community. This has led to a number of church building projects being completed.

#### *Stage 6: Church - community relationship building*

The consultants run a workshop for the facilitators, reflecting on the progress and the learning from the process since the last workshop, and training them in skills in how to help churches build relationships with community leaders and the community, and how to gain their commitment to the process.

The facilitators then work with two pilot churches applying their training under the guidance and supervision of the consultants. They facilitate meetings between the church and the community leaders and community, and they help the church to explain the process to the community and get their ownership.

This stage also involves facilitating the community leaders and the community to draw up criteria for, and then to select, people from their community who will help to shape and lead the process. These are known as Church and Community Resource Persons (CCRePs). Each community has 3 CCRePs selected by the church and 3 CCRePs selected by the community.

This process is then repeated, without the consultants, in the other 4-5 pilot churches.

#### *Stage 7: Community information gathering*

A workshop on initiating community mobilisation and information gathering is run for the facilitators and the newly appointed CCRePs. This includes reflection on the process since the last workshop; building an understanding of the *community mobilisation* process and the role of the CCRePs; and training in facilitating the community in the information gathering stage.

The facilitators and CCRePs, with the support of the consultants, then work with two pilot churches and their communities in helping the community to gain an initial overview of the issues in their community through historical profiling, seasonal calendars, mapping, etc. They also facilitate the community in helping them appoint an Information Gathering Team, who are then trained by the disciples, and begin to collect more in-depth information about the community.

This process is then repeated, without the consultants, in the other 4-5 pilot churches and communities. The CCRoPs, based in their own communities, are able to give day-by-day support to the information gathering process, and they are backed up by regular visits from the facilitators.

#### *Stage 8: Community in-depth needs analysis*

A workshop is run on Community Information Analysis for the facilitators. This includes reflection on the process since the last workshop; developing further skills in facilitating community information gathering; and learning how to facilitate communities in the analysis of the information they have gathered.

The facilitators then work with two of the pilot communities applying this training, and helping the communities to analyse the information they have gathered. They then repeat the process in the 4-5 other communities, without the consultants.

Two further workshops are run for further training of the facilitators in Community Information Analysis, and each is followed by further visits to the pilot communities.

In Soroti, this stage also provided time to trouble-shoot some of the problems that had arisen in some of the churches, particularly the loss of interest of the church in the process. New *church mobilisation* processes were undertaken to re-awaken the church.

#### *Stage 9: Community goal setting and action planning*

A workshop is run on Goal Setting and Action Planning for the facilitators. This includes reflection on the process since the last workshop, and training in facilitating realistic community goal-setting and action planning.

The facilitators then work with the 6-7 pilot communities in helping them develop goals and action plans.

#### *Stage 10: Community implementation and monitoring*

A workshop is run on Implementation and Monitoring for the facilitators. This includes reflection on the process since the last workshop; training in how to equip community leaders and CCRoPs with monitoring skills; training in how to facilitate the selection of community development committees; and training in how to train committees in facilitating the implementation of action plans.

The facilitators then work with the 6-7 pilot communities in helping them to establish development committees, and in helping them to implement their action plans.

#### *Stage 11: Renewal of diocesan/ district level ownership in the process*

A workshop is run for the diocesan/ district level and deanery/ area level staff, pastors, and development workers who attended the Envisioning Workshop in Stage 2 of the process. Learning and outcomes from the process to date are shared with them to encourage ownership and support for the next stages of the process, and to encourage planning for the replication of the process in other parts of the District.

#### *Stage 12: Ongoing training and support to the community development committees*

The development department staff work with the committees in identifying their training needs, and then providing this training. This could include training in such areas as financial management; supervision, monitoring and evaluation; project cycle management; community action planning; and disaster management and preparedness.

The development staff may also provide specialist training input. For example, in the Diocese of Ruaha, they plan to provide training in income generation and business management.

#### *Stage 13: Replication*

Stages 1-12 are repeated with a further number of selected churches and communities. The workshops are run by the first set of facilitators, training up further facilitators, rather than by the external consultants.

The process adopted by Urban Ministries contains some similarities to the above process. In particular, it mobilises the church prior to mobilising the community, and does so through using Bible studies. However there are some significant differences.

There is no reliance on an outside consultant; the facilitators are all Urban Ministries staff; a team of resource persons within the church is appointed before the process begins with the church rather than once it has been mobilised; and the process has a very specific focus on initiating and training a number of self-help groups in each community, with an emphasis upon saving schemes and income generation activities. The full process can be reviewed in the Urban Ministries Profile section.

#### **1.4.5. Inputs needed**

The *church and community mobilisation* model requires very significant input.

*Consultancy*: the process needs approximately 170-180 days per consultant. PAG Soroti used three consultants, the Diocese of Ruaha used two consultants, and ACROSS used two consultants (one a Regional Adviser). Urban Ministries is not using consultancy in the implementation of the process.

*Staffing*: the process needs a dedicated staff team of at least 5 people.

*Facilitator time*: the facilitators, who are not paid, give huge amounts of time to the process. By the time the first 10 stages of the process are completed, each of the 15 facilitators in Soroti will have given approximately 200 days of their time in an 18 month period (60 days in training workshops; 70 days in facilitating two churches and communities with the consultants; 70 days with facilitating the remaining pilot churches and communities, and in follow-up visits). In other words, each facilitator will have worked half-time on the process for 18 months.

*Churches' time*: Each pilot church takes on average 15 days for Bible studies and training as part of the process. A church with an average attendance of 50 at the *church mobilisation* meetings will have invested at least 750 people days before they are ready to mobilise the community.

*Communities' time*: In Soroti, each pilot community took on average 10 days of corporate gatherings for community mobilisation, information gathering and needs analysis. Few community members attended all these days. However, CCRPs gave much more time to the process (11 days training and approximately 19 days *community mobilisation*) and IGT members gave approximately 15 days to the process. Thus in a community which averages 100 people per community gathering and has 20 people in its IGT, the total number of people days spent on the process before any project is implemented is just under 1500.

*District Assembly Pastors and Development Worker time*: Two one-week workshops for upwards of 60 people.

*Cost*: the PAG Soroti *church and community mobilisation* process is anticipated to cost £56,019 over three years, averaging £9,336 per pilot community; the Diocese of Ruaha process is anticipated to cost £84,117 over two years, averaging £12,016 per pilot community. The Urban Ministries process is anticipated to cost £87,276 over two years, averaging £10,909 per pilot community.

#### **1.4.6. Timeframes**

This is a long process. From the first envisioning workshop with district or diocesan church leaders, it is realistic to anticipate a two and a half year time period before the process begins to replicate in non-pilot churches and communities.

For example, the *church and community mobilisation* process with PAG Soroti has been going over 20 months and the process is still a few months away from beginning replication in non-pilot churches and communities. And this has been with highly intensive inputs throughout, which have created inevitable strains on the volunteer facilitators.

The Diocese of Ruaha and ACROSS processes had originally anticipated completing the process within 12-18 months, but this now appears unrealistic.

The Urban Ministries pilot process is designed to take 18-21 months from the start of working with the church to having fully established and independent self help groups and community development associations. It is still too early to say whether this is a realistic timeframe.

#### **1.4.7. Results**

All four partners are at too early a stage in the process to be able to show significant results. However, PAG Soroti and the Diocese of Ruaha have seen some significant changes in terms of the church.

##### **1.4.7.1. Attitudinal changes at Diocesan/ District level**

In PAG Soroti, there is now significant commitment and ownership of the process at a District level, and growing commitment and support at a national level. The General Superintendent of PAG Uganda has asked that all Districts in time, adopt the *church and community mobilisation* process in their churches.

There has been a significant shift in the thinking of the PAG Mission and Development Department. They now see a time when the agenda for the Department will be determined by feedback and demand from the grass roots Assemblies, rather than being set at District level.

The process has also moved PAG, a denomination that is regarded by the Christian constituency as highly conservative in its evangelical theology, to a place where it is able to confidently (but not arrogantly) interact and engage with people of other Christian denominations, other faiths and people of no faith.

#### **1.4.7.2. Attitudinal changes at local church level**

Many pastors attending the Envisioning Workshop in both Ruaha and Soroti changed their view of development, recognising the biblical nature of holistic ministry and recognising the need, and their capability, to become initiators of their own development.

Parishes in Ruaha are now working more closely with the Development Department than they did before the process, and in the pilot communities there is a much more participatory approach to parish decision making. Lay people are becoming much more involved in the day-to-day activities of the church, and where previously they had left all responsibilities up to the pastor or evangelist, they are now taking part enthusiastically in the mission of the church.

In Soroti, it is reported that there is greater willingness within the pilot churches to give to and support those with needs. People are seeing their role is to give, not get, and the financial and in kind offerings have increased dramatically.

In Ruaha, two pilot churches have begun to improve their buildings using local resources, as a result of being facilitated to recognise and utilise their own resources. For example, a church building that had stood unfinished for over 15 years has now been completed by the church mobilising their own resources.

#### **1.4.7.3. Church growth**

There has been significant church growth amongst the pilot churches in Soroti, both spiritually and numerically. There is a far greater appreciation and hunger for studying the Bible amongst church members. And church attendance in the three churches specifically evaluated by an external consultant in March 2003 had grown by 17%, 26% and 100% respectively. The wider community have become less suspicious of the church and its motives for development as a result of the process.

#### **1.4.7.4. Signs of community change in Soroti**

In the early stages of community mobilisation within Soroti, communities are participating fully and enthusiastically and are beginning to experiment and take the initiative. There is also a high degree of confidence within the communities that whatever the process brings in its final stages will be valuable and will be embraced wholeheartedly.

One pilot community, on being mobilised, decided to take action against a community leader who had misappropriated the community's funds. Previously, this leader had bullied and frightened individuals away who had approached him seeking redress. Now, on a set day, the whole community gathered together and turned up at his house to demand money, and he has been forced to pay them back. This has greatly encouraged the community.

### **1.5. The household mobilisation model**

This model is based on the work of one partner, the Diocese of North Kigezi in the Rukungiri District of Uganda.

#### **1.5.1. Aim of the model**

The aim of the model is to work directly with individual households in targeted communities, mobilising them to take simple initiatives to address poverty issues in an integrated way, so that gradually the standard of living for the whole community is improved.

#### **1.5.2. Reason for adopting the model**

The model is used as one of a range of community development tools, and is used in those communities which are particularly needy and would benefit from more intensive support and input.

The Diocese of North Kigezi identified a need to work in a much more focussed way with a number of the most needy parishes in the area, working household by household in bringing about change in a wide range of areas: health, sanitation, housing, farming, soil conservation, savings, etc. Their other approaches were not reaching the neediest households in these communities.

#### **1.5.3. Scope of the model**

The focus of the model is on individual households. Diocesan development staff work with a parish development committee in identifying and then working with communities on a household-by-household basis. The model is not focussed on diocesan structures or the local church or even the community as a whole. It has a very specific focus.

The scope of the programme, due to its intensity, is very limited. The Diocese of North Kigezi, for example, only works with three communities every three years.

#### **1.5.4. The process step-by-step**

1. The diocesan development department identify 2-3 priority parishes.
2. Two diocesan development staff work with the parish development committee in each selected parish, training them in PRA. Other members of the church and community are also involved in this process.
3. The parish development committee carry out a PRA assessment with the help of the two diocesan staff, and prioritise the needs. (In the context of the Diocese of North Kigezi, these needs invariably include health, water and income.)
4. The development committee then goes from household to household in the parish, working with each household to identify simple ways they can improve their lives. The development staff visit regularly (as much as 2-3 times a week) to support this process. They are also supported by trainee Community Health Workers who visit as part of their practical training.
5. It takes between two to three years to reach a significant proportion of the households. (There are approximately 200 households in each parish). Gradually during this time, as other householders begin to see the benefits of the process, they too want to get involved and make changes, so that the process develops a momentum of its own.
6. After three years the development department then selects another three parishes to work with.

#### **1.5.5. Inputs needed**

*Diocesan Development Staff time.* The Diocese of North Kigezi commit two of their most experienced development staff to this process on a part-time basis. One of these visits each parish as much as twice a week. In terms of staffing ratios, it works out as approximately one full-time post per two communities.

*Parish Development Committee time.* The household-by household approach requires the committee members to be willing to give significant time to the process.

*External resources.* Depending on the nature of the initiatives resulting from the process, external resources (such as seedlings or livestock) may be provided by the diocese, but in such cases the community is always expected to be the main contributor and external resources are only given to supplement, not replace, local resources.

*Cost.* The cost of the programme, other than development staff salaries, is minimal. If an approximate salary cost is £5000, over three years, the cost of working in each community will be approximately £7,500.

In the case of the Diocese of North Kigezi, the salaries for the two workers are covered by their primary health care and diocese-wide programmes, and so the programmes does not even appear on the budget sheet.

#### **1.5.6. Timeframes**

The process takes on average about three years before it is fully rooted in the community.

#### **1.5.7. Results**

The programme has led to major changes in the lives of the households impacted. People have improved the sanitation around their homes and improved their homes with local materials. They have built raised stoves to protect from burns and have reduced the amount of wood needed for cooking. They have improved the latrines, and have installed hand washing facilities with water and soap using a simple tippy tap. They have built bathing shelters, and put up drying racks for the dishes. They have dug soil conservation contours on their farms and have planted agro-forestry trees and elephant grass along the contours to hold the soil together and provide fodder for animals. They have planted fruit trees. They now mulch and manure the land. They have started kitchen gardens.

The process also stimulates communities to work together. In one parish, the development committee formed a credit scheme that now has over 250 members and 5 million shilling in savings. They are now able to give loans to members as well as buy goats. As these goats have kids they will be given to members.

One woman reported that after three years of following the soil conservation and farming practices she learnt about through her household visit, she has increased her harvest by at least two-thirds.

Another woman reported that she now grew enough food to see her and her children through the hungry season and to be able to pay for two of her children to attend secondary school.

Attitudes have also been changed through the programme. One male farmer reported that he will now occasionally do the cooking to give his wife an evening off.

Importantly, self-esteem has been significantly raised. Paul Lapworth reported how householders were really proud to show visitors what they had achieved, how they had made improvements to their lives, homes and farms, in real contrast to other communities.

## 2. Analysis of the models

### 2.1. Organisational change model

The previous section noted that the *organisational change* model can lead to widely differing results, from the KHC Project Gilgal process, which is beginning to have significant impact on local churches, to the Diocese of Mundri process, which has had minimal impact on the church.

#### 2.1.1. Lessons

There are a number of factors that affect the effectiveness and impact of an *organisational change* model:

##### 2.1.1.1. Ownership of the partner in the process

More than any other model, the *organisational change* model requires the ownership and commitment of the organisation, and particularly the ownership and commitment of the higher levels of leadership within the organisation. Without this, the process is likely to be sidelined and become ineffective.

*(a) Ownership is important at the very outset of the process.* A significant difference between KHC and the Diocese of Mundri was that KHC initiated their change programme whereas the Diocese of Mundri did it in response to pressure from Tearfund (further funding would not be available unless they underwent an OD process). This undoubtedly affected the commitment of the Diocese to the process. The initial commitment and vision for the process amongst the senior KHC leadership was one of the key factors in helping it to become established at the heart of the organisation.

*(b) Ongoing ownership and commitment is vital if the process is not to be sidelined.* During the Diocese of Mundri process, the Bishop, who had had very little involvement in the process, returned from exile. The process, which was already struggling, was placed even further on the periphery of the church's agenda.

Within KHC, despite initial strong commitment to the process, there has been a gradual loss in ownership amongst senior leaders, and the process has been increasingly owned and driven by just a small team (the Training Team) within the organisation. Even the Change Management Team's involvement has become limited as other issues have pushed out the change agenda. This has slowed up the process, affected the capacity of the organisation to monitor and support change, and creates the potential for huge organisational conflict ahead if the grassroots embrace change but the senior staff do not.

It should be noted that change is a threatening process. Where change re-distributes power in relationships, it can be particularly threatening to those who hold power already. The dynamics of *organisational change*, and the resistance, conscious or sub-conscious, of senior staff to change that significantly affects them should not be underestimated.

##### 2.1.1.2. Willingness to invest in the organisational change process

The partner not only needs to be committed to the process; it needs to invest resources and personnel in it. Without dedicated staff and sufficient numbers of them the process can become extremely vulnerable.

This is evidenced in the KHC process where with the gradual disengagement of the Change Management Team, the Training Team became the main carriers of the process. This team, with only four staff, was expected to be responsible for the training, follow-up, monitoring and reporting of the training programme across the entire denomination, as well as encouraging learning and managing the dissemination of lessons. This placed a huge burden on them, and inevitably, the implementation and management of the process has suffered. The process has also been made more vulnerable. The over-reliance of the process on these four staff, and the lack of organisational willingness to increase the size of the team, despite designated funding from Tearfund to do so, has left the team feeling over-worked and under-valued, and increased the likelihood that they may leave. According to the consultant, such an event would put the process back two or three years at least.

A similar situation is apparent in the Diocese of Mundri where if one key figure (Canon Baringwa) was to leave, the changes brought about by the process would almost certainly be lost.

Partners engaging in *organisational change* processes must be prepared to invest resources, and particularly dedicated staff, in the process. A failure to do so leaves the process at too great a risk of being marginalised.

##### 2.1.1.3. The coherence of the organisational change plan

Much of the effectiveness of an *organisational change* process is affected by the coherence of its design.

*(a) Interventions must be connected.* The Diocese of Mundri's process struggled to initiate significant change because the change plan lacked coherence. The workshops were not part of a process, but were just a series of unconnected



interventions. They had self-contained aims and were not linked together. The KHC change plan, on the other hand, shows a direct link between the training taking place at grassroots and the direction of the strategic plan.

*(b) The capacity of key staff should be built.* The change plan should identify key staff and encourage investment in them. The most significant benefits of the Diocese of Mundri process arose out of the training that key staff received in church finance and administration. With KHC, the investment of the consultant's time in the training and coaching of the Training Team has ensured the process has kept going when otherwise it may well have folded.

*(c) The speed of grassroots' implementation needs to be planned for.* The KHC change plan was based on the assumption that churches would not start initiating projects until the whole training programme had been rolled out. In actuality, church members responded with such enthusiasm to even the little bit of training they received that they began to initiate projects immediately after the first workshop. This has caused two problems. One is that with limited training, projects may be poorly thought through and badly managed, and may lead to people being reluctant to engage in future church initiatives. Secondly, monitoring systems were not in place to assess and support the mobilisation and self-initiation going on at grassroots, only to record whether training had in fact been delivered. There is thus a lack of awareness of what is going on at grassroots level, making it difficult to learn from what is happening or to respond appropriately.

#### **2.1.1.4. The effectiveness of the consultant**

*Organisational change* processes are highly sensitive and require skilled consultants who are capable of winning the trust of the partner while retaining the ability to challenge.

In the KHC process, the evaluation of the consultant's work found that "he had established excellent rapport with the senior leadership of KHC to the point where he had their full confidence and was able to be transparent and honest about progress and shortcomings." His involvement in the process over a five-year period has been significant and key in ensuring that KHC has addressed some unpalatable issues and kept focussed on its objectives.

In the Diocese of Mundri process, the choice of consultant was somewhat more problematic. They were not an *organisational change* specialist, and also they came to be seen as a Tearfund representative, and thus a hoop to be jumped through for funding, rather than being perceived as neutral and independent.

It is unrealistic to expect one consultant to have all the skills necessary and time available to help facilitate an organisation through an entire change process. The skills required to help an organisation address high-level structural and capacity issues are quite different from those required to help stimulate attitudinal change and community mobilisation at a grassroots level. For example, the KHC Training Team, though hugely appreciative of the consultant's support and input, still felt that his lack of ability to fully contextualise the process to the grassroots situation was a major drawback.

For large *organisational change* processes, such as KHC's Project Gilgal, a team of consultants offering a range of skills should perhaps be considered.

#### **2.1.2. Strengths of the model**

The *organisational change* model, when successful, has a number of major strengths:

##### **2.1.2.1. Its impact is far reaching**

The reach of the *organisational change* model is far greater than that of any of the other models under review. By working with whole organisations, the opportunity to cascade training and achieve comprehensive coverage in an area, or even in a country, is realistic. The KHC process, for example, has the potential to directly impact 5 million people, a staggering number.

##### **2.1.2.2. It creates an organisation that is committed to, and structured around, the outworking of its mission**

*Organisational change* processes involve re-visioning and re-structuring, and when done successfully, help the organisation to be much more focussed and effective in bringing about real change. In contexts where most organisations struggle with ineffective bureaucracies, unutilised resources and low capacity, the *organisational change* model offers the possibility of establishing long-term sustainable change.

##### **2.1.2.3. It provides very good value for money**

An *organisational change* process is expensive, but when successful, such is its reach, it becomes very cost effective. For example, the expenditure on Project Gilgal works out at only £67 per community, if all 5000 KHC churches reach out to their communities as a result of the process. Even if only 2% of those communities in reality are impacted by the process, it still works out cheaper per community than the Narok *community mobilisation* process or the Soroti *church and community mobilisation* process.

#### **2.1.3. Weaknesses of the model**

### **2.1.3.1. The process is very vulnerable to failure**

All the strengths of the model listed above are based on the process being successful. The weakness is that it is a process very vulnerable to failure.

The process takes a long time - two and half years with the Diocese of Mundri; seven years and more with KHC. Retaining organisational focus and commitment during such a lengthy period is very difficult. Added to this are the changes in personnel that inevitably occur, and the changes in the external environment – droughts, wars, etc – that can destabilise the whole process. It is particularly questionable whether an *organisational change* model can be effective in situations of high instability such as Sudan.

The *organisational change* model does not fit naturally into the remit of any existing department and the managing of the change process rarely fits into any staff member's pre-existing role. The consequence is that senior staff have to carve out time from their existing work to give to the process. This puts the process at risk, for it is very difficult for the key staff to give the change process their full attention or to make it their top priority. The process can easily drift for lack of organisational oversight and steerage.

The process is also vulnerable to failure because it is dependent on skilled staff to develop, implement and manage the change plan. The challenge is that the very need for the *organisational change* process often arises out of the lack of skilled staff to start off with. Building up the capacity of individuals may need to be done first, before the focus shifts to the organisation as a whole, but this further extends the process. More than any other model, the *organisational change* model requires a number of skilled senior staff if it is ultimately to have an impact at the grassroots. Some organisations just do not have these, or do not have ones who they can afford to spare from their existing work.

The process is also vulnerable to being sidelined or prematurely ended because it is easy for the organisation to lose interest or faith in the process. This may happen because it takes so long for there to be any tangible results from the process. Large inputs are given – time, money, energy – often with minimal initial changes and this can be a big discouragement. It can also happen because the process challenges the power relationships within the organisation in ways which senior staff did not expect and do not want.

### **2.1.3.2. The process models top-down change**

The strength of the model is its ability to reach the whole organisation, for it to have a direct impact on every church. This is only possible however through a top-down approach, cascading training from HQ through zonal/ diocesan and district/ deanery levels down to the grassroots. The organisation sets the agenda; the grassroots churches follow. The weakness is that this models an approach contrary to a *community mobilisation* approach. Churches are encouraged to participate in a pre-set agenda of training. When they look to meet needs in their communities, the natural approach will therefore be for them to initiate activities that they invite the community to participate in, rather than seeking to work with their community from the outset in analysing and prioritising needs. This can be seen in the kind of initiatives undertaken by churches and individuals in the KHC process, where the process has inspired action rather than thorough analysis.

### **2.1.3.3. The process may empower individuals rather than the whole church**

Although every church may be reached by the process, the impact may be limited. The process in the KHC model has to date released the "entrepreneurs" in the church to develop some exciting initiatives. It has given support and inspiration to those who already have the capacity to take initiative. It is not clear however whether the process empowers, or even reaches, the poorest members of the community, and nor is it clear whether the enthusiasm stimulated in some communities for action is sustainable.

### **2.1.3.4. The focus is on the church, not the community**

The *organisational change* model is focussed on changing the organisation, the church, not on changing or impacting the community. The hope is that once the church is changed the community will benefit. However, it is a natural weakness of the church that given the opportunity it is much more likely to look inwards to meet its own needs than look outwards to meet the needs of those beyond the church. Unless change within the community is made an explicit focus, most change is likely to be internal to within the church. New, improved structures may be put in place, but the attitudes of the local church will still be to look towards meeting its own needs, rather than looking out towards the needs of the wider community.

### **2.1.3.5. The impact of an organisational change process is inevitably dissipated by the time it reaches the grassroots level**

The KHC process reaches thousands of churches, but the impact it has on each one is limited. Local churches are receiving training second or third hand, and as there is an understandable deterioration in the training as it is passed down the levels, it becomes more didactic and less effective. In other models, trained staff directly work with churches, or are only one stage removed from them. In *organisational change* models the gap is much greater. Quantity is gained at the cost of quality.

## 2.2. Local church mobilisation model

### 2.2.1. Lessons

#### 2.2.1.1. Replication needs to be built in to the design of the process

Any local *church mobilisation* process needs to be designed with replication in mind. A process that does not will always be limited by its staff capacity. The comparison between ESSA whose five dedicated staff worked with 21 churches in 2001 and ZOE whose 3 dedicated staff worked with 191 churches in 2002 on not dissimilar processes, suggests that a simpler process that can be used by volunteers can have a significantly greater impact. In ESSA's case, the skills for training pastors and churches have not been passed on to others, but remain with the programme's five staff. In contrast 20 out of 32 ZOE volunteer area co-ordinators have run envisioning workshops for pastors and training workshops for volunteers, and a further 10 are confident of being able to do so.

#### 2.2.1.2. Local church ownership can be achieved by allowing the church to control the process

The ZOE process is significant because from the outset the pastor is in control of the process. They either initiate contact with ZOE or respond to an invitation from another pastor. It is they who decide whether to take the vision for working with orphans further, and if they do, it is they who share it with their local church congregation, and they who organise for ZOE to come and train their church volunteers. The volunteers are accountable not to ZOE but to the committee of the local church formed to supervise the orphan care work.

As a result, almost every church is able to sustain their own initiatives by their own efforts, whether through church giving, raising money from local donors or through income generation projects. Given the horrendous state of Zimbabwe's economy this is a remarkable testimony to the empowering nature of the process.

By not looking to control the process, ZOE has released hundreds of churches to take the initiative, and to be self-sustaining in their work.

This is an important lesson for any local *church mobilisation* process. For this model to be effective, the aim must be to release and empower churches, not to seek to control or direct them.

### 2.2.2. Strengths of the model

#### 2.2.2.1. The process can be issue-specific

There is a very important place for an approach where a community-led needs appraisal determines the initiatives of the local church, and some of the models explored in this report focus on such an approach. However, there is also a legitimate role for a pre-determined response to community needs, especially in situations of crisis. The church can play a very valuable role in providing basic support and care to AIDS orphans, whose numbers in southern Africa are already reaching crisis proportions.

A local *church mobilisation* model is suited to helping churches make immediate issue-specific interventions because it is neither caught up with organisational issues that affect models that seek to involve the church at denominational or district/ diocesan level, nor is it bound by the need to listen to the immediate needs of the community, as with other models. It can be focussed on the specific task of mobilising the local church on a specific issue, such as HIV/AIDS, and in situations of crisis this can be of immense value.

#### 2.2.2.2. The model can lead to tangible results in a short space of time

As the model works directly with local churches, it does not take long before there is some tangible impact at local community level. Unlike other models, the starting point is close to the community. Time does not need to be spent in winning over the church organisational structures first. Nor does time need to be given to extensive needs assessment and analysis.

#### 2.2.2.3. The model does not need to divert costs into maintaining a bureaucracy

As ZOE have shown, a facilitating and mobilising agency does not require large overheads. Indeed limited capacity can be a positive advantage in ensuring that there is no temptation to the agency in becoming a programme implementer. Low capacity also reduces the likelihood of being seen by the local church as the resource provider, encouraging churches to more quickly become self-sufficient.

#### 2.2.2.4. The model can provide excellent value for money

A simple and replicable process can give excellent value for money. ZOE's work is a case in point. For less than £24,000, over 40,000 orphans now receive regular visits and support from Christians in their community – the equivalent of 60 pence per orphan. In any terms, this is good value.

This costing does not take into account the cost to the local church and volunteers, but this points out the strength of a process where the local church are prepared to make such a commitment without relying on external support.

### **2.2.3. Weaknesses of the model**

#### **2.2.3.1. The local church mobilisation process relies on the commitment of the church pastor**

When working through the local church, there is significant reliance on the pastor to be the champion, advocate and encourager of the process. But they are not always easy to work with, nor are their priorities the same as the partner.

The ESSA process found that many pastors held deeply rooted prejudices, were often very busy, especially with the rise in funerals that the AIDS epidemic had produced, and the HIV/AIDS issue was low on their agenda of priorities for the church.

#### **2.2.3.2. The local church mobilisation process is vulnerable to changing church priorities**

Even where the pastor is committed to the process, the everyday demands of church life can make reliance on the church as the vehicle of change difficult. There are many competing agendas within the church, many of which are entirely justifiable, and it is difficult for the church to prioritise the agenda of the mobilisation process above all else.

#### **2.2.3.3. The model does not enable specialist interventions in addressing needs**

By working through the local church rather than specialist agencies, the local *church mobilisation* model cannot provide sophisticated levels of response to issues. For example, the level of care provided to orphans and their families in either the ZOE or ESSA processes is basic. Those in need are receiving the support and help of neighbours, not of specialists. The value that simple basic care can give, both physically and in terms of dignity and self-esteem is very high, but it does mean that specialist issues may not be picked up and addressed.

#### **2.2.3.4. The model does not facilitate community empowerment**

By mobilising the local church but not the community, the model creates a client-provider attitude within the church. The process is not about working *with* the community in identifying and addressing needs, but working *for* the community. In doing so, the model runs the risks of developing initiatives that are irrelevant to the needs of the wider community, and initiatives that do not lead to the empowerment of the community but to their dependence on the church.

#### **2.2.3.5. The model does not provide a macro approach to addressing the root causes of issues**

The model's strength is in mobilising lots of individual churches to respond to immediate needs within the community. It is less appropriate as a vehicle of bringing about structural change or at addressing the root causes of issues at a national level.

### **2.2.4. Conclusion**

The local *church mobilisation* model is a very appropriate approach when seeking to address a major issue, where basic care can make a significant impact. The short-comings of such an approach – the lack of specialist provision; the tendency towards welfare rather than development; the lack of coherent long-term strategies to address the root causes of the problem – need to be acknowledged, but as one of a range of approaches to address a crisis as large as, for example, the HIV/AIDS epidemic in southern Africa, it is very valuable.

## **2.3. Community mobilisation model**

### **2.3.1. Lessons**

#### **2.3.1.1. Adequate staffing of the process is essential**

For the *community mobilisation* model to be effective, there needs to be a minimum of one staff member per two communities in the pilot stage.

MUD only had two staff for seven communities and this proved insufficient, as was shown by irregular monitoring visits, an inability to provide technical and mentoring support to CORPs, an inability to anticipate crucial milestones in the mobilisation process, and delayed response to warning signals. In contrast, NIDP devoted seven staff to work with 12 communities, and their ongoing and regular involvement in each community has been instrumental in helping to maintain the initial impetus of the mobilisation process.

#### **2.3.1.2. Development staff must invest time in understanding their community and shaping the process appropriately**

Each community is unique, with its own characteristics and dynamics, which affect the pace at which it will go through the five phases of mobilisation. Development staff need to take this into account when working with CORPs in determining the

regularity of mobilisation meetings. It should not be assumed that all communities will move through the process at the same speed.

Giving time to understanding the community will also help development staff to respond to external threats to the process in time, and in fact turn these threats into opportunities for community growth. For example, in one community being badly affected by crocodile attacks, the development staff helped the community to mobilise around this particular issue and address it rather than allowing it to continue and thus hinder the process.

### **2.3.1.3. Development staff must give attention to creating a process that is sustainable beyond their involvement**

It is tempting for staff to encourage dependency of communities on their expertise as this gives a sense of value and control. Because of this, and the willingness of communities to play along with this, an intentional withdrawal plan must be set in place, whereby the development staff work towards the complete independence of the community. To do this, much emphasis needs to be given to:

- Helping communities to mobilise or raise 100% of their required resources themselves;
- The formation of village management committees to manage programme activities, to take responsibility for the on-going need to keep the community mobilised, and to monitor and evaluate the programmes;
- Helping communities to form partnerships with churches, agencies and the Kenyan government;
- Identifying and equipping selected community members with specific skills that will aid the on-going development of the community; and
- Encouraging inter-village visits and learning.

In Narok, this approach is showing positive signs of working, with communities becoming much more independent of NIDP staff.

### **2.3.1.4. CORPs numbers should not be allowed to drop below three per community**

Some of the communities in the MUD process suffered from CORPs withdrawing from the process half-way through, and leaving the process somewhat under-represented within the community. The burden on the remaining active CORPs became very large. There should be at least three CORPs per community, and ideally at least one per sub-village, throughout the process.

### **2.3.1.5. CORPS need ongoing training and support beyond the five mobilisation phases**

There is a very great need for CORPS to receive training in how to support and lead communities that have been mobilised. The issues arising from mobilised communities are complex and varied – setting up implementation structures, managing expectations, maintaining momentum, managing relationships between the various community stake-holders, accessing appropriate external resources, etc – and CORPs need training and mentoring in dealing with these issues. The difference in the sustained impact of the NIDP process as compared to the MUD process can be attributed in part to the much better ongoing training and development of the CORPs in Narok.

### **2.3.1.6. CORPs should not be paid, but their contribution needs to be recognised and remunerated**

CORPs contribute a huge amount of energy and time to the process. Some will work almost half-time on the process. This level of contribution needs to be recognised. CORPs should not be paid as this would introduce an unhealthy dependency dynamic into the relationship between the development department and the community. However, other forms of recognition, such as training and regular visits from the development staff should be utilised, so as to encourage and value the CORPs. The communities, themselves, should be encouraged to recognise the value of the CORPs' work, too. One of the MUD communities did this by exempting the CORPs from contributing resources to community projects, because they recognised that their role in mobilising the community was already a huge contribution.

### **2.3.1.7. The monitoring of CORPs is essential**

The contribution of the CORPs to the process is fundamental to the overall success of community mobilisation. Their role also gives them significant influence within the community. Consequently, it is essential that their work is monitored. Initially, this responsibility may rest mainly with the development staff, but as the community becomes mobilised they will want to take more responsibility for this. A process of monitoring and supervision needs to be understood and owned by the CORPs – after all they are giving their time voluntarily – and those doing the monitoring and supervision should comprise of not just representatives from the village government, but from the local church and wider community as well so as to ensure balance and direction.

### **2.3.1.8. Time needs to be invested in building relationships with the community leadership**

Recognising and making use of the existing community leadership structures speeds entry, integration, and implementation of the mobilisation process. It also helps to prevent damaging power struggles being outplayed within the community through the process. Investing time in helping the village government understand the process is therefore crucial as without their support, the process is much weaker.



It needs to be recognised that this is an on-going process, and not just a phase at the beginning of the mobilisation process. CORPs and development staff need to be particularly aware when there are leadership changes within the village governments. For example, in one MUD community, a new village government was elected who had not been involved in the mobilisation process. Their style of leadership was much more directive, and they tried to impose on the CORPs and the community the types of projects that they wanted to be implemented, without any consultation. This created significant tensions.

### **2.3.1.9. The organisational capacity of the development staff must be intentionally built if the process is to be replicable without further consultancy support**

One of the strengths of the *community mobilisation* process used by MUD and NIDP is the quality of the training of the development staff in mobilising communities. In both cases, there is excellent evidence of the development staff being able to apply the theory and practice of the process independently of the consultant. The process has been designed with this as a key objective, and it has largely succeeded.

However, with the MUD process, there is evidence to suggest that the skills in dealing with complex scenarios, the skills in training new CORPs and initiating the work in new communities, and the skills in managing and monitoring the overall programme have not been adequately transferred.

This must be addressed if the process is to be replicated without the need for ongoing consultancy input. Development staff, as well as receiving the training and support that CORPs receive, should also have additional training and mentoring in the wider management of a *community mobilisation* programme.

## **2.3.2. Strengths of the model**

### **2.3.2.1. The community mobilisation model is effective in changing the attitudes and thinking of the community towards their own development**

Communities in MUD and Narok have been able to identify various changes as a result of the process: they have become more aware of themselves (their strengths, potential, weaknesses and dreams); they have come to realise that much can be achieved by the community working together; they have discovered that they have resources that they can make use of rather than having to rely on outside help; they have become more understanding of one another's views and behaviour; they are more united; and they are more positive about the future. These are significant changes.

### **2.3.2.2. The community mobilisation model helps to initiate a high level of community involvement in community decision-making and projects**

As a result of the MUD process, there was much higher attendance and participation in community meetings than previously, and people were much more willing to give their time and resources to community-wide initiatives.

In Narok, the average attendance at the community mobilisation meetings was 101, and the numbers in the final phase of the process were actually higher at 104. Both figures show a remarkably high level of sustained commitment and involvement in the process. This high level of involvement includes women, who have often been excluded in the past. Women have been able to become much more vocal in meetings, and are able to freely express their views without too much resistance from men, as a result of the process. Women constituted almost exactly 50% of all community gatherings.

### **2.3.2.3. The community mobilisation model gives communities the desire and capacity to take control over their own development**

In Narok, communities now arrange their own meetings and make positive decisions without the need for NIDP supervision or guidance. They now make their own action plans, plan their own projects, set their own goals and monitor progress of their own development work. Indeed, as early as March 2002, it was reported that most of the community development projects in Narok were now going on without NIDP intervention. A case in point is the Erusiai water project where the community had registered with the government and had continued to raise money for their project without turning to the NIDP for any assistance whatsoever.

This ability to encourage community independence is a significant strength of the programme.

### **2.3.2.4. The community mobilisation model stimulates neighbouring communities to want to take more control over their own development**

The *community mobilisation* process has influenced many communities beyond those who have been formally mobilised. A striking example of this is in one community neighbouring the Olendeen cluster area in Narok. Some people from this community attended some of the mobilisation meetings without the knowledge of the NIDP staff, and then went and mobilised their own church community quite independently. The result has been that all 32 church members have been mobilised to fight food insecurity and each one has established a kitchen garden and has half an acre of food crops.



This shows that the model stimulates other communities in their development, and there is increasing demand from other communities who want to benefit from the process. For example, seven villages had approached NIDP by March 2003.

### **2.3.2.5. The community mobilisation model significantly improves the quality of leadership at community level**

The village governments in all the MUD communities expressed that as a result of the process they were now “better” leaders. They were now more in a position to lead because of new skills they had gained such as planning needs analysis and prioritisation, resource mobilisation, dealing with conflicts, and understanding community behaviour. They now had multi-year plans for their communities and could easily get people to contribute and participate in community initiatives. Before the process, they struggled to get the community to participate in community initiatives or get individuals to contribute towards community projects. Their capacity and their effectiveness as leaders had greatly increased.

In Narok, community chiefs report that their task of provincial administration has become much easier as a result of communities becoming mobilised.

The model does not only improve the current community leaders, but develops new leaders as well. The mobilisation model through training CORPs, and to a lesser extent, Information Gathering Team members, develops people in the community with key mobilisation and analysis skills, and many of these are then elected into leadership positions. One MUD community was so empowered by the process that it elected out its entire previous village committee and voted in new members who had actively participated in the mobilisation process.

### **2.3.2.6. The community mobilisation model helps to establish effective community-owned structures to manage community development**

The NIDP process has been very effective in establishing community based development institutions. These institutions have become instrumental in initiating development activities, mobilising communities, monitoring the field activities and helping the communities in reflecting and reviewing their progress.

### **2.3.2.7. The community mobilisation process stimulates significant church growth**

Despite the fact that the model does not work through the local church, the local church still benefits significantly from the process. Churches in both the MUD and NIDP pilot communities have shown signs of dramatic growth. The process is still seen as “Christian” because the partner is church-based. Neither the MUD nor the NIDP development staff sought to hide their identity as working for the church, nor deny the fact that Christian values shaped the process and their motivation. Gradually, as the community came to trust in the integrity of the development staff, the community then began to ask for more Christian input (e.g. for prayers to be said before and after each community meeting).

The process seems to lead to church growth for the following reasons:

- As the church shows itself committed to the entire community’s development, so the community’s response is to show more interest in spiritual issues, almost in reciprocation;
- The development staff’s refusal to work just along denominational lines gains respect from the community, and this respect leads to more people attending church;
- As the community becomes more united through the process, there is less fear of being seen going to church, and church also becomes a natural social meeting place;
- Church leaders being invited to be part of the village government has helped to lessen the divide between church and community, build relationships, and lead to a greater openness to attend church;
- The local church becomes identified with a positive and life-giving process as church gatherings become a forum for communication about the process.

The level of church growth that occurs cannot be dismissed as happening by default. The church has seen significant growth in almost every community where the process has been used. Even though the actual process is not particularly holistic, the results are.

### **2.3.2.8. The community mobilisation model stimulates quick results in comparison to other church-based community mobilisation models**

In comparison to other models looked at in this report, the *community mobilisation* model quite quickly begins to show tangible results of change, because the process works direct with the community, rather than trying to work through another mobilising agency such as the local church or the church denominational structures. Tangible results from the process begin to be seen within a year to 18 months of initiating the process.

## **2.3.3. Weaknesses of the model**

### **2.3.3.1. The community mobilisation model is vulnerable to changes in the external environment**

Like with other models, the *community mobilisation* process can be vulnerable when the community is faced with other, more immediate issues. In Narok, the numbers at community gatherings have been detrimentally affected by the need for

people to go further afield in search of food because of drought, the need for them to stay out in their fields to protect their crops and livestock from wild animals, and by the competing demands of political rallies close to election time. Such issues can sometimes be used as a basis for mobilising the community, rather than hindrance to it, but this requires skilled and timely facilitation.

### **2.3.3.2. The community mobilisation model is vulnerable to organisational disruption and change**

Although less directly impacted by organisational turmoil than other models whose focus is in part on changing the organisation, the development staff's capacity to affect change in communities through the *community mobilisation* model can still be significantly hindered. This has been the case with MUD where the further development of the programme since 2000 has been delayed by divisions within the diocese.

### **2.3.3.3. The community mobilisation model is heavily reliant upon CORPs**

The process heavily relies upon the CORPs. When these move away from the community, or choose to step down from the role, the long-term sustainability of the process is jeopardised. This is a particularly serious concern given the fact that CORPs are required to give so much time to the process – in MUD's case, approximately 150 days over two years – without remuneration.

### **2.3.3.4. The community mobilisation model does not change decision-making institutions above community level**

It is quite common for development to only get so far in a community before it needs to seek deanery permission. For example, if a community wants to build a secondary school serving a number of communities, it is reliant on the deanery to mobilise the other communities in the area to help support such a project. However, as the *community mobilisation* model does not seek to envision or train the deanery level of the church, it is unlikely they will have either the understanding or vision to do so.

### **2.3.3.5. The implementers of the community mobilisation model work within an organisation that may have insufficient understanding and ownership to be able to support such a process**

The *community mobilisation* model does not seek to change the organisation or influence it. This may be fine during the initial stages of the programme, but once communities become empowered and begin to set their own agenda for development, internal tensions are likely to occur within the organisation. This is clearly seen in the NIDP process. Although NIDP were fully committed to the process, there was little or no understanding of the process by the Diocese of Nakuru or its development department, to whom NIDP was accountable. The Diocese was wanting to retain significant control over community development initiatives, thus undermining the whole point of the process and creating massive frustrations within communities who had been empowered and then had their power taken away. Although this problem has been worked through to an extent with the formation of a committee made up of both diocesan staff and community representatives, the tensions remain.

### **2.3.3.6. The model's focus on the community rather than on the church makes it more difficult for the process to be replicated more widely within a denomination**

Unlike other models, there is no attempt to win over and envision the church leaders and diocesan staff to the process. As a result, it is more likely to be seen as process only relevant to the development department rather than the wider church. For example, in Narok, the Bishop of Nakuru still does not have a particularly good understanding of the process, despite numerous visits to Narok. He is still unable to differentiate between the NIDP approach and more top-down development approaches elsewhere in the diocese. Despite significant church growth in Narok, he is yet to be convinced that this approach should be replicated elsewhere. Because of this, although there has been very significant change in one local area, this process is unlikely to be replicated in other parts of the diocese.

In MUD, there is a greater likelihood of replication elsewhere in the diocese, because the Bishop was involved with the development department in the original design of the programme. However, local pastors still have to be won over to the process.

### **2.3.3.7. The model does not utilise the full potential of the local church**

Where the local church was supportive and/or active in the *community mobilisation* process, the pace and impact of the process was considerably increased. However, whether churches did get involved tended to be quite random. There is a need for a more intentional training and awareness raising programme for local churches which would help them to understand how sustainable development fits with a Christian worldview, how community involvement is part of their Christian calling, and how the process could enable the church to build long term relationships which could bring about evangelism. As a minimum, this training should be done with the pastors, who should then pass it on to their congregations. In failing to build this component into the process, this model loses out on utilising the full potential of the church.

## 2.4. The church and community mobilisation model

### 2.4.1. Lessons

#### 2.4.1.1. Sufficient time must be invested in working with community leaders

In Soroti, insufficient time was given to engaging with the local community and government leaders and gaining their understanding and commitment to the process before community mobilisation took place. The support of local leaders is key in ensuring that a large proportion of the community attend meetings and become mobilised. Without their support, the process will only connect with small numbers in the community and lack credibility.

#### 2.4.1.2. Attention must be given to building the capacity of diocesan/ district level staff to adapt to the new ways of working brought about by the process

In Soroti, the *church and community mobilisation* process has had a significant impact on the thinking and resource allocation of the Missions and Development Department, and a knock-on effect on the PAG headquarters. Consequently, attention needs to be given to how to build the capacity of PAG to respond to the training, staffing and budgetary implications of this new community-led approach to development that has been inspired by the process. Otherwise, the benefits of the process will be lost, and communities and staff will become frustrated.

#### 2.4.1.3. It takes time for local churches and their pastors to take responsibility for supporting their facilitators

It takes time for parish church leaders to understand their responsibility for meeting the costs of the facilitators in terms of food, accommodation and transport. They only begin to understand this once the church has been mobilised and they have explored resource mobilisation. Prior to this, they still have a dependency mentality. The costs of early visits should therefore be shared, with the diocesan contribution gradually being reduced. The danger, otherwise, is that facilitators end up out of pocket.

#### 2.4.1.4. Spiritual attack is reported as a challenge to the process

Spiritual attack has been reported as an issue facing a number of those involved in the *church and community mobilisation* process. The process is certainly one that builds and equips the church, so one should perhaps not be surprised by this. Consideration needs to be given to how those involved in the process can be best supported in prayer.

### 2.4.2. Strengths of the model

#### 2.4.2.1. The model achieves high levels of ownership at diocesan/district church levels

The *church and community mobilisation* model initially seeks to envision the leadership of the partner agency, whether that is at the diocesan/ district or the national level of the denomination. This has greatly helped to win institutional support and commitment to the process

In Soroti, the district leadership was careful to identify, with the advice of the external consultants, key stakeholders within and beyond the district, in order to get wider 'buy-in' to the process. The Envisioning Workshop for key staff throughout the district was crucial in gaining this support. This has ensured that the process has been adopted as a key component of the district's development work, it has been well resourced, and there is strong commitment to replicating the process in other communities.

In Ruaha, the fact that the Bishop initiated the process, and was involved in the initial Envisioning Workshop, has given the process a huge amount of credibility within the diocese.

#### 2.4.2.2. The use of Bible studies to mobilise the church is very effective

The Bible can provide an excellent basis for *church mobilisation* and resource mobilisation, and the *church and community mobilisation* process is very effective at using it through facilitating participatory Bible studies. They envision and motivate the church, and create a momentum for change. They also help to ground the whole process in a biblical understanding of integral mission, which helps to root it into the values and beliefs of the church. Thus the approach becomes more than a one-off process; it becomes a way of life, and is therefore much more sustainable.

#### 2.4.2.3. The model provides for excellent skills transfer from the consultant to the local facilitators

The approach of the model to the training of local facilitators, based on theoretical training, followed by application alongside the consultant, followed by application independent of the consultant, followed by review and reflection guided by the consultant, is consistent with the best adult learning models. The initial results from the pilot communities where the local facilitators have been left to work independently of the consultants suggest that the *church and community mobilisation* skills have been transferred exceptionally well.

#### **2.4.2.4. The model creates an environment where replication is encouraged**

The *church and community mobilisation* model, by envisioning the diocesan/ district level staff at an early stage, helps to create a positive attitude towards the process, which makes its replication beyond the pilot areas in the diocese/ district much easier. And because it is working at a diocesan/ district or even potentially at a national level, the scope for replication is much greater than a process purely focussed at a local church or local community level.

The example of PAG Soroti illustrates this. The external evaluation estimated that if 25% of the first batch of local facilitators (5) became trainers in the *church and community mobilisation* process, and the ratio of trainer to trainee was maintained at 1:10, 50 more local facilitators could be trained in the second stage, working with 10-12 further communities.

If these ratios were maintained, after a second and third replication stage (ie, ten years after the start of the pilot process), a conservative estimation would be that between 100-120 churches would have gone through the process and between 500-600 local facilitators trained. Within a further two and a half years (ie, a fourth replication stage), every local church congregation within Soroti District (240) will have been mobilised, directly impacting on the entire population of the district (430,000 people). This is perhaps unlikely, but it gives a clear indication of the potential of the programme.

#### **2.4.3. Weaknesses of the model**

##### **2.4.3.1. The model struggles to get full ownership of the process by the local church**

In Soroti, in most of the pilot churches there has been a decline in church involvement and enthusiasm once the process has moved on to focussing on community mobilisation. This is a serious weakness. The main justification for the *church and community mobilisation* model, as opposed to the *community mobilisation* model, is that it is much better at getting the church involved in the mobilisation process. However, the evidence from PAG Soroti seems to suggest it is only partially successful, despite the large amount of energy and time being put into this stage of the process. In the Diocese of Ruaha, which is further back in the process, they too are finding it takes longer than anticipated to change the attitudes of the church members.

The failure of the process to gain unequivocal support from the local church is largely due to two factors: the strong dependency culture within the church which relies on outside aid rather than its own resources; and an unwillingness to interact with the wider community. The church envisioning process has gone some way to addressing these issues, but has not gone far enough.

The result is that the process is either being delayed by the local facilitators having to go back to the church to regain their commitment, or the process is moving on without the church on board. More time and energy would need to be invested by the facilitators in working with the local church and pastor if church ownership and involvement in the whole process is to be achieved, and yet even at this stage, the inputs are high for what is resulting at the local church level.

##### **2.4.3.2. The model places exceptional demands upon the volunteer facilitators**

The process places huge demands upon the local facilitators. They are unpaid, and yet many have ended up working almost half time on the process. Most have been willing to do so because of their commitment to the process and because of how they have personally developed through working with the consultants. However, questions remain over their willingness to give sufficient time to the process during the replication stage, and whether the new trainee facilitators appointed will share the same levels of commitment given that they will not have such experienced trainers working alongside them.

A further challenge arising from the time-demand placed on facilitators is that potentially excellent facilitators, who are committed and well educated, but are in employment, cannot take part, because the training alone is too intensive for them to get permission from their employers to miss so much time off work.

Due to the level of demands placed upon them, both PAG Soroti and the Diocese of Ruaha have considered remunerating the facilitators in some way. This raises difficult questions in terms of creating dependency. However, this may be appropriate once the facilitator has finished their trainee stage and they are needed to help with the replication stage. As long as they do not get paid for working with their own communities there is less danger of a dependency mentality becoming established.

It is difficult to see how sustainable the process could be otherwise, given the demands that the process places on the facilitators and their families. The other alternative is to radically reduce the involvement of the facilitators in the process.

##### **2.4.3.3. Community appointed CCRoPs are under-supported**

Community-appointed resource persons (CCRoPs) have been under-supported through the process. Compared with the *community mobilisation* model, they have received very little training (only one 11-day workshop), and their role has been unclear. As these are the people who will have key responsibility in the on-going mobilisation of the community and the implementation of the action plans once the local facilitators withdraw, this is potentially a serious weakness. They need more regular support and training from the local facilitators.

#### **2.4.3.4. The model relies on a reasonably high level of capacity within the organisation to support the process**

In Soroti, the facilitators have been dependent on the District for their transportation to the communities, and on numerous occasions important church or community workshops have started late or not at all due to the facilitators' transportation arriving late. This has damaged the credibility of the process and delayed progress.

Delays and stop-start interventions have also dampened the spirits of those who are being mobilised in Ruaha.

The church partner needs to be able to provide a reasonable level of logistical support, and if it can't, the process struggles.

#### **2.4.3.5. The length of the process makes it vulnerable to external factors**

The process takes a long time – two and a half years to get to the same point as the *community mobilisation* process gets to in a year. This means that there is more likelihood of the process being affected by changes in the external environment before it has had a chance to become rooted into the church and community. Factors such as droughts, wars and instability could all seriously disrupt the process.

#### **2.4.4. Issues to be considered**

##### **2.4.4.1. Should local churches be mobilised to take action prior to community mobilisation?**

There are differing opinions on whether the *church and community mobilisation* process should seek to not only envision but also actively mobilise the local church so that it implements some initiatives prior to community mobilisation. Church mobilisation prior to community mobilisation was not the original plan of the process but became so after churches felt they needed more confidence in the process before they could go to their communities. They felt they could not recommend the process to their community unless they had tried it for themselves first.

However, recent progress reports from the external consultants still suggest that church confidence and ownership is low, despite this approach, and indeed the evaluation suggests that this amended approach has added to the problem by misleading some church members into thinking that the *church and community mobilisation* process is for them and not for the community.

Before the replication of the process begins, some key questions need to be answered:

- Will the church not get involved in community mobilisation if it does not experience its own mobilisation first?
- Can the mobilisation of the church lead to a distorted process where church members believe the overall process is for the benefit of the church, not the community?
- Will a mobilised church allow the community to take control of community mobilisation if the church itself has had a head start?

##### **2.4.4.2. Is the church and community mobilisation process suitable for use in urban and unstable areas?**

As has been noted, the process takes time. Consideration needs to be given to whether such an approach is only suitable to stable rural communities. In areas of instability and in urban areas where there is a more transitory community, is the process too slow to be effective?

At present, there is not much evidence either way. However, the recent instability in the Soroti area, and the Urban Ministries pilot process, will give an opportunity to explore this issue over the next couple of years.

##### **2.4.4.3. Is the church and community mobilisation process suitable for use in very remote and isolated rural areas?**

In remote, isolated areas, there are significant challenges facing a *church and community mobilisation* process, or indeed just a *community mobilisation* process:

- Getting the consultant to the area (their willingness to travel to such remote areas; the cost of their time spent travelling; logistics; etc)
- Finding a venue that could act as a training venue
- Finding sufficient educated people to be CORPs/ facilitators/ CCRePs
- Transporting the facilitators to their pilot communities
- Drawing in any external technical expertise
- Facilitating any cross-country learning

The work of ACROSS in Yei, Sudan, may give some indications, but like with the urban and unstable areas, it is something that needs to be tested out over the next couple of years.

##### **2.4.4.4. In implementing a church and community mobilisation process, should Tearfund work directly with low-capacity churches or should it work via established NGOs?**



This is a question being asked in Sudan. At present, Tearfund is working through ACROSS, building their organisational capacity to work with Sudanese denominations in the *church and community mobilisation* process. However, it is questionable how effective or cost-efficient this is, particularly as ACROSS as an organisation lacks the vision or the ownership for the process. In such circumstances, the process tends to stagnate and get diverted by organisational politics, and the funds end up going into supporting core organisational costs rather than into the programme itself. Although there is commitment to the process amongst the designated programme staff, the wider organisation does not own it. Indeed, the process seems to be only moving forwards because of the regular interventions of the Tearfund Regional Adviser.

In such circumstances a case could be made for Tearfund going operational, and directly facilitating *church and community mobilisation* programmes. However, while such an approach may work in a reasonably accessible and relatively well-resourced area such as Yei, the logistical challenges of working in more remote areas (such as transporting mobilisers to the pilot communities) may be difficult for a small team of facilitators to handle without the back-up of a large organisation, where the church itself is not in a position to provide this.

#### **2.4.5. Conclusion**

A *church and community mobilisation* process, which is highly participatory and which seeks a high level of church engagement, takes a long time and requires a large amount of external facilitation. It involves spending a lot more resource – time, money, planning – than other approaches before there are any tangible results on the ground, and it involves greater risk. However, the assumption is that once the impact does start being felt at grass roots level, the long-term impact is much greater.

It is too soon as yet to fully test this assumption. The process needs to be completed and the impact on the target communities evaluated before an analysis can be made. The costs of the process will reduce over time, as the mobilisation skills become established within the target communities and institutions and the on going costs of supporting local community mobilisation and development becomes to a greater extent locally resourced. As a result, the cost effectiveness of the programme needs to be adjudged over a 5-10 year period, rather than over the period of the pilot process.

## **2.5. The household mobilisation model**

### **2.5.1. Strengths of the model**

#### **2.5.1.1. The model brings about long-term change.**

Communities that went through the process 5-6 years ago are still maintaining the improvements that were made at that time. Further research would be helpful to discover whether these communities have continued to initiate and develop new activities in the absence of the diocesan development staff.

#### **2.5.1.2. The model targets the poorest in the communities.**

Whereas models that work with the community as a whole may miss the needs of specific households, and particularly those that are most isolated or vulnerable, the *household mobilisation* model can focus in and work directly with the poorest households

#### **2.5.1.3. The model involves minimal overheads and costs.**

The model does not require large support structures, ensuring that the costs of the programme that there are, directly benefit the lives of the poor.

#### **2.5.1.4. The model brings comprehensive community change**

By the end of the programme in a community, every household will have been worked with, and thus every member of the community will have had the opportunity to bring about changes that will improve their quality of life.

### **2.5.2. Weaknesses of the model**

#### **2.5.2.1. The model relies heavily on experienced development staff**

The model relies on staff who have a knowledge of development interventions in a wide range of areas – health, agriculture, housing, income generation, water and sanitation, etc – and also have a facilitative rather than interventionist approach, encouraging households to own the development ideas for themselves and to implement them at their own pace. This requires highly skilled and experienced staff. Partner churches may struggle to find such staff or may find that such staff are not willing to work at such a grassroots level.



### 2.5.2.2. The model does not lend itself to easy replication

The reliance of the model on experienced staff, and the time intensity required of them in the process, means that there will only ever be a limited number of communities that will be worked with at any one time. The communities impacted will greatly benefit, but in terms of having a significant impact on addressing poverty issues throughout an area or district, even long-term, the impact will be minimal.

It is not clear to what extent neighbouring communities witnessing the changes brought about by the programme have been motivated or able to replicate it themselves without the involvement of the two development staff. This needs to be researched.

### 2.5.2.3. The model is not holistic in its approach

The approach is not focussed on the local church, and it is the parish development committee, not the church, that is used as the gatekeeper and mobiliser of the community. In the Diocese of North Kigezi process there is a spiritual dynamic to the work, but this is more to do with the spirituality and passion of the two diocesan development workers than due to the process itself. With other staff, the process may well lack a spiritual dynamic.

### 2.5.3. Conclusion

Drawing out strengths and weaknesses from the *household mobilisation* model can only be done tentatively due to the lack of information on this model. If it was possible to relatively easily train up more facilitators so that the programme did not rely on just one or two experienced development staff, a number of the weaknesses of this model would be immediately addressed. In terms of cost effectiveness and impact on the community it holds its own with almost all the other models. It is certainly worth more research.

## 3. Comparison of the models

The most appropriate way to compare the five models of church based community mobilisation programmes is to look at the most effective or most advanced programme for each of these models. These are:

- *Organisational change* – Project Gilgal
- *Church mobilisation* – ZOE
- *Community mobilisation* – Narok Integrated Development Programme
- *Church and community mobilisation* – PAG Soroti
- *Household mobilisation* – North Kigezi Diocese

At the beginning of each sub-section, an attempt is made to rank the models, 5 being the most effective model, 1 being the least effective. This ranking is based on all the documentation available at time of writing. Undoubtedly, if it had been possible to visit the programmes and interview key staff, some of the ranking would change, but this “snapshot” ranking gives a relatively fair picture of the various models’ strengths and weaknesses.

### 3.1. Development philosophy

- 5 = Community mobilisation
- 4 = Church and community mobilisation
- 3 = Household mobilisation
- 2 = Organisational change
- 1 = Church mobilisation

The *community mobilisation* model and the *church and community mobilisation* model both have the best development philosophy in that they both place high emphasis on community participation in identifying and addressing needs, and in establishing structures which enable the longer-term independence and sustainability of development work. A potential challenge however with the *church and community mobilisation* model is that the church, on being mobilised, may seek to hold on to control of the process. This needs to be checked out to see whether this does indeed happen.

The *church mobilisation* model and the organisational change model are both focussed on the church, rather than the community. This tends to lead to welfare or top-down approaches rather than meaningful participation of the community. The *household mobilisation* model does engage the community and seeks to empower individuals to own and shape their development. However, the reliance on outside development “experts” throughout the life span of the programme makes it less sustainable than the *community mobilisation* and *church and community mobilisation* models.

## 3.2. Comparison of the models

### 3.2.1. Integrated response to community needs

- 5 = Community mobilisation
- 4 = Church and community mobilisation
- 3 = Household mobilisation
- 2 = Organisational change
- 1 = Church mobilisation

The Narok Integrated Development Process has shown itself to be very effective at addressing a wide-range of community needs in an integrated way. It is the only programme that to date has stimulated a wide variety of community initiatives addressing issues of health, education, food security, income generation and communications. The model's strength is on empowering the community to take action, not in giving specialist support, and thus the church or development department is not constrained by its own areas of expertise. It is still too early to assess the impact of PAG Soroti, but one would anticipate that as the community mobilisation stage is very similar, the results may well be similar too.

*Household mobilisation*, by working individually with households, helps to identify a wide-range of different issues and encourages an integrated approach. It is weaker than the *community mobilisation* models however because it does not tend to harness community-wide responses to issues, which can be more effective than isolated individual action.

The *organisational change* model may inspire people to take individual initiatives across a range of issues but there is not an integrated approach. The initial evidence from Project Gilgal suggests that motivated individuals are setting up their own projects in areas they feel capable in – e.g. income generation – but there is not a systematic approach to dealing with community needs.

The *church mobilisation* model is effective at addressing specific issues – in the case of ZOE, the issue of HIV/AIDS – but it does not lend itself to the more complicated challenge of addressing the overall needs of the community, of which the specific issue is but just one.

### 3.2.2. Target beneficiaries

#### *Number of Beneficiaries*

- 5 = Church mobilisation
- 4 = Organisational change
- 3 = Community mobilisation
- 2 = Church and community mobilisation
- 1 = Household mobilisation

#### *Reaching the poorest in the community*

- 5 = Household mobilisation
- 4 = Church mobilisation
- 3 = Community mobilisation
- 3 = Church and community mobilisation
- 1 = Organisational change

The number of direct beneficiaries from the ZOE *church mobilisation* programme is over 40,000. As all of these beneficiaries are orphans or vulnerable families, almost all of them will be the poorest people in their communities. The household mobilisation model is also very focused on the needs of the poor, as it specifically targets individual households. However, as it only works with three communities at a time, the number of beneficiaries is small.

The KHC *organisational change* model, because of its scope, can impact a large number of beneficiaries. There is not the data as yet to properly assess the number of beneficiaries, but it is possibly somewhere between 10,000-20,000. However, indications are that the process is not as yet reaching the poorest in the community, but rather empowering those who already have initiative and resources.

The *community mobilisation* model and the *church and community mobilisation* model both address poverty issues at a community-wide level. This means that the poorest benefit as members of the community, but they are not specifically targeted. The Narok programme is impacting an area of 11,000 people. The Soroti PAG process is focussed on a slightly smaller area.

### 3.2.3. Strengthening of community structures

- 5 = Community mobilisation
- 4 = Church and community mobilisation
- 3 = Household mobilisation
- 2 = Organisational change
- 2 = Church mobilisation

The *community mobilisation* model helps to significantly strengthen existing community structures and to form new structures that are accountable and effective. Its emphasis on community empowerment, and the time invested in training and building the capacity of the community development committees are key in this. The *church and community mobilisation* model is similar, although time will tell whether by starting the process with the local church the community structures are somewhat disempowered or by-passed. The *household mobilisation* model, by working through the parish development committee, also helps to enskill and energise local community structures.

On the other hand, neither the *organisational change* model nor the *church mobilisation* model have any impact at all on the community structures.

### 3.2.4. Attitudinal changes

- 5 = Community mobilisation
- 3 = Church and community mobilisation
- 3 = Household mobilisation
- 2 = Organisational change
- 1 = Church mobilisation

Once again, those models that are more specifically focussed on the community have seen greatest impact. The *community mobilisation* model has shown itself to be very effective in changing attitudes, while the more church-focussed models tend to have less direct influence on community attitudes.

### 3.2.5. Ability to address poverty issues at a macro level

- 5 = Organisational change
- 4 = Church and community mobilisation
- 3 = Community mobilisation
- 2 = Church mobilisation
- 1 = Household mobilisation

A whole denomination or diocese/district can have significant leverage in addressing poverty issues at a macro level, whether in terms of challenging government under-investment or corruption, or in terms of developing an area or nation wide response to a key poverty issue. In this regard, the *organisational change* model, with its emphasis on helping to develop effective structures and clearer vision, has the greatest potential in this area. The *church and community mobilisation* model, with its ability to envision and motivate a denomination around a slightly narrower agenda, also can lend itself to empowering the church to act effectively. *Household mobilisation*, on the other hand, is too focussed on individual needs to be able to input into macro issues, even if the model provided a forum. The ZOE *church mobilisation* model has the potential to be somewhat more effective, but it lacks the ability of a diocese or denomination to naturally draw together a coalition of interests.

## 3.3. Impact on the church

### 3.3.1. Denominational change

- 5 = Organisational change
- 4 = Church and community mobilisation
- 3 = Church mobilisation
- 2 = Community mobilisation
- 1 = Household mobilisation

The *organisational change* model, when effective, can have a very significant impact upon the church denomination. The whole focus of the model is on bringing about changes within the denomination structures, so that it is better placed to achieve its mission. The *church and community mobilisation* model has a somewhat narrower remit – the envisioning and mobilising of the denomination around holistic ministry – but this narrower focus, and the radical nature of this approach – means that it can have the potential to bring about almost as much change as the *organisational change* model.

*Church mobilisation* is focussed on individual churches, and therefore does not change whole denominations. However, the impact of the process on individual churches can lead to change in the denominational structures over time.

*Community mobilisation* impacts denominational structures almost by default. As the development department changes in ethos and approach, becoming less directive and more community-led, this can create tensions and synergy for change within the larger institution of which it is a part.

The *household mobilisation* model has minimal impact on the church denomination.

### 3.3.2. Local church growth

- 5 = Community mobilisation
- 4 = Church and community mobilisation
- 3 = Organisational change
- 2 = Church mobilisation
- 1 = Household mobilisation

Surprisingly, the model that seems to have the greatest impact in terms of church growth is the *community mobilisation* model. Despite the model having no focus on the local church, there has been an increase of 93% in church attendance since the process began. Reasons for this growth are given in the Analysis section of this report.

It is still early days in terms of the *church and community mobilisation* model, but initial evidence suggests that numerical church growth is not any greater than, and potentially less than, the *community mobilisation* model. What is different however is that the *church and community mobilisation* model leads to definite spiritual growth within the congregation. The Bible studies and teaching on holistic ministry have led to a much greater hunger for studying the word of God.

The *organisational change* model is also showing signs of significantly impacting local church growth, but at present evidence is still largely anecdotal. The Project Gilgal story of one church seeing 5,000 people from two “untouchable” tribes come to faith is an extraordinary one, but it is still not apparent yet whether such events are happening all over the country or are isolated one-off events.

The *church mobilisation* model also leads to church growth, with most of the churches involved with ZOE seeing an increase in the number of those attending church and coming to faith, but reports do not match the church growth occurring in the models above.

The *household mobilisation* model is having some impact because of the testimonies of the two development staff involved, but it is not having a significant impact in terms of church growth.

### 3.3.3. Attitudinal changes within the church

- 5 = Church and community mobilisation
- 4 = Organisational change
- 3 = Church mobilisation
- 2 = Community mobilisation
- 1 = Household mobilisation

Some models have been more effective at helping to change attitudes within the church towards development, towards leadership and towards the wider community.

The *church and community mobilisation* model focuses on achieving attitudinal change within the church. There is good evidence to suggest that at a diocese/ district level this is proving to be successful, with, for example, PAG Soroti becoming much more confident in their interaction with other agencies and with the development staff much more keen to work in a facilitative rather than directive way with the grassroots churches. Church pastors have become much more convinced about the biblical nature of holistic ministry. At local church member level, there are also definite changes in attitude, with increased giving and commitment to the poor. However, it is not clear yet whether this change in attitude is permanent.

The *organisational change* model can also be effective in changing attitudes, and where as in the case of Project Gilgal this is a significant intention of the process, it can be very effective. Project Gilgal has seen a wide range of changes within the church, including KHC’s headquarters’ leadership becoming much more open to discuss issues and listen to others, zonal leaders becoming more enthusiastic, open and facilitative in their leadership style, and district level leaders becoming better at working together.

*Church mobilisation* may not greatly affect attitudes at diocesan/district level but it can be effective at changing attitudes at local church level. ZOE’s ability to recruit over a thousand volunteers from within the churches to work with people with AIDS is a good indicator of the attitudinal change that is possible to bring about.

*Community mobilisation* does not directly change or challenge church attitudes, although those local churches that do choose to engage with the process taking place in their community begin to change in their attitude to the community and to their understanding of church leadership. However, the process does not impact those churches that are resistant to change.

The *household mobilisation* model does not affect attitudes within the church.

## 3.4. Training

### 3.4.1. Training of staff

- 5 = Church and community mobilisation
- 5 = Community mobilisation
- 5 = Organisational change
- 2 = Church mobilisation
- 2 = Household mobilisation

There are very good opportunities for training and building the capacity of the programme’s designated church staff within the *church and community mobilisation*, *community mobilisation* and *organisational change* models. Indeed, all three partners, PAG Soroti, NIDP and KHC, can point to a high level of skills transfer from the respective consultants to their key staff. Rightly these processes have recognised the need to build the capacity of their key staff, and have invested resources in doing so. The strength of the *church and community mobilisation* and *community mobilisation* models are

that they follow excellent adult learning methodology, providing staff with the opportunity to learn the theory of the process, then apply it under the supervision of the consultant, and then apply it independently of the consultant with an opportunity to reflect and learn after the experience. The main weakness has been that the consultant's training has tended to ignore the wider issues of how to manage and monitor the programme as a whole. The strength of the KHC process has been the consultant's focus on developing the skills of a small team of staff – the Training Team – and this intensive approach has led to a highly able team being developed. The weakness of this approach is that the consultant has not had much grassroots experience and so has found it more difficult to appropriately contextualise the process.

Neither ZOE's *church mobilisation* process or the diocese of North Kigezi's *household mobilisation* process sought to train staff.

### 3.4.2. Training of volunteer facilitators

#### *Number of people trained*

- 5 = Organisational change
- 4 = Church mobilisation
- 3 = Church and community mobilisation
- 2 = Community mobilisation
- 1 = Household mobilisation

#### *Quality of training*

- 5 = Church and community mobilisation
- 4 = Community mobilisation
- 3 = Household mobilisation
- 2 = Church mobilisation
- 1 = Organisational change

Volunteers are people who are not employees of the programme but give significant time to helping to facilitate the process.

The *organisational change* model, using a cascade approach to delivering training, has the capacity to train thousands of volunteers. Project Gilgal has remarkably trained well over 3,500 volunteer facilitators. It has been able to do so by the consultant training four KHC staff, who have in turn trained several hundred trainer of trainers at zonal level, who have then trained several thousand church pastors, who will then train their congregations. This approach is only possible where the diocese/ district or denomination have fully bought into the process and are prepared to resource it in terms of finances, time and energy. The momentum for such a huge training programme can best result from an *organisational change* process. The weakness with this approach is that the quality of training tends to reduce the further down the chain it goes, and the important adult learning approaches used in the higher level training settings tend to be replaced by more didactic and less effective styles closer to the grassroots. The process provides quantity, but not necessarily quality.

The *church and community mobilisation* model invests a huge amount of time in its key volunteer facilitators (known as "disciples"), training them to the same level as the programme staff. In the pilot stage the consultant works first hand with them; in future stages, it will be experienced staff. Excellent opportunities are provided for learning, action and reflection. The weakness with this is that this team is by necessity reasonably small (in PAG Soroti's case, 15), and the time demands that such a high quality of training requires can be close to excessive. This model also trains up others (6 church and community owned resource persons per community; approximately 20 information gathering team members per community), but to date this training has been at a relatively low level.

The *community mobilisation* model trains its community owned resource persons (CORPs) in the same way as the *church and community mobilisation* model trains its "disciples". The process is shorter as they are not being trained in facilitating the local church, but it is still a lengthy and demanding process.

The ZOE *church mobilisation* model trains area volunteer co-ordinators to envision and train church pastors so that they envision their congregations. By keeping the training simple and focussed, ZOE have been able to develop 32 area co-ordinators, who have now trained and envisioned over 191 local church pastors. The training does not touch on some of the more difficult issues (e.g. community participation), but by keeping it simple it has made it much easier for the training to be replicated.

The *household mobilisation* programme trains the parish development committees in PRA and in doing household visits, and the two staff regularly visit to provide support and to model good practice. Although the number of people being trained is relatively small – approximately 5-6 people per community - the quality of the training they receive is presumably quite high given the amount of staff time invested.

## 3.5. Long-term impact of model

### 3.5.1. Sustainability

- 5 = Community mobilisation
- 4 = Church and community mobilisation
- 3 = Church mobilisation
- 2 = Household mobilisation
- 1 = Organisational change



In terms of impact on existing communities, the *community mobilisation* model is the most sustainable model. The model's focus on building the capacity of independent community structures to manage, implement and monitor its own development initiatives is very important, and the NIDP process suggests that the model is effective in doing so. It is also highly effective at establishing high levels of ownership of the community in their own development, and a commitment to "doing things for ourselves".

The *church and community mobilisation* model is also sustainable for the same reasons, as it follows a similar process. However, there is a concern that by mobilising the local church first, the amount of community ownership in the process may reduce and with it the legitimacy of any community structures resulting from the process. This needs to be carefully monitored over the next 2-3 years.

The *church mobilisation* model is sustainable because from the outset participating churches are encouraged to take full responsibility for the process and not be reliant on ZOE for financial or administrative support. If ZOE was to close, almost all the churches would be able to continue with their programmes. There is high ownership within the churches, too. They are motivated because of a conviction to act, not because there is any external funding available.

With the *household mobilisation* model, there is evidence to suggest that changes made by households during the process are maintained afterwards. However, it is not clear whether households and communities continue to initiate new changes. This needs to be explored. The longer-term sustainability of the North Kigezi programme may be limited by the fact that it is very reliant on two experienced staff, who have not trained anyone else in being able to do their work.

The impact of the *organisational change* model has the potential to be sustainable as it seeks to help the church become much more effective in achieving its mission. However, the Project Gilgal process highlights some of the challenges of such an approach. For the impact of such an enormous programme as Project Gilgal to be sustainable there needs to be whole-hearted commitment to the process amongst the senior church leadership, and even if this is initially gained it can be difficult to sustain over a long time period and when change ends up challenging the power dynamics of the church. One of the consequences of this is that Project Gilgal is heavily reliant on the Training Team of just four staff, and thus its sustainability is highly questionable, as the Training Team are over-worked and feel under-valued. At grassroots level, it is questionable how sustainable the process is. The training has created an initial enthusiasm, but has not adequately addressed the need for community owned initiatives and community owned structures that are essential if there is going to be long-term and sustainable impact.

### 3.5.2. Replicability and reach

#### *Replicability*

- 5 = Church and community mobilisation
- 4 = Church mobilisation
- 3 = Community mobilisation
- 2 = Household mobilisation
- 1 = Organisational change

#### *Reach*

- 5 = Organisational change
- 4 = Church and community mobilisation
- 3 = Church mobilisation
- 2 = Community mobilisation
- 1 = Household mobilisation

The *organisational change* model is based on enabling a one-off fundamental change of the whole organisation, and therefore the process itself is not designed to be replicated. Various elements of the process, such as the training, are replicated, but not the process as a whole. This focus on changing the whole organisation leads it to having a far greater reach than any of the other models. A direct comparison between the *organisational change* process taking place in KHC and the *church and community mobilisation* process being undertaken by its Urban Ministries department makes this clear. Project Gilgal will influence all 5000 local KHC churches, whereas over the same period Urban Ministries will do well to work with any more than 50 churches. The differences in scale are huge.

The *church and community mobilisation* model is very well suited to enabling replication. By focussing on the diocesan/ district or national level of the church it helps to create ownership and commitment to the process amongst key decision-makers, ensuring that there is a momentum to carry the process forward beyond the pilot stage. The process also trains up a team of staff to replicate the process without reliance on outside facilitation, and this team is backed up by a team of volunteer facilitators. Although replication takes longer than with the *church mobilisation* model the long-term reach of the model is enormous. As the Analysis section shows, within 12 years the whole of the Soroti district of 240 communities could have gone through the *church and community mobilisation* process.

The ZOE *church mobilisation* model is one that is designed to enable fast and easy replication, and this is shown by the number of new churches (70) that began the process in 2002 alone. The process is simple, low-cost and can be facilitated by a team of coordinators spread throughout a large geographical area, thus enabling the programme to reach a large number of churches. It does not require large amounts of input from a consultant or a staff team, which is what creates bottlenecks for replication in the other models. However, a more complicated process, such as the one used by ESSA, significantly slows up the speed of replication.

The *community mobilisation* model does not lend itself so easily to replication. It trains up a staff team who are able to facilitate the process, but unlike the *church and community mobilisation* process, it does not train up a team of volunteer facilitators who are available to mobilise other communities. The CORPs tend to be community-specific, and so the process in new areas will heavily rely on the staff team. Also, as the model does not focus on the church structures, it is



more difficult for it to gain the commitment from church pastors and the diocese to replicate the process elsewhere. The situation in Narok illustrates this, for despite the extraordinary results from the programme, the diocese seem reluctant to replicate the process elsewhere.

The *household mobilisation* model does not lend itself to speedy replication due to its reliance on experienced development staff and the intensity of their inputs. For example, the diocese of North Kigezi only work with three churches in a three-year period.

### 3.6. Level of time inputs required

These are assessed on the basis of average time inputs per community, and the ranking scores 5 for least time-intensive and 1 for most time-intensive.

	Staff	Consultancy	Volunteer Facilitators	Local Church	Community Gatherings
Organisational change	5	3	5	2	5
Church mobilisation	4	5	4	3	5
Community mobilisation	3	2	3	5	1
Household mobilisation	2	5	2	5	3
Church and community mobilisation	1	1	1	1	2

Although the *organisational change* model places by far the largest demands on staff time of any model – indeed twice the amount of any other model to get to the same stage of church and community action – its scope is so large, that per community it works out as by far the least time-intensive process. The same is also true of the time demands it places on its volunteer facilitators. Taken as a whole the time demands are enormous (a rough estimate of about 108,000 volunteer days), but per community the time input becomes relatively small (22 days per community). The model is heavily reliant on external consultancy, and yet once again, per community the amount of time becomes negligible (less than an hour of consultancy per community!) Each local church has to give approximately 10 days for training workshops, but there are no time-demands on the community.

The *church mobilisation* process is also less time-intensive than most of the models. It does not rely on external consultancy; with the ZOE model, staffing is kept down to a minimum; the demands on volunteer facilitators are kept fairly small; and while there may be up to five training workshops for churches there are none for the community.

The *household mobilisation* model requires greater time-intensity of some roles than others. It does not rely on external consultancy or on church or community gatherings. However, in terms of the time-demands it places on staff (approximately 345 days per community) and on its volunteer facilitators (the village development committees – approximately 450 days per community) it is more intensive than any model other than the *church and community mobilisation* model.

The *community mobilisation* model places significant time-demands on everyone but the church. On average, each community requires 201 staff days, 22 consultancy days, and 225 volunteer facilitator days, as well as 15 days of community gatherings. This is a significant amount of input. It is not a surprise that the process most focussed on community participation should require the largest amount of community time. The employment of two consultants has improved the training of the staff and volunteer facilitators, but clearly increases the consultancy time demands of the process. As the model bypasses the local church, there is no need for church gatherings as part of the process.

The most time-intensive model per community is the *church and community mobilisation* model. On average, each community requires 479 staff days, 85 consultancy days, and 1139 volunteer facilitator days, as well as 15 days for church workshops and 10 days of community gatherings. This is a very large amount of input. The staff inputs are high due to the complicated and thorough nature of the process, which seeks to work at a number of different levels within the church before the process even reaches the community. The consultancy inputs are particularly high due to employing three consultants, although one of these was a trainee consultant. In Ruaha, only two consultants have been employed, reducing this figure by a third. And the volunteer facilitator inputs are high because of training a larger variety of roles than any other model – volunteer facilitators, church pastors, CCRPs and Information Gathering Team members.

### 3.7. Cost

It is difficult to give an entirely accurate comparison of costs of the various programmes, as some partners include salary costs and others do not, some figures are based on budget forecasts and others on actual spending, and some budgets are just components of a larger budget of which this programme is only a part. A truly accurate comparison requires a lot

more detailed work than is within the scope of this report, but a rough guide can be obtained by combining this section with the Time Inputs section above. The costs for each of the models are based on the expenditure involved in working with the local church or community from nothing up to the point where it has established its own independent development structures.

The rankings are based on 5 being least expensive and 1 being most expensive.

#### Overall programme cost

- 5 = Household mobilisation
- 4 = Church mobilisation
- 3 = Church and community mobilisation
- 2 = Community mobilisation
- 1 = Organisational change

#### Cost per community

- 5 = Organisational change
- 4 = Church mobilisation
- 3 = Community mobilisation
- 2 = Household mobilisation
- 1 = Church and community mobilisation

The Diocese of North Kigezi *household mobilisation* programme is the cheapest overall programme, but this is due to working with only three communities. Per community, the process becomes relatively expensive (£7,500).

The ZOE *church mobilisation* programme, for a relatively small amount of investment, impacts a large number of communities, and is significantly less expensive per community than three of the other models (£337).

The Soroti PAG *church and community mobilisation* programme is not surprisingly expensive given the high amount of time inputs required in the process. Although the overall cost of the programme is similar to a number of other models, as it is only working with a few communities, the cost per community is much higher than any other model (£9,336)

The NIDP *community mobilisation* programme is just fractionally more expensive as an overall programme than that being run in Soroti. However, per community, the cost of the programme is almost half the amount, and gives excellent value (£4,721).

The Project Gilgal *organisational change* programme is by far the most expensive overall programme, costing £335,141, almost six times the amount of the next most expensive model. However, as with the time inputs, the huge reach of the programme, affecting 5000 churches and their communities, means that the cost per community is by far the cheapest of any of the models (£67).

## 3.8. The length of the process and its risk of failure

### 3.8.1. Length of the process with each community

The ranking is based on 5 being the shortest process and 1 being the longest process.

- 5 = Church mobilisation
- 4 = Community mobilisation
- 3 = Church and community mobilisation
- 2 = Household mobilisation
- 1 = Organisational change

The ZOE *church mobilisation* model is by the far speediest process, with churches taking between 3 months to a year to complete the process and be independently initiating and managing their own community projects. The *community mobilisation* model takes about 18 months to get to a stage where community structures are sufficiently established for them to be taking independent action and managing and monitoring their own initiatives. The *church and community mobilisation* model takes approximately 30 months to reach the same point, as working with the church structures and the local church can add up to a year to the process. The *household mobilisation* process takes approximately three years before the development staff cease their involvement in the community. By far the longest process is the *organisational change* model. Project Gilgal has so far taken seven years, and may well require another two to three years before it is at the stage where church or community initiatives are started and managed in a coherent and sustainable way.

### 3.8.2. Risk of failure

The ranking is based on 5 being the lowest risk and 1 being the highest risk model.

- 5 = Household mobilisation
- 4 = Church mobilisation
- 3 = Community mobilisation
- 2 = Church and community mobilisation
- 1 = Organisational change

The *organisational change* model involves significant risk. The length of the process, the potential challenge to existing power structures, and the difficulties of achieving and retaining organisational ownership of the process are just some of the factors that make this model the highest risk of the models. When the process fails, as it did in the Diocese of Mundri, there may well be very little to show for the high level of investment in the process.

The *church and community mobilisation* model also involves risk as it too involves working with the church structures and runs the risk of being sidelined by both diocesan/district and local church agendas. However, even if the programme is not replicated elsewhere within the church, within the pilot communities there will be at least some evidence of change.

The other models do not involve high levels of risk. The *community mobilisation* programme has established a good track record, and even if there is little replication, the pilot communities will certainly benefit from the process. The ZOE *church mobilisation* programme involves little risk as the churches do not need to rely heavily upon ZOE for their work, and because such large numbers of churches are coming on board, the process can cope with the failure of a few churches that fail to fully understand or engage with the process. And the *household mobilisation* model is low risk because it is closely managed by development staff, and because it works at an individual level, it does not tend to threaten community or church power structures.

### 3.9. Tabular comparisons

Appendices 1-5 provide further comparisons of the models and the 11 programmes in tabular form.

*Appendix 1* compares the total inputs of each programme up to the establishment of independent community development structures.

*Appendix 2* compares the inputs per community of each programme to reach this stage.

*Appendix 3* compares the scope of each programme, in terms of who was directly worked with during the process.

*Appendix 4* compares the impact of the programmes to date on the church and the community.

*Appendix 5* summarises the ranking scores of this section in one table.

## 4. Conclusions

### 4.1 The organisational change model

The *organisational change* model, when effective, can have a significant impact upon church structures at all levels, building its capacity and motivation to respond to the needs of the poor. It can have a huge potential impact because it works with the entire organisation, rather than just a part of it. Although an expensive model, it provides good value for money per community, because its reach is so large.

However, it is a very high risk model, with no guarantees that the process will get as far as impacting the local grassroots churches. Even if change is brought about at this level, the amount of community change may well be limited given the top-down nature of the process. The model may well lead to change occurring in many communities, but the changes may well be superficial and unsustainable in the long-term.

The model is appropriate in situations where the organisation lacks the vision, capacity or structures to implement community mobilisation or church and community mobilisation programmes.

### 4.2. The church mobilisation model

The *church mobilisation* model, if based on the ZOE model, provides a cost effective and low-risk response to specific poverty issues where basic care can make a significant impact. Without large outlay of time or resources, a remarkable number of church volunteers can be mobilised to respond to basic poverty issues in the community.

This model does not lend itself to more integrated approaches to addressing poverty, nor does it encourage good development practice, in that there is very limited needs identification or community participation and ownership.

However, as one of a range of approaches to address a crisis as large as, for example, the HIV/AIDS epidemic in southern Africa, it is very valuable.

### 4.3. The household mobilisation model

The *household mobilisation* model provides a low-risk and very focussed approach to addressing poverty. It brings about significant attitudinal and lifestyle changes amongst the poor, and provides useful skills training for village development committees.

However, the model has virtually no impact upon the church, it is heavily reliant on skilled staff, and it is very limited in its scope, working with only a handful of communities at a time.

The model is best used alongside other programmes, and used in contexts where community mobilisation processes have failed to engage a number of the poorest households in the community.

#### **4.4. The community mobilisation model**

The *community mobilisation* model brings about significant change in communities over a relatively short time period. Of all the models, per community, it has the greatest impact. It is based on sound development principles, and ensures outcomes from the process are community initiated and community owned, and that the changes brought about are sustainable. Per community, it provides excellent value for money. It is a time-intensive process, but this at least helps to develop the skills and capacity of local people. Even though the actual process is not particularly holistic, the results are, and surprisingly, of all the models, this model has led to the greatest church growth.

#### **4.5. The church and community mobilisation model**

The *church and community mobilisation* model leads to significant changes in attitudes and practice at both local and diocesan/district church levels, and has an impact on the community second only to the *community mobilisation* model. The model provides excellent training for programme staff and volunteer facilitators, ensuring that the skills are present for further replication of the process in new communities. The emphasis on gaining wider church understanding and support for the process ensures that there is a readiness to replicate the programme beyond the pilot stage.

However, the model is costly (the most expensive per community) and places huge time demands on all concerned, including consultants, staff and volunteer facilitators. There is also concern that the initial focus on the church may impede effective community mobilisation and may not sufficiently change the attitudes of the local church.

If these concerns are adequately answered, then the *church and community mobilisation* process should become the main model adopted by Tearfund partners. If not, the *community mobilisation* model is a highly effective alternative model.

## **5. Recommendations**

### **5.1. General recommendations**

#### **5.1.1. It is recommended that the East and Southern Africa Team continue to support church-based community mobilisation programmes.**

The evidence from this initial overview report is that such programmes are good value for money, build the capacity of local staff, prompt significant church growth, and lead to major impact upon the lives of poor communities, both in the short and long term.

#### **5.1.2. It is recommended that Tearfund continues to enhance its unique position in this field by supporting further research and learning.**

Tearfund's evangelical beliefs and commitment to holistic ministry places it in a unique position of influence with many churches in the East and Southern Africa region. Through further research and the sharing of learning it can help to develop a best practice approach to church-based community development work that could have a significant impact throughout the entire region.

### **5.2. Further research**

This report gives an initial overview of a number of models of church-based community mobilisation programmes. There are some outstanding questions that arise which should be researched and answered if the East and Southern Africa team is to have full confidence in the promotion and the support of this approach to development.

#### **5.2.1. It is recommended that further research is done into the church and community mobilisation model, involving learning reviews and evaluations of key partners**

The *church and community mobilisation* model needs to be closely monitored and studied. There is good evidence to suggest that a *community mobilisation* model produces significant results, but since MUD and NIDP, there has been a move away from this approach to a *church and community mobilisation* model. However, it is still not clear whether such a model is effective. This model needs to be researched further in terms of:

- What impact is it having on the pilot communities?
- What impact is it having on the pilot churches?
- Is it being replicated elsewhere in the diocese/ district?
- How does church mobilisation influence community mobilisation? Does it distort the focus of the programme? Does it make community ownership and empowerment less likely?

PAG Soroti and the Diocese of Ruaha should be more closely examined, with a view to answering these questions.

Questions have been raised as to whether the model is workable in areas of instability. The work of PAG Soroti and ACROSS in Yei, Sudan, should help to answer this question, and should be assessed. The ACROSS programme will also help to test whether the programme is workable in very remote and isolated areas.

The Urban Ministries' Church and Community Mobilisation for Development programme, which began earlier this year, also needs to be closely monitored and studied throughout the course of its pilot period. This programme is particularly important as it is the only programme so far with a specifically urban focus. Its approach to community mobilisation, through the use of self-help groups, is also a new approach and needs to be learned from.

**5.2.2. It is recommended that the evaluation of Project Gilgal in 2004 should seek to identify the quantity and quality of change at grassroots level.**

The cost of this model can only be justified if it achieves significant change at local community level. Important questions that need to be asked include:

- How many local KHC churches have been impacted by the process?
- How many church initiatives and community initiatives have been started?
- How sustainable and appropriate are these initiatives?
- Are the poorest in the communities being impacted?

In addition it is essential that the lessons from Project Gilgal are written up in a form that can be used by other churches going through a similar *organisational change* process.

**5.2.3. It is recommended that a learning review be made of ZOE's work, so that its ability to expand rapidly with minimum inputs can be understood and communicated with other partners.**

ZOE's growth is remarkable, and learning the lessons from this may well help other partners such as ESSA to improve the reach and effectiveness of their programmes.

**5.2.4. It is recommended that the Diocese of North Kigezi household mobilisation model is researched and written up in more detail.**

There is very little written up on this model at present. As the partner does not seek funding for this aspect of its work, it has no written proposals about the work, and there are no reports or evaluations. However, the model provides an important alternative to some of the larger-scale approaches, and could help to influence and inform the work of other partners.

**5.2.5. It is recommended that a cost analysis is done of other development models being used by Tearfund partners in East and Southern Africa.**

It is difficult to say with certainty that church-based community mobilisation models are effective and good value for money until compared with other programmes.

**5.3. Support to the East and Southern Africa Team**

**5.3.1. It is recommended that the East and Southern Africa Team (particularly Desk Officers and Regional Advisers) receive further input on the various models of church-based community mobilisation.**

As a significant plank in the Regional Team's strategy, it is important that the Team understands the strengths and weaknesses of the various models, so that they are able to plan appropriately and realistically, and so that they are able to communicate this learning with partners.

**5.3.2. It is recommended that an assessment tool is developed for Desk Officers and Regional Advisers, based on the learning from this report, which helps them to analyse proposals and reports, and set the terms of reference for evaluations, based on the key factors for each of these models.**

This assessment tool would take the form of a list of key questions to be asked of the various levels of each programme, and would also include indicators to look out for that might suggest a programme is struggling.

**5.4. Sharing learning**

**5.4.1. It is recommended that the various consultants, regional advisers and key partners are brought together to review learning from the various models.**

Learning lessons from other models will help to inform the work they are already doing, and help them to become aware of common pitfalls and challenges in the process that they may encounter.

**5.4.2. It is recommended that the community mobilisation model and the church and community mobilisation model are written up in the form of handbooks that can be used by consultants and partners.**

At present, the *church and community mobilisation* model and the *community mobilisation* model are very dependent on Francis Njoroge. There is a need to train up more consultants and also to capture in writing the essence, and the step-by-step detail, of the process. Handbooks should be written for consultants, programme staff and volunteer facilitators. These handbooks should be flexible and loose-leaf, so that they can be changed and amended as further lessons are learnt and the process refined.

**5.4.3. It is recommended that the next Regional Partner Workshop should include a review of the church-based community mobilisation models.**

This will help to give partners a vision for what is possible, and stimulate them to adopt similar approaches.



## Appendix 1

### Inputs up to the establishment of independent community development structures

Model	Partner <sup>1</sup>	Number of communities	No of years to get to this stage	No of staff	Staff Days @ 230 days per year	Consultants Total days	Volunteer Facilitators' Total Days	Church Day Workshops per comm.	Community Gatherings Total Days	Approx. Cost
Org. Change	Gilgal KHC	5000 <sup>2</sup>	7	4	6440 <sup>3</sup>	300	108,000 <sup>4</sup>	10 <sup>5</sup>	0	£335,141 <sup>6</sup>
Church Mob.	ZOE <sup>7</sup>	70 <sup>8</sup>	1 <sup>9</sup>	3	690	0	1600 <sup>10</sup>	5 <sup>11</sup>	0	£23,625 <sup>12</sup>
Church Mob.	ESSA	15	1	5	1150	0	180 <sup>13</sup>	6	0	£55,899 <sup>14</sup>
Comm Mob.	MUD	7	1.5	2	690	240	3150 <sup>15</sup>	0	15	£54,111 <sup>16</sup>
Comm Mob.	Narok	12	1.5	7	2415	268	2700 <sup>17</sup>	0	15	£56,650 <sup>18</sup>
Ch+Comm Mob.	Soroti	6	2.5	5	2875	510 <sup>19</sup>	6832 <sup>20</sup>	15	10	£56,019 <sup>21</sup>
Ch+Comm Mob.	Ruaha	7	2.5	5	2875	340	5608 <sup>22</sup>	15	10	£84,117 <sup>23</sup>
Household Mob.	N. Kigezi	3	3	1.5	1035	0	432 <sup>24</sup>	0	0	£22,500 <sup>25</sup>

## Appendix 2

### Inputs per community up to the establishment of independent community development structures

Model	Partner and number of communities	Time to get to this stage (years)	Staff Days	Consultants Total days	Volunteer Facilitators' Total Days	Church Workshops Total Days	Community Gatherings Total Days	Approx. Cost
Org. Change	Gilgal KHC (5000)	7	1.3	0.06	22	10	0	£67
Church Mob.	ZOE (70)	1	10	0	23	5	0	£337
Church Mob.	ESSA (15)	1	77	0	12	6	0	£3,726
Comm Mob.	MUD (7)	1.5	98	34	450	0	15	£7,730
Comm Mob.	Narok (12)	1.5	201	22	225	0	15	£4,721
Ch+Comm Mob.	Soroti (6)	2.5	479	85	1139	15	10	£9,336
Ch+Comm Mob.	Ruaha (7)	2.5	410	49	801	15	10	£12,016
Household Mob.	N. Kigezi (3)	3	345	0	450	0	0	£7,500

## Appendix 3

### Scope: Who the programmes directly work with

	National Denom/ NGO	National Dev./NGO Department	Diocesan/ District Church	Diocesan/ District Dev Dept	Deanery/ Sub-District Church	Deanery/ Sub-District Dev Dept	Volunteer Facilitators	Local Church	Community Owned Resource Persons	Village Government	Community
Across	Across Board	<b>6 staff</b>	<b>4 denominations</b>	-	-	-	<b>18</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>Not yet appointed</b>	Too early to say	6
ESSA	-	<b>5 staff</b>	-	-	-	-	<b>15 pastors</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1-2 per church</b>	-	15
Project Gilgal	HQ; Board; OD Team	<b>4 staff Training Team</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>	3,600 +	<b>5000</b>	-	-	-
North Kigezi	-	-	-	<b>2 staff</b>	-	-	-	-	<b>3 Dev Committees</b>	3 Dev Committees	3
MUD	-	-	<b>Bishop approval</b>	<b>2 staff</b>	-	-	-	-	<b>21</b>	7	7
Mundri	-	-	<b>Yes</b>	-	<b>Yes</b>	-	-	<b>Reps of pastors, MU and Youth</b>	-	-	-
NIDP	-	-	-	-	-	<b>7 staff</b>	-	-	<b>10</b>	Yes	4 areas 12 comm
Ruaha	-	-	<b>HQ+pastor workshop (60)</b>	<b>5 staff</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>15 deanery trainers</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>28</b>	Yes	7
Soroti	Informed & supportive	-	<b>HQ+pastor workshop (68)</b>	<b>5 staff</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>36</b>	Yes	6
Urban Min	-	<b>5 staff</b>	-	-	-	-	-	<b>8</b>	<b>80 church + 300 SHG reps</b>	-	8
ZOE	3 staff	-	-	-	-	-	<b>32 Co-ordinators</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>1013 volunteers</b>	-	40,000 orphans

## Appendix 4

### Comparison of impact to date of the programmes

	Health, Water and Sanitation	Income Generation Activities
ACROSS		
ESSA	10 HIV/ AIDS caring programmes run by local churches Plan for a 200 bed hospice to be built	
Project Gilgal	Clinic built by community (65% of cost raised locally + 500 people gave free labour) cutting typhoid, malaria and child mortality by 40% in four communities	<i>800 people involved in raising the funds for a 10,000-bush coffee project generating 1600 Birr p.a. 200 families begin income generation projects 40 women form a seasonal income generation project generating 20,000 Birr p.a</i>
N. Kigezi	Latrines improved, hand-washing & bathing shelters introduced	Village formed a credit scheme with 250 members – give loans and buy goats
MUD	2 dispensaries constructed	Coffee growing started Market stalls built
Mundri		
NIDP	3 dams were constructed 6 dams were de-silted The number of pit latrines and bathrooms increased There was an increase in the numbers of households boiling their milk and water 1 dispensary was built 36% reduction in the number of children suffering typhoid and diarrhoea	
Ruaha		Church members forming income generation groups
PAG Soroti		Community decided to take more control over market so that it benefits community rather than outsiders
Urban Min		
ZOE	1992 – 2001: 0 to 15000 orphans worked with 2002: 15,000 to 40,000 (167% growth)	Income generation training taking place

	<b>Education</b>	<b>Food Security</b>
ACROSS		
ESSA		
Project Gilgal	<i>A literacy project has grown to 1500 in six months, including 137 non-believers. 340 adults (50% female) attend literacy project 3 literacy + worship centres built (involving 1000 people's work) Student boarding house built (1200 contributed labour/materials)</i>	
N. Kigezi		Households take measures against soil erosion + plant trees Households start market gardens One woman reported 66% increase in harvest due to changes One woman reported now self-reliant on food + now able to afford to send 2 of her children to school
MUD	Repair of/ building school classrooms + teacher's houses	Grinding mill constructed 4 wells and water tanks constructed
Mundri		
NIDP	Over 800 more children in nursery and primary schools 33 classrooms, 3 kitchens and 7 teachers' houses constructed 3 new schools (nursery, primary and secondary) built 134 adults attending adult literacy classes All schools formed committees, and 16 of these were trained	100 households increased their acreage under food cultivation <i>2 communities and 11 farmers cleared land and put up fencing against wildlife</i> 306 kitchen gardens were established 105 food stores were built 56 cattle crashes built 6 farmers and 1 whole community began micro-irrigation schemes 75 households started to keep poultry 17 households practice agro forestry 18 paravets trained 5 farming groups formed
Ruaha		
PAG Soroti		
Urban Min		
ZOE		

	<b>Church Growth</b>	<b>Attitude Change</b>
ACROSS		
ESSA		No. of people in churches willing to acknowledge they are HIV+ has increased
Project Gilgal	The District Leadership in one District began a reconciliation initiative reaching out to the marginalised Menja and Faki tribes, who were treated as "sub-human" by all the other tribes in the area. Within a very short time, they had achieved full integration within the church, with 5000 people coming to faith, much to the shock of the surrounding community. Communities have started to change their attitudes towards the church, and support church initiatives because they have seen them to be successful	HQ leadership much more open to discuss and listen Zonal leaders more enthusiastic, open and facilitative District level leaders better at working together
N. Kigezi		One male reported he will now occasionally do the cooking to give his wife an evening off Pride and high self-esteem in communities
MUD	The number of Christians increased by 50% In one community the church has grown from 4 to 60 baptised members	<i>More aware of themselves (strengths, weaknesses, etc)</i> Desire to solve own problems by working together rather than by relying on outside help Community more united + more tolerant of each other Communities more positive about the future Greater willingness to give time/ resources to community initiatives
Mundri		Leadership keener to be self-reliant
NIDP	<i>The number of regular church attendees grew by approx. 93%</i> 200 people became Christians 8 new churches were built and at least 5 were rehabilitated 75% of the congregations started regular mid-week fellowships 39 local preachers and evangelists were trained Evangelism Committees were formed and took initiatives without relying on outside support 13 missions were held	
Ruaha	2 church buildings have been repaired	Pastors no longer believe in the physical/ spiritual dichotomy Lay people much more involved in the mission of the church than before
PAG Soroti	Church growth of 17%, 26% and 100% in churches evaluated Hunger and appreciation for studying the Bible Financial + in-kind offerings have increased dramatically	PAG now able to interact confidently with others Dev Dept now open to agenda being set by grassroots Church members see their role is to "give, not get" Community encourage monogamy to reduce poverty
Urban Min		
ZOE	<i>Most churches have seen an increase in church attendance and those becoming Christians.</i> The church is seen to be a caring community	



	<b>Road and Communication Improvements</b>	<b>Village Government Changes</b>
ACROSS		
ESSA		
Gilgal		
N. Kigezi		Dev Committees skilled and envisioned
MUD		All said were "better leaders": more skilled, more participative, better at planning Some ineffective governments were replaced Far greater comm. involvement in decision-making and implementation
Mundri		
NIDP	More than 4 of the 10 communities improved roads leading to their villages 2 communities built bridges to improve access to their villages 2 communities built new roads totalling a distance of 24km	<i>Community chiefs report that their task of provincial administration has become much easier as a result of communities becoming mobilised.</i>
Ruaha		
PAG Soroti		A corrupt leader was forced to pay back stolen funds when the community organised themselves and protested outside his house
Urban Min		
ZOE		

## Appendix 5: Ranking chart of the models

	Org Change	Church Mob	Comm Mob	Church + comm. mob	Household mob
<b>Development philosophy</b>	2	2	5	4	3
<i>Sub-section ranking</i>	2	2	5	4	3
<b>Community impact</b>					
Integrated Response	2	1	5	4	3
No. of target beneficiaries	4	5	3	2	1
Reaching the poorest	1	4	3	3	5
Community structures	2	2	5	4	3
Attitudinal changes	2	1	5	4	4
Addressing macro level	5	2	3	4	1
<i>Sub-section ranking</i>	2	1	5	4	3
<b>Church impact</b>					
Denominational change	5	3	2	4	1
Local church growth	3	2	5	4	1
Attitudinal change	4	3	2	5	1
<i>Sub-section ranking</i>	4	2	3	5	1
<b>Training</b>					
Training of staff	5	2	5	5	2
No. of volunteer facilitators trained	5	4	2	3	1
Quality of volunteer training	1	2	4	5	3
<i>Sub-section ranking</i>	4	2	4	5	1
<b>Long-term impact</b>					
Sustainability	1	3	5	4	2
Replicability	1	4	3	5	2
Reach	5	3	2	4	1
<i>Sub-section ranking</i>	2	4	4	5	1
<b>Time inputs</b>					
Staff	5	4	3	1	2
Consultancy	3	5	2	1	5
Volunteer facilitators	5	4	3	1	2
Local church	2	3	5	1	5
Community gatherings	5	5	1	2	3
<i>Sub-section ranking</i>	4	5	2	1	3
<b>Cost</b>					
Cost of overall programme	1	4	2	3	5
Cost per community	5	4	3	1	2
<i>Sub-section ranking</i>	3	5	2	1	4
<b>Length and risk</b>					
Length of process	1	5	4	3	2
Risk of failure	1	4	3	2	5
<i>Sub-section ranking</i>	1	5	4	2	4
<b>Overall ranking</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>

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<sup>1</sup> The Diocese of Mundri has not been included as it is difficult to identify any communities impacted by its organisational change process. ACROSS and Urban Ministries are not included as it is still too soon to assess the levels of input they require.

<sup>2</sup> This figure is based on KHC's figure of 5000 local KHC churches throughout Ethiopia. It assumes that every church will be impacted by Project Gilgal.

<sup>3</sup> Based on 4 full time staff over 7 years. Although the Training Team began in 2000, it seems reasonable to assume that in the preceding years the equivalent of 4 full-time staff were engaged in the development and initial implementation of the Organisational Change Plan

<sup>4</sup> A minimum of 3,600 zonal trainer of trainers and church pastors were trained in 3 modules, and then trained others. At approximately 5 days per module to be trained, and 5 days to train others, this works out at 30 days per person. 30 days X 3,600 people = 108,000 !

<sup>5</sup> Based on each church needing a minimum of 3 days training per module

<sup>6</sup> Based on Project Gilgal summary sheets for 1997-2003. This figure is likely to rise over the next couple of years as KHC seeks to support grassroots initiatives.

<sup>7</sup> ZOE has been using the church mobilisation model since 1992. It is a recent Tearfund partner so it has not been possible to trace the programme's development from its beginning. It needs to be borne in mind that this is an established project and unlike the other partners its initial start-up costs have not been taken into account.

<sup>8</sup> This figure is based on the 70 new churches that got involved with ZOE during 2002.

<sup>9</sup> One year is the maximum length of time it takes for a church to go from the beginning of the process to setting up its own independent initiatives.

<sup>10</sup> Based on ZOE's 32 volunteer area coordinators giving 1 day per week

<sup>11</sup> This is an estimate

<sup>12</sup> This is based on the 2002 budget during which year the number of churches involved with ZOE grew by 70 to 191.

<sup>13</sup> Based on 15 pastors attending the awareness and training seminar 12 times a year

<sup>14</sup> Based on 2003-4 budget

<sup>15</sup> 21 CORPs (3 per community) gave approximately 150 each over the period of the process

<sup>16</sup> Based on PEP summary sheets from April 1998 – June 2000 (the date of the evaluation). The figure does not include the cost of building houses for the two staff or the evangelism costs for the programme.

<sup>17</sup> 10 community facilitators gave approximately 150 each. Also, 4 Information Gathering Teams, with approximately 20 people in each, gave 15 days each to the process.

<sup>18</sup> Based on PEP costs from 2000-2. This figure does not include the budgeted costs for the three year strategic plan for ongoing mobilisation and capacity building within the communities of £60,790

<sup>19</sup> 170 days of consultancy x 3 consultants

<sup>20</sup> 15 facilitators x approximately 200 days; 68 pastors attending 2 one-week workshops; 36 CCRPs x approx 30 days; 120 IGTs x approx 15 days

<sup>21</sup> Based on summary sheet budgets for 2001-4

<sup>22</sup> 15 facilitators x approximately 120 days; 32 pastors attending 2 one-week workshops; 42 CCRPs x approx 30 days; 140 IGTs x approx 15 days

<sup>23</sup> Based on 2002-4 budget

<sup>24</sup> It is estimated that 6 members of the Parish Development Committee give 2 days a month to the process over the 3-year period.

<sup>25</sup> This is based on 1.5 salaries @ £5,000 p.a. for three years